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The fundamental question, which the notion of fair trial rights imposes is to what 
extent can a trial be fair to those accused of the most heinous crimes affecting the 
whole of humanity?  
In attempting to find an answer, this dissertation explores the general human rights 
instruments, the Rome Statute and the selected case law at the ICC; including six 
judgments Lubanga, Katanga, Bemba, Gbagbo, Ble Goude and Ntaganda. The 
dissertation therefore sought, on the one hand, to assess the extent to which fair trial 
principles have been applied in case law and secondly, to assess in light of the growing 
jurisprudence of the ICC, to what extent one can say that fair trial rights are protected 
at the ICC, given the competing demands of the international community, the victims 
of the most serious crimes under international law, and the accused. 
The dissertation is testing a proposition: The International Criminal Court, as a 
criminal court, should have the realistic but defensible focus of ending impunity via an 
accused-centred procedural regime that also, but not primarily, gives content and 
effect to the other competing interests of victim’s rights and the demands of the 
international community. 
The dialectical tensions between the rights of the accused, the participation of 
victims and the interests of the international community are explored through the case 
law analysis.  
The Rome Statute as the founding instrument of the ICC projects the ICC (wrongly) 
as primarily a human rights court with a broad mandate to end impunity and enhance 
world peace. In reality, the ICC is, of course, a criminal court with one paramount task: 
to determine, via fair criminal trials, whether accused persons are guilty of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
It is argued that more emphasis or at least a balanced approach should be applied 
between the interests of victims and those of the accused. In many instances (as 
illustrated in this dissertation) the court has unfortunately not succeeded in protecting 
the fair trial rights of the accused nor ensured that there is equality of arms within trial 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of universal justice. That 
is the simple and soaring hope of this vision. We are close to its realization. We will do our 
part to see it through till the end. We ask you [...] to do yours in our struggle to ensure that 
no ruler, no State, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity. 
Only then will the innocents of distant wars and conflicts know that they, too, may sleep 
under the cover of justice; that they, too, have rights, and that those who violate those rights 
will be punished.”1 
 
1 1 Introduction and background 
The States that are parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(“Rome Statute”) are those sovereign States that have ratified or acceded to this treaty 
that established the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The ICC is the first 
permanent, treaty-based international criminal court established to help end impunity 
for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community. On 17 July 1998, the international community reached a historic milestone 
when 120 States adopted the Rome Statute, which forms the legal basis for 
establishing the permanent ICC.2  
The Rome Statute was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome on 17 July 
1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002. Currently, the Rome Statute has 139 
signatories and 122 states are states parties thereto, including all of South America, 
nearly all of Europe, most of Oceania and roughly half the countries in Africa.3 South 
Africa signed the Rome Statute on 17 July 1998 and ratified it on 27 November 2000.4 
                                                          
1 The statement of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the International Bar Association in New 
York on 11 June 1997. See United Nations: Meetings, Coverage and Press Releases 
“International Criminal Court Promises Universal Justice, Secretary-General tells International 
Bar Association (12 June 1997) Office of Legal Affairs – United Nations Press Release 
SG/SM/6257 <http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm> (accessed 25-07-2017). 
2 ICC “About the ICC” (2002) International Criminal Court <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx> (accessed 
25-07-2017). 
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010) 2187 UNTS 90. 
4 ICC “State Parties to the Rome Statute” (undated) International Criminal Court 
<https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20ro





The ICC has jurisdiction to adjudicate over individuals accused of the international 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. The 
temporal jurisdiction of the Court is also limited by Article 11 to crimes occurring after 
the entry into force of the Statute, namely 1 July 2002.5 With respect to states that 
become party to the Statute after 1 July 2002, the ICC has jurisdiction only over crimes 
committed after the entry into force of the Statute with respect to that state. 
The ICC is set apart from similar tribunals by virtue of the complementarity regime 
between national and ICC jurisdictions. Complementarity allows states to take 
ownership of the international criminal justice process by performing the investigations 
and prosecutions themselves unless they are unwilling or genuinely unable to do so. 
Therefore, the ICC gives preference to domestic courts if these are willing and capable 
of conducting fair trials.6  
Due to the broad authority of the ICC, many expectations were created by the 
establishment and implementation of this court, as it offered the promise of a leveller 
international playing field for justice.7 In the pursuit of the promise of justice, particularly 
universal justice, it is imperative to ensure that adequate protection of the rights of the 
accused as enumerated in the Rome Statute is realised together with the expectations 
of victims and the international community. 
 
1 2  Research problem and rationale 
In understanding the establishment and significance of the ICC, it is important to 
understand the history that gave rise to the establishment of this court. The history is 
also important for understanding the development of international criminal law. In 
1945, the International Military Tribunals for Nuremberg and Tokyo were established 
to prosecute high-ranking German and Japanese officials accused of crimes under 
                                                          
5 A different temporal jurisdictional regime applies to the crime of aggression, as defined in art 
8bis of the Rome Statute. This is so because the crime of aggression only became part of the 
effective jurisdiction of the ICC on 17 July 2018, when the package of amendments to the 
Rome Statute adopted at the Kampala Review Conference of 2010, entered into force. See 
Res ICC-ASP/16/res.5 <https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP16/ICC-
ASP-16-Res5-ENG.pdf>.  
6 M du Plessis & L Stone The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court in African Countries (2008) 4. 
7 Human Rights Watch “The Court of Last Resort” (29 June 2012) Human Rights Watch 





international law.8 In 1950, The United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) 
unanimously affirmed the so-called Nuremberg Principles that emanated from the 
legal frameworks and jurisprudence of the post-war tribunals.9 The Nuremberg legacy 
extended beyond the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and the adoption of the Principles. 
For instance, the Nuremberg jurisprudence on persecution as a crime against 
humanity, and the tireless efforts of the Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin to have included 
“genocide” as a discrete crime against humanity in the indictments of the major 
accused persons at Nuremberg eventually led to the adoption of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948.10 Further, the 
criminalisation of violations of international humanitarian law as war crimes in the 
Nuremberg Charter was codified and further developed in the four Geneva 
Conventions of1949.11 The Geneva Conventions require State parties to bring persons 
alleged to have committed or ordered to commit “grave breaches” of humanitarian law, 
regardless of their nationality, to trial before a national court or, if possible, before an 
international tribunal.12 
In response to massive human rights violations in the Balkans, an International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) was created in 1993. A similar 
tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), was created the 
following year and in response to the genocide and massive human rights violations 
in that country. The United Nations Security Council created these tribunals.13  
In 1994, the UNGA created an ad hoc committee to investigate the establishment 
of a permanent international criminal court. It was through this process that the ICC 
was created.14 The ICC and the ad hoc tribunals are comparable as they are all created 
by a Statute and have very similar processes as well as, so a significant extent, the 
                                                          
8 M Caianiello & G Illuminati “From the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia to the International Criminal Court” (2000) 26 NC J Int'l L & Com Reg 407 413. 
9 Nuremberg Principles, UNGAOR, 5th session, Supp No 12, UN Doc. A/1316 (1950).  
10 78 UNTS 277.  
11 75 UNTS 31 (GCI); 75 UNTS 85 (GCII); 75 UNTS 135 (GCIII); 75 UNTS 287 (GCIV).  
12 Caianiello & Illuminati (2000) NC J Int'l L & Com Reg 416-417. 
13 J Norton “The International Criminal Court, An informal overview Loyola University Chicago” 
(2011) 8 International Law Review 84. 
14 R Blattmann & K Bowman “A View from Within, Achievements and problems of the ICC” 6 





same substantive jurisdiction (with the crime of aggression added to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, thus making this court different from the ad hoc tribunals).15 
The Rome Statute16 in its preamble states that: “the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their 
effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by 
enhancing international co-operation”. Key fair trial principles are contained in Article 
67 of the Statute, which means that even though the nature of the crime is serious and 
affects communities instead of merely one person or persons, the accused is still 
entitled to the fairness of proceedings, which has to be adhered to from arrest to 
conviction within the ICC. Hence, the human rights of the accused person are of 
paramount importance, even though the Preamble of the Rome Statute is not explicit 
about this (compared to the emphasis which the Preamble put on the quest to end 
impunity and the rights of victims).17  
A challenge when prosecuting the most serious crimes of international concern; 
notably war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression, is the extent 
to which human rights of the accused are factored into the equation. A general point 
of departure is that every human being should always be treated fairly and humanely 
and with dignity. Within the context of the Rome Statute and its application to the trials 
at the ICC, the concept of fairness, particularly in relation to the rights of the accused, 
will be investigated in this study to establish the extent to which human rights have 
been afforded to the accused. The assumption is that the Rome Statute not only 
represents one of the boldest attempts by the international community to end impunity 
for the most serious crimes under international law but also serves as a normative 
roadmap for an emerging system of international criminal justice that is inclusive of fair 
trial rights. 
In this regard, Article 21 of the Rome Statute lays down the different sources of 
applicable law. In addition to the rules of evidence, procedure and the elements of 
crimes, the ICC can have recourse to the applicable treaties, principles and rules of 
international law. The ICC can apply human rights treaties, customary international 
                                                          
15 Caianiello & Illuminati (2000) NC J Int'l L & Com Reg 433. 
16 Entered into force 1 July 2002.  
17 For the full text of the Rome Statute of the ICC, see UN Doc.A/CONF. 183/9, International 





human rights law and general principles found in various legal systems. Moreover, 
Article 21(3) demands that the interpretation and application of the law, pursuant to 
this article, must be consistent with “internationally recognized human rights”.18 
The guarantee of the right to a free and fair trial is recognised in a number of 
international and regional human rights treaties. Human rights must, therefore, be 
weighed against the rights contained in the Rome Statute and the manner in which 
trials are conducted at the ICC. 
This study essentially deals with the challenges of individual responsibility within 
collective atrocities. The ICC was established to deal with the worst crimes under 
international law, but with individual responsibility as a means to achieve justice. The 
primary aim is, therefore, to analyse the dialectics inherent in the structure of the Rome 
Statute and evidenced by the emerging jurisprudence of the ICC. The dissertation will 
analyse some of the early cases and subsequent judgments that illustrates the 
tensions and contradictions flowing from demands by the international community for 
justice, expectations of fairness, and the relative novelty of a rather formalised role for 
victims in the ICC processes.  
While the crimes, by their nature, are often at the forefront of discussions about the 
role and function of the ICC, individual (fair trial) rights also come into play. The fair 
trial rights as enunciated in the Rome Statute includes the following: the right to legal 
advice, right to pre-trial disclosure, right to a speedy trial, right to silence and 
presumption of innocence. Fair trial rights further include the right to an independent 
and impartial tribunal, right to a fair hearing, right to public hearing, right to a hearing 
within a reasonable time, and the right to reasoned judgment.19  
In measuring fairness, the principle of equality of arms must be observed throughout 
the trial process. This means that both parties (principally the prosecution and the 
defence) are treated in a manner ensuring that they have a procedurally equal position 
during the course of the trial and are in an equal position to make their case. It means 
that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present its case, under 
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conditions that do not place it at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the opposing 
party.20  
In domestic criminal trials, where the prosecution has all the machinery of the state 
behind it, the principle of equality of arms is an essential guarantee of the right to 
defend oneself. This principle would be violated, for example, if the accused was not 
given access to the information necessary for the preparation of the defence, if the 
accused was denied access to expert witnesses, or if the accused was excluded from 
an appeal hearing where the prosecutor was present. The dissertation will investigate 
the application of the principle of equality of arms by the ICC. 
The right to a fair trial has gained international recognition via various instruments, 
for instance:  
 
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”): Article 14 (fair 
trial) and Article 15 (no retroactive penal laws).  
 The European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”): Article 6 (fair trial), Article 
7 (no punishment without law) and Protocol No. 7 (rights of accused persons). 
Another regional standard in Europe is the European Social Charter (fair trial 
rights under Articles 47 to 50).   
 The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (“ACHPR”): Article 7 (fair 
trial). Article 26 imposes a duty on state parties to guarantee the independence 
of the courts and allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate 
national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the African Charter.   
 
Various articles contained in the Rome Statute will also be analysed in great detail, 
specifically Articles 64, 66 and 67, which focus on the rights of the accused. Article 
64(2) gives the accused the right to a fair and expeditious trial. Article 66 particularly 
emphasises the principle that an accused person shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty. Article 67 guarantees various rights pertaining to an accused person 
and protecting the rights of the accused. 
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The dissertation analyses the jurisprudence of the ICC by using the fair trial and 
international human rights framework of analysis. At the time of writing, the ICC has 
delivered only a small number of final judgments. There have thus far been 28 cases 
before the Court, with some cases having more than one suspect. ICC judges have 
issued 34 arrest warrants. Thanks to cooperation from states, sixteen people have 
been detained in the ICC detention centre and have appeared before the Court. 
Fifteen people remain at large. Charges have been dropped against three people due 
to their deaths. ICC judges have also issued 9 summonses to appear. The judges 
have issued 8 convictions and three acquittals.21 
The dissertation will analyse not only the judgments on the merits but also relevant 
preliminary and pre-trial decisions and processes as set out in the theoretical 
framework espoused later in this chapter. Particular attention will also be paid to the 
important role of the Prosecutor in terms of the protection of the integrity and fairness 
of processes before the ICC.  
 
1 2 1 Victim’s rights 
In the same vein as the accused’s rights are contained in various international 
human rights instruments, so too are the rights of victims as set out below. 
The plight of victims is often described as the shock by the international community 
to crimes committed against victims often in the context of scenes of atrocities against 
civilian populations for example in countries like Syria or the Central African Republic. 
It is these scenes which leave us believing that those responsible should be held to 
account but on the other hand it also leaves us wondering about the rights of the 
victims and the impact of these atrocities on victims, their families and loved ones.22  
Victim’s rights became more prominent as early as WWII when the human rights of 
victims (in times of war and peace) were codified in numerous international 
instruments. These conventions, as listed hereunder impose a duty on the violating 
party to provide compensation for violations: 
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 In the context of armed conflict: 
(1)  the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; 
(2)  the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War; and  
(3)  Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention.23 
 
And in peacetime, the ICCPR expanded victims' rights. To this end, Article 2(3) 
provides that each State Party to the ICCPR undertakes to: 
 
(a)  ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognised are violated 
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed 
by persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b)  ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any 
other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to 
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c)  ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
 
While the ICCPR does not mandate a state party to pursue a specific course of 
action to remedy the violation of protected rights, the language of this provision clearly 
envisages that the remedy is effective, of a legal nature and enforceable. Significantly, 
the ICCPR renders the “act of State” defence inapplicable by ensuring the duty to 
provide a remedy regardless of whether the violations were committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity. This limitation is fundamental to ensuring that human 
rights and international humanitarian law violations are remedied since these acts are 
often committed only by states.24 
The European Court on Human Rights has interpreted two articles of the European 
Convention for the protection on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
prescribing victims’ rights in the criminal process: as found in Article 2, right to life, and 
Article 13, right to an effective remedy. The European Court has granted ownership of 
victims' rights in the criminal process to the direct victim of the violation. Furthermore, 
                                                          
23 M Cherif Bassiouni “International Recognition of Victims' Rights” (2006) 6 Hum Rts L Rev 
203 213-214. 
 





if the victim is dead or has consented to being, represented, the victim's next of kin 
may assert the victim's rights.25  
Further, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1965 (“ICERD”) also exemplifies an explicit requirement that States 
provide a remedy. This convention requires States Parties to: 
 
“assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the 
competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial 
discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this 
Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation 
or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.”26 
 
Since the 1980s, international human rights norms related to the prosecution of 
certain grave crimes have emerged as more victim-focused27. Despite the fact that 
many domestic legal systems in the world already prescribed victim participation in the 
criminal process, international human rights law initially conceived of prosecutions 
solely as a state duty to the public and not as a private right. These victim-focused 
prosecution norms establish that prosecutions are an essential component of the 
remedy states owe victims of certain grave crimes. Moreover, these norms began to 
recognise certain participatory rights of victims in criminal proceedings, other than as 
witnesses.28  
Since its inception, the United Nations has adopted two General Assembly 
resolutions dealing with the rights of victims:  
 
(i) the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power; and  
(ii) the 2006 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.  
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The focus of the former was on victims of domestic crimes, while that of the latter 
is on victims of international crimes; more particularly, gross violations of international 
human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law. The Victims’ 
Declaration has been described as "a reflection of the collective will of the international 
community to restore the balance between the fundamental rights of suspects and 
offenders, and the rights and interest of victims. The Victims’ Declaration has also 
become known as the Magna Carta for victims.29  
The Victims Declaration begins by offering a succinct definition of what it means to 
be a victim and then proposes four avenues of redress for victims: access to justice 
and fair treatment, restitution, compensation, and assistance. Bachrach opines that 
access to justice and fair treatment means that victims should be treated with 
“compassion and respect for their dignity” and furthermore, that they be entitled to 
“access to the mechanisms of justice and to prompt redress” for the harm that they 
have undergone.30 
Building from the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, requested its 
Special Rapporteur, Theo Van Boven, to provide a set of proposed basic principles 
relating to reparations for victims under international law. These became known as 
‘The Van Boven Principles’ and were continuously referred to during the numerous 
meetings that led to creating the ICC and primarily concerned the duty of every state 
under international law “to respect and to ensure respect for human rights and 
humanitarian law.”31 
The International Criminal Tribunals (ICTs) were created with the Victims 
Declaration partly in mind. Instead of creating ad hoc courts that would once again 
only concern themselves with the prosecution, the ICTY and ICTR were expected to 
fulfil their mandate while, to some extent, bearing in mind the victims' rights and 
concerns during the judicial process.32 
Specifically, Article 20 of the Statute of the ICTY (“ICTY Statute”) concerns the 
commencement and conduct of trial proceedings and affirms that “[t]he Trial 
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Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are 
conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect 
for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and 
witnesses.” The ICTY Statute also included a provision governing the conduct of 
criminal prosecutions in Article 22 which provided that the ICTY include "in its rules of 
procedure and evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses.”33  
 
1 2 2  The Rome Statute and the ICC – victim’s rights 
With this background to the development of victim’s rights in mind, The Preamble 
of the Rome Statute states that: 
 
“Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of 
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity” 
“Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the 
world, 
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole 
must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking 
measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.”  
 
The Rome Statute, therefore, states its support for the rights of victims which are 
mainly contained in Article 68 of the Statute and reparations are contained in Article 
75. The Rome Statute of the ICC allows for victims to participate in a legal capacity, 
not merely as witnesses or recipients of reparations throughout most stages of the 
accountability process, from the investigation stage through to the trial itself.34 
Article 15(3) of the Statute initiates the victim’s participation with their referring 
information to the prosecutor with the aim of initiating a preliminary examination of a 
certain situation, but they are not entitled to do this by themselves, which means that 
they cannot directly open an examination. The second stage of their participation 
involves making statements on the prosecutor's request to authorise the investigation.  
Article 19(3) stipulates that in the pre-trial stage, the victims can submit 
observations on jurisdiction and admissibility, but they may not challenge the latter. In 
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terms of Article 61 victims are allowed to attend the confirmation of charges hearing, 
make opening and closing statements, produce and participate in the examination of 
evidence, but they cannot press charges. 
In the trial stage, the victims may participate in a similar way as in the confirmation 
of charges hearing, but they cannot appeal against the judgment in terms of Article 81. 
Article 68 sets out the victim’s rights to participate in proceedings and therefore to 
exercise these rights, the victims need to ask permission from the Court, proving that 
their interests are affected by the concrete procedural act in which they would like to 
intervene. The Court shall only grant their participation if it is satisfied, not only that the 
victims’ interests are affected, but also that their intervention does not undermine the 
right of the accused to a fair trial. The Chamber also prescribes how their participation 
is to take place at each stage pursuant to article. 68(3). For instance, in order to 
question witnesses, the victim's legal representative has to submit in advance the 
questions they want to ask, and the Chamber will decide whether or not such questions 
are appropriate according to rule 91(2).35 
In this regard, Hon opines that: 
 
“the overwhelming function of the ICC is truth-finding, and victims, having experienced first-
hand the crimes at issue, are in a good position to help the ICC accomplish that mission. 
Granting victim’s, a larger participatory role also ensures that the ICC will address their 
concerns-not only for accountability but also for justice (both communal and individual) and 
reconciliation. As with much at the ICC, one of the drawbacks of this scheme is that the 
jurisprudence assessing and analysing the boundaries, scope, and modalities of victim 
participation is still developing and is therefore quite fluid.”36  
 
Therefore, through the case law chapters of this dissertation, the participation rights 
of victims and the development thereof will be reviewed against the fair trial rights of 
the accused. 
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1 3  Research question 
The fundamental question, which the notion of fair trial rights imposes, is to what 
extent can a trial be fair to those accused of the most heinous crimes affecting the 
whole of humanity? How does one even begin to seek an answer to such a question? 
In attempting to find an answer, this dissertation will look at the general human rights 
instruments, the Rome Statute and the selected case law. 
This dissertation seeks, on the one hand, to assess the extent to which fair trial 
principles have been applied in case law. Secondly, to assess in light of the growing 
jurisprudence of the ICC, to what extent one can say that fair trial rights are protected 
at the ICC, given the competing demands of the international community, the victims 
of the most serious crimes under international law, and the accused. 
In order to do so, the theoretical framework which will be employed will contain an 
analysis of the fair trial rights contained in human rights instruments as well as in the 
Rome Statute and its application in case law. In addition, the dissertation seeks to 
review how the court has addressed its balancing role of ensuring that the fair trial 
rights of the accused are justified and applied, given the often competing demands of 
the victims, prosecutor and the international community. 
 
1 4  Research methodology 
At the outset an explanation of the “dialectical tensions” in the title of the dissertation 
needs to be addressed in understanding the methodology employed herein.  
Dialectics considers all phenomena as being in movement, in the process of 
perpetual change. Generally speaking, dialectic is a mode of thought, or a philosophic 
medium, through which contradiction becomes a starting point for contemplation. As 
such, dialectic is the medium that helps us comprehend a world that is racked by 
paradox37. Dialectic has long been a rhetorical method of finding and presenting 
arguments to conduct and resolve disagreements. The late eighteenth century, 
however, saw a new use of the term: it became the theory of speculative antagonisms 
within things and concepts as well as the theory of finding and handling these 
contradictions. The main aim of modern metaphysical dialectics is being able to think 
                                                          







and sustain the logic of contradictions and develop means for their productive logical 
use.38  
Therefore, at the outset, the dissertation seeks to explore the assumed dialectical 
tensions between the rights of the accused, the rights of victims and the expectations 
of the international community on the decisions undertaken by the ICC. The focus of 
the dissertation is primarily on the rights of the accused, which does not discount the 
tensions inherent within the Rome Statute of affording rights to victims or the potential 
influence of the international community on the decisions of the court. The focus on 
the rights of the accused has largely been due to the fact that the ICC was initially set 
up to be seen as an international criminal court taking into account the human rights 
of all parties as well as satisfying the demands of the international community (states 
parties and civil society organisations). Textually (that is, a reading of the Rome 
Statute) as well as contextually (public opinion, activists’ expectations, the politics of 
the Assembly of States Parties and so on) one can note that the ICC is struggling to 
attend to all the legal positive and legal normative, aspirational and perceptional 
demands.  
The dissertation is testing a proposition: The International Criminal Court, as a 
criminal court, should have the realistic but defensible focus of ending impunity via an 
accused-centred procedural regime that also, but not primarily, gives content and 
effect to the other competing interests of victim’s rights and the demands of the 
international community. I am hesitant to label the interests and rights of victims as 
secondary, but the dissertation will test the proposition that important though they are, 
victims’ rights and the diverse interests of the international community could potentially 
detract from the primary purpose of the ICC, namely to prosecute those accused of 
the most heinous crimes and to end impunity. This being said, due to the many 
expectations placed on the ICC, the rights of the accused are in some instances 
compromised as the court itself is not adequately equipped to address all the 
competing interests within the appropriate human rights framework in a systematic 
way as was intended in the drafting of the Rome Statute and as set out in the rights 
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contained in the Statute. Taking into account the dialectic lens, the dissertation reviews 
the tensions through the case law, focusing mainly on the rights of the accused, in 
order to propose a potential solution to the “paradox” of the competing interests 
confronting the ICC. 
The research methodology employed is a combination of doctrinal and theoretical 
research methodology. Doctrinal research focuses on determining what the law is on 
a particular point. It involves locating and interpreting relevant primary and secondary 
sources of law and synthesising those sources to form a rule or rules of law. As part 
of this process, an evaluation and critique of competing or inconsistent sources may 
be required. Doctrinal research may also suggest ways in which the law should 
develop.39 The study will utilise a range of primary and secondary sources including 
legal research publications, being international resources that are available in print 
and/or digital format. Primary sources will include relevant legislation, statutes, 
conventions, resolutions and case law. Secondary sources will include law journal and 
review articles, case commentary as well as relevant books and web-based 
publications.  
All the information received is based on research and reports already published and 
no empirical research is foreseen in the conduct of this study and therefore the study 
relies solely on primary and secondary data. This is a normative, qualitative study 
utilising a human rights framework of analysis of the fair trial rights of the accused. The 
theoretical framework will elaborate on the human rights framework, the concept and 
understanding of a fair trial and the relevant Articles related to a fair trial as contained 
in the Rome Statute. 
In addition to the doctrinal approach, the research will consider whether an area of 
law is in need of reform or whether a proposed reform is necessary and/or desirable. 
The dissertation will ultimately utilise a theoretical framework on fair trial rights as 
human rights. This framework will serve to demonstrate how the dissertation is related 
to the work of others. The theoretical framework will, therefore, seek to locate the 
dissertation within the different approaches taken by various authors on the subject of 
fair trials and will therefore serve as a conceptual framework, by providing a set of 
                                                          





concepts that can be used for the dissertation.40 In this regard, the essence of the 
dissertation will analyse case law by applying the fair trial principles and human rights 
principles related to fair trial to five cases that have been tried at the ICC. The 
(sometimes contentious) interpretation and application of the fair trial rights in these 
selected cases will then be problematised and contextualised with reference to the 
central research question. 
Six judgments – Lubanga, Katanga, Bemba, Gbagbo, Ble Goude and Ntaganda – 
will form the core of the case studies for purposes of the dissertation. The dissertation 
will analyse not only the judgments on the merits, but also all the preliminary and pre-
trial decisions and processes, in terms of the theoretical framework espoused in the 
dissertation. Particular attention will also be paid to the important role of the Prosecutor 
in terms of the protection of the integrity and fairness of processes before the ICC. It 
should be noted that the cases are discussed as they were available at the time of 
writing and conclusion of this dissertation. Subsequent developments (for instance 
appeals and sentencing decisions and so forth) are not reflected in this reworked 
submission of the dissertation. It is also important to note that the cases were selected 
to illustrate the tensions that inform the central research question. The dissertation 
should therefore not be read as a comprehensive commentary on the selected cases.  
 
1 5  Theoretical framework 
The fair trial paradigm of this study is informed by a deliberate choice, namely to 
investigate the position of the individual accused, given the epochal context: The ICC 
as a symbol and as a practical, operational part of a project to end impunity for the 
worst atrocities and to advance the rights of victims.  
The Preamble to the Rome Statute encapsulates and incorporates the many 
different claims and interests informing the international criminal justice system, of 
which it is assumed that the ICC is perhaps the pre-eminent role player. This study 
assumes that there are obvious, and some less obvious tensions embedded in the 
plethora of demands and interests in the Rome Statute and as evidenced by the 
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emerging jurisprudence of the ICC. The study asserts that fair trial rights of the 
accused are not only one of the dialectical tension points, but indeed at the heart of 
the (international) criminal justice system and therefore of vital importance.  
The following section serves to set out an understanding of the functioning of the 
ICC, including the role of victims, as well as unpacking fair trial rights and legal 
principles which will be used as the basis for the dissertation in respect of the accused 
and the international legal framework for the rights of victims and the demands of the 
international community in order to give the reader a firm grounding in the principles 
which will be applied within the dissertation. 
 
1 5 1  Overall explanation of the ICC, its functions and responsibilities 
The ICC is an independent international organisation which was set up by an 
international multilateral treaty, the Rome Statute of 1998. It is located in the city of 
The Hague in the Netherlands, and it has set up temporary field offices in places where 
the ICC Prosecutor is conducting investigations.41  
The ICC has been established to try and punish individuals accused of committing 
crimes so serious that they are considered to affect the entire world. These crimes are 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.42 It is 
important to mention that the ICC can investigate and prosecute crimes that are not 
necessarily linked to conflict, but that are affecting vulnerable persons and 
communities. For instance, rape and other crimes of sexual violence such as sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation and 
enslavement, including trafficking of women and girls can constitute crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and even genocide.43 
The ICC has criminal jurisdiction over individuals (natural persons older than 18 
years of age); not groups, corporate entities or States. The ICC does not have 
universal or global jurisdiction, so any individual who is alleged to have committed 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC must be brought before the ICC having regard 
to the jurisdictional regime which is essentially based on the territoriality and 
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personality principles via states parties and within the meaning of the principle of 
complementarity. Jurisdiction based on a referral by the UN Security Council is also a 
possibility.  
The Office of the Prosecutor’s prosecutorial policy is to focus on those who, having 
regard to the evidence gathered, bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes, and 
does not take into account any official position that may be held by the alleged 
perpetrators.44 
The ICC is composed of four organs: The Presidency, the Chambers, the Office of 
the Prosecutor and the Registry:  
The Presidency consists of three judges (the President and two Vice-Presidents) 
elected by an absolute majority of the eighteen judges of the Court for a maximum of 
two, three-year terms. The Presidency oversees the administration of the Court, with 
the exception of the Office of the Prosecutor. It represents the Court to the outside 
world and helps with the organisation of the work of the judges. The Presidency is also 
responsible for carrying out other tasks, such as ensuring the enforcement of 
sentences imposed by the Court.45  
There are eighteen judges, including the three judges of the Presidency, are 
assigned to the Court’s three judicial divisions:  
 
(i) the Pre-Trial Division (composed of seven judges),  
(ii) the Trial Division (composed of six judges), and  
(iii) the Appeals Division (composed of five judges).46  
 
The judges are persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who 
possess the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices. All have extensive experience relevant to the Court’s judicial 
activity. The judges are elected by the Assembly of States Parties on the basis of their 
established competence in criminal law and procedure and in relevant areas of 
international law such as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights. 
                                                          
44 ICC “Understanding the ICC” 5 <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf> (accessed 28-12-2018). 
45 ICC “Understanding the ICC” 9 and Art 38 of the Rome Statute. 





They have extensive expertise on specific issues, such as violence against women or 
children. The election of the judges takes into account the need for the representation 
of the principal legal systems of the world, a fair representation of men and women, 
and equitable geographical distribution. The judges ensure the fairness of proceedings 
and the proper administration of justice.47 
The Office of the Prosecutor is an independent organ of the Court. Its mandate is 
to receive and analyse information on situations or alleged crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, to analyse situations referred to it in order to determine whether 
there is a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation into a crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes or the crime of aggression, and to bring the perpetrators 
of these crimes before the Court.48 
In order to fulfil its mandate, the Office of the Prosecutor is composed of three 
divisions: 
 
(i) The Investigation Division, which is responsible for conducting investigations 
(including gathering and examining evidence, questioning persons under 
investigation as well as victims and witnesses). The Statute requires the Office 
of the Prosecutor to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances 
equally.  
(ii) The Prosecution Division has a role in the investigative process, but its principal 
responsibility is litigating cases before the various Chambers of the Court.49 
(iii) The Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division, which, with the 
support of the Investigation Division, assesses information received and 
situations referred to the Court, analyses situations and cases to determine 
their admissibility and helps secure the cooperation required by the Office of 
the Prosecutor in order to fulfil its mandate.50 
 
The Registry helps the Court to conduct fair, impartial and public trials. The core 
function of the Registry is to provide administrative and operational support to the 
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Chambers and the Office of the Prosecutor. It also supports the Registrar’s activities 
in relation to defence, victims, communication and security matters. It ensures that 
the Court is properly serviced and develops effective mechanisms for assisting 
victims, witnesses and the defence in order to safeguard their rights under the Rome 
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. As the Court’s official channel of 
communication, the Registry also has primary responsibility for the ICC’s public 
information and outreach activities.51 The registry plays an important role in facilitating 
the participation of victims in proceedings at the ICC as will be articulated more clearly 
herein. 
The ICC assumes jurisdiction over specified crimes in the following ways: 
 
1. Referral by a State Party (including self–referral) - Article 14 of the Rome 
Statute. 
2. Referral by the Security Council in the exercise of its powers under Article 14 
of the Rome Statute  
3. An investigation initiated by the Prosecutor of the ICC of his own accord – 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute. 
 
The purpose of criminal proceedings before the ICC is to ensure that allegations of 
serious crimes are investigated, prosecuted, and if the accused is proved guilty, 
punished in accordance with the Rome Statute.  
 
1 5 2  The stages of proceedings at the ICC  
Preliminary Examination Stage: This stage is focused on deciding whether the ICC 
Prosecutor will investigate a particular situation in which crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court may have been committed.  
Investigation Stage: This stage is initiated when the Prosecutor decides to formally 
open an investigation into a situation following the preliminary examination, in order to 
collect evidence and find out what crimes have been committed and who is 
responsible.52  
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Pre‐Trial Stage: This stage is the period in which the Court decides whether or not to 
issue a warrant of arrest or an order to appear before the Pre-Trial Chamber against 
one or several individuals, and, once a person has been arrested and brought before 
the judges of the Chamber, whether or not to confirm the charges put forward by the 
Prosecutor.53 
Trial Stage: This stage comprises the trial of individuals accused of having committed 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, at the end of which the accused is either found 
guilty and sentenced, or acquitted of the crime(s), if based on the evidence brought 
forward the judges are not convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the 
accused.54 
Appeal Stage: If the parties challenge the outcome of the trial, this is the stage in 
which the final judgment is given. It is possible for the Appeals Chamber to reverse a 
conviction or acquittal issued by the Trial Chamber if, for instance, the Appeals 
Chamber judges determine that the Trial Chamber judges misapplied the law or made 
substantial factual errors.55 
Reparations Stage: In the event of a conviction, the Trial Chamber may issue an 
order for reparations to victims against the convicted person. If the convicted person 
does not have any means to afford reparations (“indigent”), the Trust Fund for 
Victims may be requested to compliment the order for reparations so that the victims 
may receive some form of redress.56 At this stage, depending on the type of 
reparations ordered (individual or collective) the victims may be called to provide some 
proof to the Chamber that they are legitimate beneficiaries of reparations. Even if 
indigent at the time of conviction, the convicted person may be asked to reimburse the 
Trust Fund for Victims should that person become non-indigent at any later stage in 
life.57 
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1 5 3 The role of victims 
Victims participate in proceedings in the courtroom through their legal 
representative. Victims may send information to the Prosecutor informing about crimes 
they believe have been committed. During a trial, a victim may testify before the ICC 
if he or she is called as a witness for the Prosecution, defence, or the victims’ legal 
representative. If a case proceeds to trial and an accused person is convicted by the 
ICC, victims may request reparations.58 
Within the Registry, the Court has established the Victims Participation and 
Reparations Section (“VPRS”), the Victims and Witnesses Section (“VWS”) and 
two independent offices, the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (“OPCV”) and the 
Trust Fund for Victims (“TFV”).59 
The VPRS informs victims of their rights relating to participation and reparations at 
the ICC and enables them to submit applications to the Court if they wish to do so. 
The VPRS also assists victims to organise their legal representation.  
The VWS has been established to provide support and protection to witnesses and 
to victims who appear before the Court. They may also assist others, such as family 
members, who are in danger as a result of a witness’s testimony. When victims testify 
as witnesses, the VWS provides administrative and logistical support to enable them 
to appear before the Court. The VWS also provides psychosocial care and other 
appropriate assistance as required.60 
At the end of a trial, if a person accused before the ICC is found guilty, ICC judges 
may decide to order that person to make reparations to the victims for the harm they 
have suffered as the result of the crimes committed. Victims can use the standard 
application forms for reparations to make their request to the ICC judges. It is important 
to note that the judges of the Court will decide whether an applicant is entitled to 
reparations or not after careful review of the application. Such a process can take a 
long time.61 









This section provided an overview of the ICC, its functions and roles and the next 
section will focus primarily on fairness, equality of arms and the main rights of the 
accused, victims and the demands of the international community. 
 
1 5 4 Fairness, fair trial rights and equality of arms 
In determining what fairness is Cogan62 puts forward two approaches in answering 
this question; first, are the substantive rights accorded to the accused adequate? This 
question, he argues, can be answered by reviewing the rights contained in the Rome 
Statute, rules of procedure, rules of evidence and case law. The second approach that 
he advances is whether these courts have the independence and powers to ensure 
fair trials? Cogan explains this as to whether or not the judges have the power to 
withstand political or international pressure to make the right decisions.63 Both these 
questions are vitally important to the current study and therefore the dissertation 
reviews the legal framework as well as the case law in determining whether fair trial 
standards are being adequately upheld by the ICC. In particular, it would be important 
to look into the role of the prosecutor and the manner in which judges arrive at their 
decisions. In assessing which fair trial standards should apply, it is necessary to look 
at the international human rights framework as well as the relevant provisions of the 
Rome Statute. 
In this regard, Article 2164 of the Rome Statute lays down the different sources of 
applicable law. In addition to the rules of evidence and procedure, as well as the 
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elements of crimes, the ICC can have recourse to the applicable treaties and the 
principles and rules of international law. The ICC can apply human rights treaties, 
customary international human rights law and general principles found in various legal 
systems. Moreover, Article 21(3) demands that the interpretation and application of 
the law must be consistent with “internationally recognized human rights.”65  
In this regard, Degan66 established a hierarchy of sources of law contained in Article 
21. Article 21(1)(b) states that the relevant treaties may include the following: The 
ICCPR or regional conventions, such as the 1950 ECHR with the attached protocols. 
Article 21(3) also includes the non-discrimination and equality clauses that judges are 
obligated to apply in criminal proceedings.67  
Young68 goes on to opine that Article 21(3) juxtaposes the related fields of 
international human rights law and international criminal law. She goes further and 
concludes that the jurisprudence indicates that Article 21(3) is most important in 
respect of fair trial rights.69 This dissertation supports the view that Article 21 reaffirms 
that international criminal law is subject to an internationally accepted human rights 
framework and refers to the international human rights treaties that will be unpacked 
hereunder. 
This Article of the Statute, therefore, permits judges to utilise international human 
rights law in making their decisions. Hence the importance of utilising the international 
human rights framework together with the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute. In 
the substantive chapters of the dissertation, which will focus on the different cases, we 
will see the varying degrees of application of this Article of the Statute by the judges. 
The interpretation of this Article will be particularly prevalent in Chapter 6, which will 
review the Ntaganda case at the ICC. 
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In order to critically assess the fair trial rights within the case law of the ICC, it would 
be important to understand the key concepts of fair trials within the legal framework 
and as discussed by various authors which is being undertaken hereunder. 
In understanding the concept of fairness, Fedorova70 suggests that fair trial 
standards encompass both individual rights and procedural guarantees. Further, to 
ensure effective defence, he argues, places an autonomous obligation on states. 
Conversely, Klamberg71 argues that the objective of a fair trial may be attained by 
attributing a set of rights upon the parties, primarily the defence. Klamberg72 is of the 
view that the key provisions of the right to a fair trial in human rights instruments are 
very similar. Further, that the right to a fair trial is a set of distinct rights which, “taken 
together, make up a single right not specifically defined”. He distinguishes between 
two aspects to the right, the judicial procedure (fair hearing) on the one hand, and the 
organisation of the judiciary (independent and impartial tribunal) on the other. This 
point regarding the independence of the judiciary seems to be vitally important in 
ensuring that fair trial rights are upheld by the ICC. The role of judges and their 
inconsistent approaches will become evident in most of the cases that are referred to 
in this dissertation through the many different, varied dissenting and separate opinions 
given in the respective cases.73 
Shaw74 argues that there are certain rights within international human rights law that 
cannot be derogated from; in particular, he mentions the right to life in the ECHR and 
Article 4 of the ICCPR. These instruments are therefore important in framing the rights 
of an accused person in an international court and will, therefore, be utilised as the 
basis for this study. 
Arguably, one of the most important rights for the purposes of this study is “Equality 
of arms”. The term equality of arms originated in modern European procedure in the 
context of Article 6 of the ECHR. It is an expression of the principle of audi alteram 
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partem or “hearing the other side.”75 The principle of “equality of arms” is a fundamental 
element of a fair trial. In essence, it means that there should be equity between the 
parties to present their own case and that each party to the proceedings should be on 
an even footing. Stahn,76 however, argues that in practice this may not be the case as 
often times the prosecutor has more resources at his or her disposal than the defence. 
This means that the defence in most cases would not receive equality of arms in 
criminal proceedings. 
In the mid-twentieth century, the former European Commission of Human Rights 
(“the European Commission”) introduced the term ‘equality of arms’ into Strasbourg 
case law77 for the first time in the criminal cases of Ofner and Hopfinger v Austria and 
Pataki and Dunshirn v Austria.78 The unifying point in these cases was that the 
accused had not been given an opportunity to be heard, unlike the opposing side. The 
Commission determined that “the equality of arms, that is the procedural equality of 
the accused with the public prosecutor, is an inherent element of ‘fair trial’”. Equality 
of arms therefore guarantees the defence participation in the criminal process and 
such participation is considered procedurally equivalent to that of the public 
prosecutor. Because of these judgments, the principle of equality of arms is now an 
established principle in domestic and international human rights case law.79  
Fedorova cites Cassese in understanding the equality of arms as follows:  
 
“the principle of equality of arms has two distinct notions; firstly as a concept developed in 
the case law of the ECHR whereby the accused may not be put at a serious procedural 
disadvantage with respect to the prosecutor; and secondly as an essential element of the 
adversarial structure of proceedings which means that equality of parties is an essential 
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ingredient of the adversarial structure of proceedings, based on the notion of the trial as a 
contest between two parties”.80  
 
Fedorova further opines that there are two types of equality; namely formal equality 
by ensuring equality between two equally situated parties; and material equality being 
the idea that a state should ensure some level of equality between the stronger and a 
weaker party, for example, a legal aid system.81 
Negri82 opines that equality of arms means that both parties should be treated in a 
manner that ensures they are in a procedurally equal position to make their case 
during the whole course of the trial. Therefore, equality of arms substantively requires 
that equality of treatment be ensured during the whole course of the proceedings and, 
procedurally, it is meant to secure enjoyment of the same procedural rights and 
guarantees between both parties.83 The authors seemingly agree that equality of arms 
is vitally important in international criminal proceedings and that there is an obligation 
on the State or institution to ensure that proceedings are both substantively and 
procedurally fair. 
Croquet84 discusses the right to a fair trial in terms of the way both the ECHR and 
the ICC have interpreted it. He argues that both institutions have had difficulties in 
defining procedural fairness and have instead referred to a broad standard of 
“fairness”. He further asserts that the ICC has defined the right to a fair trial as a 
“fundamental right” which mirrors the ECHR's understanding of the right to a fair trial. 
Croquet makes an important point, similar to another author,85 by asserting that in 
reference to the ECHR’s case law, the ICC has also recognised that the right to a fair 
trial benefits not only the accused but “all participants in the proceedings” thereby 
encompassing the prosecutor and the victims. It is submitted that this dissertation 
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supports the view that, even though the courts have interpreted that fair trial rights 
apply to all parties to proceedings, this dissertation will be based on the premise that 
fair trial rights apply solely to the accused.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, a few selected cases of the ICTY and ICTR, 
as they pertain to the subject matter of the discussions in the case law chapters of the 
dissertation, have been selected. The importance of reviewing and understanding the 
case law at the Tribunals is that the work of the tribunals reflects core elements of fair 
trials in respect of the international criminal law discourse. It serves to influence and 
shape the discourse of the ICC going forward. It is with this in mind that a reflection of 
their view of fair trial rights is being discussed hereunder, as this will have a bearing 
on the analysis of the case law chapters in the dissertation. 
In The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic86 in order to decide on the scope of application of 
the principle of equality of arms, the ICTY Appeals Chamber carried out a review of 
the international case law and stated as follows: 
 
“the Appeals Chamber is of the view that under the Statute of the International Tribunal the 
principle of equality of arms must be given a more liberal interpretation than that normally 
upheld with regard to proceedings before domestic courts. This principle means that the 
Prosecution and the Defence must be equal before the Trial Chamber. It follows that the 
Chamber shall provide every practicable facility it is capable of granting under the Rules 
and Statute when faced with a request by a party for assistance in presenting its case. The 
Trial Chambers are mindful of the difficulties encountered by the parties in tracing and 
gaining access to evidence in the territory of the former Yugoslavia where some States 
have not been forthcoming in complying with their legal obligation to cooperate with the 
Tribunal. Provisions under the Statute and the Rules exist to alleviate the difficulties faced 
by the parties so that each side may have equal access to witnesses.”87  
 
This decision demonstrates the tribunal’s willingness to admit that the parties may 
be unequal particularly in securing evidence and it shows the court’s willingness to 
ensure that the disparities that may exist between the parties are addressed to ensure 
a fair trial. The importance of this decision is the court’s willingness to ensure equity 
between the parties. 
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In The Prosecutor v Clement Kayishema and The Prosecutor v Clement Kayishema 
& Obed Ruzindana,88 the tribunal had the following to say: 
 
“The Appeals Chamber observes in this regard that equality of arms between the Defence 
and the Prosecution does not necessarily amount to the material equality of possessing the 
same financial and/or personal resources. In deciding on the scope of the principle of 
equality of arms, ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić held that ‘equality of arms obligates a 
judicial body to ensure that neither party is put at a disadvantage when presenting its 
case’.”89 
 
This reference to equality of arms is important as it recognises the potential 
disadvantages that may exist between the parties and the court emphasises the need 
of the court to ensure that equality of arms is upheld. 
It is, however, important to note that some court decisions refer to equality of arms 
or fairness in respect of “all parties” not only in respect of the rights of the defendant. 
This became apparent at the tribunals, particularly in The Prosecutor v Kvocka:90 
 
“Procedural equality requires that the concept of a fair trial be applied taking into account 
the interests of both parties. The Prosecution acts on behalf of and in the interests of the 
international community. Thus, as the international community has an interest in the 
enforcement of such guarantee, it cannot be deprived of it by the mere circumstance that 
the Appellant would like to waive his own entitlement to a fair trial.”91 
 
The ICC held a similar view regarding the fact that fair trial rights apply equally to 
all parties: 
“The term ‘fairness’ (equite) from the Latin ‘equus’ means equilibrium, or balance. As a 
legal concept, equity or fairness ‘is a direct emanation of the idea of justice.’ Equity of the 
proceedings entails equilibrium between the parties, which assumes both respect for the 
principle of equality and the principle of adversarial proceedings. In the view of the 
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Chamber, fairness of the proceedings includes respect for the procedural rights of the 
Prosecutor, the Defence, and the Victims as guaranteed by the relevant statutes (in 
systems which provide for victim participation in criminal proceedings).”92 
 
Mcdermott93 opines that the reference to equality of all parties or to both the accused 
and the prosecution is simply incorrect when considering the fair trial rights accorded 
to the accused. Under the chapeau of the rights of the accused, Article 67 of the Rome 
Statute consists of two subsections – the first holding that “the accused shall be 
entitled to a public hearing …, to a fair hearing conducted impartially … and to a list of 
nine minimum guarantees in full equality”, while the second deals with the 
prosecutorial obligation to disclose exculpatory material to the accused. To 
emphasise: the ICC has extended fair trial rights to other actors on a number of 
occasions, stating that fairness can also extend to other parties, such as the 
prosecution in the proceedings. 
However, Mcdermott94 firmly argues against the fact that fair trial rights apply 
equally to the defendant, prosecutor and victims. It is within this argument that lies the 
critical tension, which this dissertation seeks to present. The underlying argument is 
therefore that even though fair trial rights apply to all parties, given the current 
functioning of the court, this may not always be possible. 
Further, Mcdermott asserts that the tribunals, as well as the ICC, have adopted the 
approach that the onus is on the defence to prove that inequality has occurred before 
the court decides on such inequality. Mcdermott states that there are a number of 
factors hindering international criminal procedure from reaching its standard-setting 
potential for the fairness of trials; first, there is a lack of coherence between decisions, 
between individual judges and broadly between tribunals. Secondly, there is a failure 
to evince international best practice in achieving the highest standards of fairness 
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which is evidenced by the number of hurdles that an accused person must jump before 
motions on his or her rights can succeed.95 
In contrast, Gutierrez96 asserts that the principle of due process is mostly addressed 
to the judicial authorities and that fair and equitable treatment should be afforded to all 
participants at all stages of the criminal process. Guitierrez further touches on the 
model of justice and the ICC has generally been described as employing a sui generis 
model of justice employing both adversarial and inquisitorial elements. Duprez97 
distinguishes between these two systems as follows: 
 
“While in the adversarial system [the] search for the (procedural) truth lies, if at all, in the 
hand of the parties and therefore their conflict is at the center of the proceedings (‘two 
cases approach’), in an ‘inquisitorial’ system it is the responsibility of the State agencies in 
charge of criminal prosecution (‘one case approach’). In this sense, the civil law model can 
be more accurately described as ‘judge-led’ (…) while the common law model is adversarial 
– prosecution and defences being ‘adversaries’.” 
 
Put simply, in an adversarial model, the parties are equal opponents each 
possessing equal standing to fight each other in the court. Duprez asserts therefore 
that the accusatorial system is traditionally inclined to provide better protection of 
individual rights and that the two systems do not operate similarly which may lead to 
inconsistencies in the application of human rights protections to the accused.98 This 
distinction, coupled with the knowledge that the ICC employs components of each 
model, may contribute to the difficulty in ensuring fairness for accused persons at the 
ICC. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that in determining fairness, equality of 
arms is of the utmost importance in assessing whether or not trials are fair. Further, it 
is clear that there are inconsistencies in the application of fair trial standards at the 
tribunals and ICC.  
In addition, there seem to be differences in interpretation and application in respect 
of to whom fair trial standards should be afforded and there are two different schools 
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of thought; one being that these standards apply to all parties and two that fair trial 
standards should solely apply to the accused. Finally, it is apparent that due to the 
combination of accusatorial and inquisitorial justice that is being employed at the ICC, 
the accused’s fair trial rights may not be applied clearly or consistently and this will 
inform the basis through which the case law will be analysed.  
 
1 5 5 Fair trial rights as human rights 
Fair trial rights of the accused are most prominently articulated in Articles 6, 9(3) 
and 14 of the ICCPR as well as in Article 6 of the ECHR. 
In his report to the Security Council on the establishment of the ICTY, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations emphasised the following:  
 
“It is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognized 
standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its proceedings. In the view 
of the Secretary-General, such internationally recognized standards are, in particular, 
contained in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.99  
 
General principles governing fair trial proceedings include universal international 
human rights standards designed to protect defendants in criminal proceedings, the 
essence of which is contained in Article 14 of the ICCPR. For the purposes of this 
dissertation and in order to set the framework for further discussions in the case law 
chapters (Chapters 3 to 6), Articles 6, 9 and 14 of the ICCPR bears relevance. The 
ECHR also bears relevance as the Right to a fair trial is encompassed in Article 6 of 
the Convention, all of which will be discussed hereunder in order to provide a firm 
basis upon which the fair trial rights of the accused are reviewed against.  
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1 5 5 1  Pronouncements by the Human Rights Committee and the European 
Court on Human Rights on the content of the fair trial rights of the accused 
1 5 5 1 1  Article 14(1): The requirement that the accused be tried by an 
independent and impartial court or tribunal  
This right is based in Article 14(1) of the ICCPR and Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The 
Human Rights Committee expressed itself on this aspect by stating that “the right to 
equality before courts and tribunals guarantees those of equal access and equality of 
arms, and ensures that the parties to the proceedings in question are treated without 
any discrimination.”100 
Conversely, the guideline to Article 6 of the ECHR states: “The right to a fair trial in 
Article 6 requires that a case be heard by an “independent and impartial tribunal” 
established by law. There is a close link between the concepts of independence and 
objective impartiality. For this reason, the Court commonly considers the two 
requirements together.” This applies equally to professional judges, lay judges and 
jurors.101 Therefore equality and independence are the guiding principles in accessing 
courts or tribunals in relation to human rights treaties. 
 
1 5 5 1 2  Article 14(2): The presumption of innocence  
This right is also contained in Article 6(2) of the ECHR and requires that every 
person accused of a criminal offence has a right to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty. Article 66 of the Rome Statute affords this right to everyone. The burden of proof 
is therefore on the prosecution who must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Article 
67(1)(i) of the Rome Statute provides that no reversal of the burden of proof is allowed 
nor any onus of rebuttal.  
According to the Human Rights Committee, “everyone charged with a criminal 
offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to 
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law. The presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the protection of human 
rights, imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving the charge, guarantees that 
no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, 
ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt, and requires that persons accused 
of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle. It is a duty for all 
public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial, e.g. by abstaining 
from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused.”102 This is an 
interesting point particularly as it relates to the potential impact which the media may 
have on the proceedings before the court, particularly in the cases before the ICC 
which often involve persons holding senior positions in government. 
Similarly, the Guideline on Article 6 of the ECHR holds a similar view in respect of 
the presumption of innocence “Article 6 embodies the principle of the presumption of 
innocence. It requires, inter alia, that: (1) when carrying out their duties, the members 
of a court should not start with the preconceived idea that the accused has committed 
the offence charged; (2) the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and (3) any doubt 
should benefit the accused.”103 In fact, the ECHR goes further and refers to the 
presumption as” a procedural guarantee within the context of a criminal trial.”104 
 
1 5 5 1 3  Article 14 (3)(a): To be informed promptly and in detail in a language 
which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him 
The same right is contained in Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 67(1)(a) of the 
Rome Statute. 
The Human rights committee explained this right to mean “The right to be informed 
of the charge “promptly” requires that information be given as soon as the person 
concerned is formally charged with a criminal offence under domestic law, or the 
individual is publicly named as such.”105 The ECHR goes further in their assessment 
of this right “In criminal matters the provision of full, detailed information concerning 
the charges against a defendant, and consequently the legal characterisation that the 
court might adopt in the matter, is an essential prerequisite for ensuring that the 
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proceedings are fair.”106 This input is of particular importance in this dissertation, as 
the case law chapters will reveal that accused persons were often severely prejudiced 
as a result of the re-characterisation of the facts. 
 
1 5 5 1 4  Article 14(3)(b): Everyone shall be entitled to have adequate time and 
facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his 
own choosing  
The same right is contained in Article 67(1)(b) of the Rome Statute. It encompasses 
two elements: 
 
(i) The first element is the right of an accused to have adequate time and facilities 
for the preparation of his or her defence during all stages of the trial; and  
(ii) The second element is the right of an accused to communicate with counsel 
of his own choosing, which is particularly relevant to the preparation for trial. 
Language and translation are important considerations when assessing the 
amount of time that is adequate for the preparation of a defence.  
 
The Human Rights Committee states that: 
  
“What counts as “adequate time” depends on the circumstances of each case. If 
counsel reasonably feel that the time for the preparation of the defence is insufficient, 
it is incumbent on them to request the adjournment of the trial.”107  
 
On the other hand, “[a]dequate facilities” must include access to documents and 
other evidence; this access must include all materials that the prosecution plans to 
offer in court against the accused or that is exculpatory. Exculpatory material should 
be understood as including not only material establishing innocence but also other 
evidence that could assist the defence.”108 This is an important point to note as it 
demonstrates that all evidence which may assist the defence needs to be disclosed in 
order to allow the defendant to adequately defend him or herself. 
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Interestingly, the ECHR includes the re-characterisation as part of what constitutes 
the accused’s right to prepare a proper defence “[s]ub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 
6 (3) are connected in that the right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the 
accusation must be considered in the light of the accused’s right to prepare his 
defence. Particulars of the offence play a crucial role in the criminal process, in that it 
is from the moment of their service that the suspect is formally put on written notice of 
the factual and legal basis of the charges against him.”109 The ECHR’s explanation 
goes further: 
 
“Article 6 3 (a) affords the defendant the right to be informed not only of the “cause” of the 
accusation, that is to say, the acts he is alleged to have committed and on which the 
accusation is based, but also of the “nature” of the accusation, that is, the legal 
characterisation given to those acts.”110  
 
The legal characterisation is therefore of vital importance in ensuring the accused 
is able to prepare an adequate defence and the legal characterisation is an aspect 
which is of particular concern in the case law chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 3 
to 6). 
 
1 5 5 1 5  Article 14(3)(c): The right to be tried without undue delay 
This right is also contained in Article 64(2) and Article 67(1)(c) to be tried without 
undue delay of the Rome Statute.111 In the course of the dissertation, it will be 
highlighted that this right has been infringed in almost every case which will be 
examined, as the accused persons have in all instances been in detention for lengthy 
periods of time and the ICC has taken many years to conclude the cases often 
resulting in accused persons being in detention in excess of 5 years. 
The Human Rights committee expounds on this principle as follows: 
 
“The right of the accused to be tried without undue delay, provided for by article 14, 
paragraph 3 (c), is not only designed to avoid keeping persons too long in a state of 
uncertainty about their fate and, if held in detention during the period of the trial, to ensure 
that such deprivation of liberty does not last longer than necessary in the circumstances of 
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the specific case, but also to serve the interests of justice. What is reasonable has to be 
assessed in the circumstances of each case, taking into account mainly the complexity of 
the case, the conduct of the accused, and the manner in which the matter was dealt with 
by the administrative and judicial authorities…. This guarantee relates not only to the time 
between the formal charging of the accused and the time by which a trial should commence, 
but also the time until the final judgement on appeal. All stages, whether in first instance or 
on appeal must take place “without undue delay.”112 
 
The ECHR holds a similar view: 
 
“The reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be determined in the light of the 
circumstances of the case, which call for an overall assessment. Where certain stages of 
the proceedings are in themselves conducted at an acceptable speed, the total length of 
the proceedings may nevertheless exceed a “reasonable time” Article 6 requires judicial 
proceedings to be expeditious, but it also lays down the more general principle of the proper 
administration of justice. A fair balance has to be struck between the various aspects of this 
fundamental requirement. When determining whether the duration of criminal proceedings 
has been reasonable, the Court has had regard to factors such as the complexity of the 
case, the applicant’s conduct and the conduct of the relevant administrative and judicial 
authorities.”113  
 
This reflects an important perspective which bears relevance in this dissertation, 
particularly in respect of the conduct of investigations and the length of time taken by 
the prosecutor in concluding these investigations, often while the accused is already 
in detention. 
 
1 5 5 1 6  Article 14 (d): To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person 
or through legal assistance of his own choosing 
Further, to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to 
have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so 
require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient 
means to pay for it. This right is also contained in Article 67(1)(d) of the Rome Statute. 
The Human rights committee distinguishes three key features to this right:  
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“First, the provision requires that accused persons are entitled to be present during their 
trial. Proceedings in the absence of the accused may in some circumstances be permissible 
in the interest of the proper administration of justice, i.e. when accused persons, although 
informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance, decline to exercise their right to be 
present. Consequently, such trials are only compatible with article 14, paragraph 3 (d) if the 
necessary steps are taken to summon accused persons in a timely manner and to inform 
them beforehand about the date and place of their trial and to request their attendance.”114  
“Secondly, the right of all accused of a criminal charge to defend themselves in person or 
through legal counsel of their own choosing and to be informed of this right, as provided for 
by article 14, paragraph 3(d), refers to two types of defence which are not mutually 
exclusive. Persons assisted by a lawyer have the right to instruct their lawyer on the 
conduct of their case, within the limits of professional responsibility, and to testify on their 
own behalf. At the same time, the wording of the Covenant is clear in all official languages, 
in that it provides for a defence to be conducted in person “or” with legal assistance of one’s 
own choosing, thus providing the possibility for the accused to reject being assisted by any 
counsel. This right to defend oneself without a lawyer is, however not absolute. The 
interests of justice may, in the case of a specific trial, require the assignment of a lawyer 
against the wishes of the accused, particularly in cases of persons substantially and 
persistently obstructing the proper conduct of trial, or facing a grave charge but being 
unable to act in their own interests, or where this is necessary to protect vulnerable 
witnesses from further distress or intimidation if they were to be questioned by the accused. 
However, any restriction of the wish of accused persons to defend themselves must have 
an objective and sufficiently serious purpose and not go beyond what is necessary to 
uphold the interests of justice. Therefore, domestic law should avoid any absolute bar 
against the right to defend oneself in criminal proceedings without the assistance of 
counsel.”115  
 
Within the context of this general comment, the tensions between the rights of the 
accused and victims or witnesses becomes apparent as the court has to take into 
account the rights of the accused but also ensure the protection of victims during all 
proceedings before it, particularly when the accused is facing grave charges which 
may have impacted victims in a profound manner. This tension or rather sensitivity is 
necessary in all cases before international criminal courts in particular, as they often 
involve charges against the accused concerning grave human rights abuses which 
significantly impacts on victims. The sensitivity to the rights of victims in these 
instances are of particular importance in balancing the rights before the ICC during the 
course of trials.  
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The Human Rights Committee extrapolates on this right further as follows: 
 
“Third, article 14, paragraph 3 (d) guarantees the right to have legal assistance assigned 
to accused persons whenever the interests of justice so require, and without payment by 
them in any such case if they do not have sufficient means to pay for it.”116 
 
The ECHR holds the view that: 
  
“The right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a 
lawyer is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial. As a rule, a suspect should be 
granted access to legal assistance from the moment there is a “criminal charge” against 
him or her within the autonomous meaning of the Convention.”117 
 
1 5 5 1 7  Article 14(e): To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him 
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him 
This right is also contained in Article 67(1)(e) of the Rome Statute. Here, the Human 
Rights Committee expands on this as follows: 
 
“Paragraph 3 (e) of article 14 guarantees the right of accused persons to examine, or have 
examined, the witnesses against them and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on their behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against them.”118 
 
The ECHR states that before an accused can be convicted “all evidence against 
him must normally be produced in his presence at a public hearing with a view to 
adversarial argument.”119 More importantly, the ECHR provides the following proviso 
which relates to the balance of the rights between the accused and victims: 
 
“While Article 6 does not explicitly require the interests of witnesses to be taken into 
consideration, their life, liberty or security of person may be at stake, as with interests 
coming generally within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention. Contracting States should 
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organise their criminal proceedings so that those interests are not unjustifiably impaired. 
The principles of a fair trial therefore require that in appropriate cases the interests of the 
defence are balanced against those of witnesses or victims called upon to testify.”120  
 
In the instance of victims and witnesses, the balance between the fair trial rights of 
the accused and victims needs to be balanced and the courts are encouraged to 
employ a level of sensitivity to the specific circumstances of the case and the 
protection of witnesses. 
 
1 5 5 1 8  Article 14 (f): To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court. 
This right is further contained in Article 67(1)(f) of the Rome Statute. The Human 
Rights Committee links the rights of an accused to an interpreter as enshrining another 
aspect of the principles of fairness and equality of arms in criminal proceedings.121 The 
ECHR similarly agrees that translation services should also be provided to an accused 
particularly in order for the accused to properly understand the charges put to 
him/her.122 
 
1 5 5 1 9  Article 14(3)(g): The right to remain silent 
This right is also contained in Articles 55(2)(b) and 67(1)(g) of Rome Statute that states 
that the accused has the right to remain silent, without his silence being a 
consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence. 
The Human Rights Committee states emphatically that: 
  
“Finally, article 14, paragraph 3 (g), guarantees the right not to be compelled to testify 
against oneself or to confess guilt. This safeguard must be understood in terms of the 
absence of any direct or indirect physical or undue psychological pressure from the 
investigating authorities on the accused, with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt.”123 
 
The ECHR also agrees that this right is absolute: 
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“Anyone accused of a criminal offence has the right to remain silent and not to contribute 
to incriminating himself. Although not specifically mentioned in Article 6, the right to remain 
silent and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally recognised international 
standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6.”124  
 
In the chapter analysing Katanga (chapter 4), it will be seen that this right had been 
infringed. 
Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR, therefore, sets out internationally 
recognised fair trial rights insofar as these are applicable to the rights of the accused 
at the ICC. Similar rights are also contained in the Rome Statute and therefore it is 
evident that the fair trial rights of the accused as contained in the Rome Statute are 
founded on these critical fair trial rights contained in the ICCPR.  
In addition to these rights the Rome Statute under Article 67 (containing the rights 
of the accused) sets out additional rights as follows: 
 
“(h) To make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her defence; and 
 (i) Not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of 
rebuttal.  
2. In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as 
soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or 
control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or 
to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution 
evidence. In case of doubt as to the application of this paragraph, the Court shall decide.” 
 
These additional rights serve to demonstrate that the Rome Statute goes further to 
protect the rights of the accused particularly insofar as the disclosure of evidence is 
concerned. However, what is of importance is that the Rome Statute was premised on 
international human rights standards in respect of the fair trial rights of the accused. 
These are therefore the rights against which the measure of whether a trial is fair or 
not should be weighed.  
 
1 5 5 1 10  Article 14(6): The right to compensation in the event of acquittal   
A similar provision is also contained in Article 85 of the Rome Statute. The Human 
Rights Committee gives substance to this and emphasises that: 
                                                          






“It is necessary that States parties enact legislation ensuring that compensation as required 
by this provision can in fact be paid and that the payment is made within a reasonable 
period of time. This guarantee does not apply if it is proved that the non-disclosure of such 
a material fact in good time is wholly or partly attributable to the accused; in such cases, 
the burden of proof rests on the State. Furthermore, no compensation is due if the 
conviction is set aside upon appeal, i.e. before the judgement becomes final, or by a pardon 
that is humanitarian or discretionary in nature, or motivated by considerations of equity, not 
implying that there has been a miscarriage of justice.”125  
 
This right is important particularly for the accused who have served long sentences 
at the ICC, lost contact with their families and who are only acquitted after several 
years in detention. 
 
1 5 5 1 11  Article 14(7): No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an 
offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with 
the law and penal procedure of each country.  
A similar provision is contained in Article 20 of the Rome Statute. The Human Rights 
Committee states that this procedure embraces the principle of ne bis in idem.  
 
“This provision prohibits bringing a person, once convicted or acquitted of a certain offence, 
either before the same court again or before another tribunal again for the same offence; 
thus, for instance, someone acquitted by a civilian court cannot be tried again for the same 
offence by a military or special tribunal.126”  
 
The Human Rights committee further clarifies its understanding of this right as 
follows: 
 
“Furthermore, it does not guarantee ne bis in idem with respect to the national jurisdictions 
of two or more States. This understanding should not, however, undermine efforts by States 
to prevent retrial for the same criminal offence through international conventions.”127 
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In respect of the ECHR, Protocol No. 7 to the Convention was drafted in 1984. The 
aim of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 is to prohibit the repetition of criminal proceedings 
that have been concluded by a final decision (ne bis in idem). The ECHR guideline 
went further than the Human Rights Committee in that it clarified the ne bis in idem 
principle in more detail in the following manner: “The ne bis in idem principle prohibits 
prosecution or trial for the “same offence”. In Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC] the 
Court acknowledged that it had adopted a variety of approaches in the past, placing 
the emphasis either on identity of the facts irrespective of their legal characterisation), 
on the legal classification, accepting that the same facts could give rise to different 
offences, or on the existence or otherwise of “essential elements” common to both 
offences (Franz Fischer v. Austria). After examining the scope of the right not to be 
tried and punished twice as set forth in other international instruments (ICCPR, Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and American Convention on Human 
Rights) and noting that the approach which emphasised the legal characterisation of 
the two offences was too restrictive on the rights of the individual, the Court took the 
view that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 should be understood as prohibiting the 
prosecution or trial of an individual for a second “offence” in so far as it arose from 
identical facts or facts which were “substantially” the same as those underlying the first 
offence.  
The starting point for the determination of whether the facts in both proceedings 
were identical or substantially the same should be the statements of fact concerning 
both the offence for which the applicant had already been tried and the offence of 
which he or she stands accused. The Court emphasised that it was irrelevant which 
parts of the new charges were eventually upheld or dismissed in the subsequent 
proceedings because Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 contains a safeguard against being 
tried or being liable to be tried again in new proceedings rather than a prohibition on a 
second conviction or acquittal. It held that its inquiry should, therefore, focus on those 
facts which constitute a set of concrete factual circumstances involving the same 
defendant and inextricably linked together in time and space, the existence of which 
must be demonstrated in order to secure a conviction or institute criminal 
proceedings.”128 This is of particular importance in the Katanga case as the accused 
                                                          
128 Guide on Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights Right 





was sent back to his country of origin to be tried again by the military court. In addition, 
the right to life is of vital importance in the Katanga case as he was sent back to a 
country which imposes the death penalty. Hence the right to life is discussed 
hereunder. 
In addition to Article 14, Article 6 (right to life), Article 2 of ECHR and Article 9 (Right 
to liberty and Security of person) of the ICCPR are of particular importance in reviewing 
fair trial rights as human rights. 
 
1 5 5 1 12  Article 6: The right to life; Article 9: Right to Liberty and security 
The Human Rights Committee and the ECHR expressed itself quite strongly on 
these two rights and indicated that they often overlap. In this regard, the Human Rights 
Committee stated that: 
 
“The right to life guaranteed by article 6 of the Covenant, including the right to protection of 
life under article 6, paragraph 1, may overlap with the right to security of person guaranteed 
by article 9, paragraph 1. The right to personal security may be considered broader to the 
extent that it also addresses injuries that are not life-threatening. Extreme forms of arbitrary 
detention that are themselves life-threatening violate the rights to personal liberty and 
personal security as well as the right to protection of life, in particular enforced 
disappearances.”129  
 
The Human rights committee also emphasised that arbitrary detentions for long 
periods of time could be detrimental to a person’s liberty and security of person.130 Of 
more importance, is the Human Rights Committee’s pronouncement on the following 
which is particularly relevant in the Katanga case chapter:  
 
“Returning an individual to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
the individual faces a real risk of a severe violation of liberty or security of person such as 
prolonged arbitrary detention may amount to inhuman treatment prohibited by article 7 of 
the Covenant.”131 
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The Human Rights Committee recently (2018),132 published another general 
comment on the right to life which specifically addresses some of the concerns raised 
in the Katanga chapter. More specifically it states emphatically that: 
 
“Paragraphs 2, 4, 5 and 6 of article 6 of the Covenant set out specific safeguards for 
ensuring that in States parties which have not yet abolished the death penalty, it must not 
be applied except for the most serious crimes, and then only in the most exceptional cases 
and under the strictest limits.”133  
 
The Human Rights Committee stated:  
 
“Furthermore, States which have not abolished the death penalty and which are not parties 
to the Second Optional Protocol or other treaties providing for the abolition of the death 
penalty can only apply the death penalty in a non-arbitrary manner, with regard to the most 
serious crimes and subject to a number of strict conditions.”134 
 
The Human Rights Committee also takes a strong standpoint that:  
 
“States parties to refrain from deporting, extraditing or otherwise transferring individuals to 
countries in which there are substantial grounds for believing that a real risk exists that their 
right to life under article 6 of the Covenant would be violated … . In cases involving 
allegations of risk to the life of the removed individual emanating from the authorities of the 
receiving State, the situation of the removed individual and the conditions in the receiving 
States need to be assessed inter alia, based on the intent of the authorities of the receiving 
State, the pattern of conduct they have shown in similar cases, and the availability of 
credible and effective assurances about their intentions. When the alleged risk to life 
emanates from non-state actors or foreign States operating in the territory of the receiving 
State, credible and effective assurances for protection by the authorities of the receiving 
State may be sought and internal flight options could be explored. When relying upon 
assurances from the receiving State of treatment upon removal, the removing State should 
put in place adequate mechanisms for ensuring compliance with the issued assurances 
from the moment of removal onwards.”135  
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The Human Rights Committee once again took a strong viewpoint on the risks 
involved in returning individuals to states where they face the risk of the death penalty: 
“Returning individuals to countries where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that they face a real risk to their lives violates articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant.”136 
The ECHR expressed itself on the liberty and security of persons as follows:  
 
“The Court has emphasised the right of all prisoners to conditions of detention which are 
compatible with human dignity, so as to ensure that the manner and method of execution 
of the measures imposed do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity 
exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention; in addition, besides the 
health of prisoners, their well-being also has to be adequately secured given the practical 
demands of imprisonment.”137 
 
In respect to the Right to Life, the ECHR expressed the following: 
 
“In cases of trials leading to the imposition of the death penalty scrupulous respect of the 
guarantees of fair trial is particularly important. The imposition of a sentence of death upon 
conclusion of a trial, in which the provisions of article 14 of the Covenant have not been 
respected, constitutes a violation of the right to life (article 6 of the Covenant).”138 
 
Further the ECHR stated explicitly that:  
 
“Article 2 of the Convention prohibits the extradition or deportation of an individual to 
another State where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she 
would face a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty there.”139 
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1 5 6  General Principles of Criminal Law 
1 5 6 1  Principles of Legality and Legal Certainty 
Article 22 contains an important principle in ensuring whether a trial is fair, 
encapsulated by the maxim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, which is 
called the principle of legality.140  
 
Nullum crimen sine lege  
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in 
question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.  
2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. 
In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being 
investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 3. This article shall not affect the characterization of 
any conduct as criminal under international law independently of this Statute. 
 
Closely linked to this principle is Article 23 which is nulla poena sine lege 
 
“Article 23 Nulla poena sine lege  
A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute.” 
 
The principles embodied here are those of legality and legal certainty which are 
critical in ensuring fairness in criminal proceedings. The ECHR is clear that Article 7 
is concerned with substantive criminal law and embodies the principle of legality, which 
stipulates that no one should be convicted or punished except in respect of a breach 
of a pre-existing rule of law otherwise referred to in Latin as Nullum crimen, nulla poena 
sine lege defined as only a law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty.141 
There are two main aspects to the principle:  
First, Article 7 prohibits legislatures and courts from creating or extending the law 
so as to criminalise acts or omissions which were not illegal at the time of commission 
or omission, or to increase a penalty retroactively.  
Secondly, it requires that the criminal law should be clearly defined. The ECHR has 
stated definitively that the principle of legal certainty: 
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“requires domestic authorities to respect the binding nature of a final judicial decision. The 
protection against duplication of criminal proceedings is one of the specific safeguards 
associated with the general guarantee of a fair hearing in criminal proceedings under Article 
6.”142 
 
Further, that the principle of legality:  
 
“guarantees certain stability in legal situations and contributes to public confidence in the 
courts. The persistence of conflicting court decisions, on the other hand, can create a state 
of legal uncertainty likely to reduce public confidence in the judicial system, whereas such 
confidence is clearly one of the essential components of a State based on the rule of law.”143 
 
In the case analysis, the importance of the principle of legal certainty will become 
evident, particularly in light of the application of Regulation 55, which allows for the re-
characterisation of crimes at the ICC. This principle will also be shown to be of 
particular importance in Chapter 6 of the dissertation, which analyses the Ntaganda 
decision and the manner in which the court decided on its jurisdiction in respect of war 
crimes. The principle is of the utmost importance in terms of ensuring equality of arms, 
ensuring that the accused is able to properly defend him/herself and to ensure a fair 
and expeditious trial. 
 
1 5 6 2  Other general legal principles applicable to the dissertation 
Article 25 Individual criminal responsibility 
 
“Article 25(2). A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.” 
 
The International Criminal Court is concerned with trying and punishing individuals, 
not States. However, most of the persons tried at the ICC are usually not the actual 
perpetrators but, in most instances, would be those who organise, plan and incite 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.144  
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If we review the concept of common purpose complicity, those who participate in a 
criminal enterprise are liable for acts committed by their colleagues. Paragraph (3)(d) 
of Article 25 describes this as contributing ‘to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose’. In 
other words, a person can be held responsible for contributing to the commission of a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court to the extent it is made with the aim of 
furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, “where such activity or 
purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”.145 In 
the case law chapters, we will see that although the prosecution tried to rely on these 
Articles to secure convictions against senior persons in positions of power, it struggled 
to succeed in securing these convictions. 
Article 28: Responsibility of commanders and other superiors which provides that 
military commanders will be held responsible for the crimes committed by their 
subordinates, however the Article provides that the prosecution must prove that the 
commander knew and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent this from taking place. 
This discussion is prevalent in chapter 5 which reviews the acquittals of Bemba, 
Gbagbo and Ble Goude. One of the dilemmas of war crimes prosecution is the difficulty 
of linking commanders to the crimes committed by their subordinates.146  
The dissertation will therefore critically analyse the manner in which fair trial 
principles have been applied by the ICC in the selected case law and the manner in 
which judges have arrived at their respective decisions in respect of fair trial rights. In 
the course of the dissertation, it becomes evident that there are certain judges in 
particular who have written separate or dissenting opinions giving direction on the 
application of fair trial rights of the accused. These decisions are of particular 
importance in defining the manner in which the ICC will address the fair trial rights of 
the accused in all its cases. However, it must be noted that to date, there has been a 
largely inconsistent approach to the rights of the accused as will be evidenced in the 
various chapters analysing the specific and selected case law.  
While the selected case law represents snapshots of approaches to procedural and 
substantive fairness at the international level; this dissertation will argue that a radical 
insistence on fair trial rights, even in the face of demands for accountability for the 







worst crimes that shock the international community as a whole, is the appropriate 
synthesis emanating from the dialectical tensions in the Rome Statute and the broader 
community of interested and affected stakeholders. Hereunder, a framework for the 
discussion on victim’s rights as human rights and the demands of the international 
community. 
 
1 5 7  Victim’s international human rights 
Within the framework of international law and discourse, the rights of victims also 
play a prominent role. The alluded tensions were evident in the previous section, 
particularly in relation to the rights of the accused in respect of witnesses and the 
ECHR discussion of the sensitivity that should be employed in addressing the 
concerns of victims. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) plainly articulates 
that “everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or 
by law.”147 
The ECHR also affords rights to victims as contained in Article 2, right to life, and 
Article 13, right to an effective remedy as well as Article 34 which grants the right of 
petition to anyone claiming to be a “victim” of a violation of the Convention. Article 13 
of the ECHR148 and Article 47149 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the 
“Charter”)150 confirms that criminal proceedings assert the victims’ rights as much as 
they preserve the identity of a community of law based on human dignity and human 
rights. 
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Victims’ rights to access to justice, as interpreted by the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR”), include the following elements: A right to proceedings that aim to 
identify, convict and punish offenders, a right to participate in the proceedings with full 
fair trial rights (Article 47(2) and (3) of the Charter, a right to be compensated within 
the framework of criminal justice whenever a victim of violent crime under substantive 
law is entitled to compensation Such understanding of victims’ rights to access justice 
that includes elements of compensation is incorporated into EU law by the Charter via 
the 2012 Victims’ Rights Directive and the 2004 Compensation Directive.  
This human-rights approach to victims’ rights is defined in the Victims’ Rights 
Directive151 which is currently the major EU instrument on victims’ rights. It states that 
a crime is a wrong and a violation of the individual rights of the victim, and due to this 
fact, victims are to be recognised and treated respectfully. It means that EU policy has 
to start from the fact that the offender and, if the offender is unable to compensate, the 
state owes compensation to victims of crimes against the person for the damages 
incurred.152 
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted two articles of the European 
Convention153 for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
prescribing victims' rights in the criminal process: Article 2, right to life, and Article 13, 
right to an effective remedy. The European Court has granted ownership of victims' 
rights in the criminal process to the direct victim of the violation. Furthermore, if the 
victim is dead or has consented to being, represented, the victim's next of kin may 
assert the victim's rights.154  
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replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. 
152 Strengthening Victims’ Rights: From Compensation to Reparation for a New EU Victims’ 
Rights Strategy 2020-2025 Report of the Special Adviser, J. Milquet, to the President of the 
European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker Strengthening Victims’ Rights: From 
Compensation to Reparation March 2019 
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153 European Convention for the Protection on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
213 UNTS 221 (1995) (as amended through Nov. 1998) [“European Convention”]. 





The European Court specifically held that, given the importance of the rights to life 
and humane treatment, Article 13 requires the state to provide victims a thorough and 
effective investigation capable of leading to identification and punishment of those 
responsible, in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate. Although 
victims' rights under Article 13 also coexist with the procedural duties to investigate 
violations of the right to life and personal integrity, the European Court has held that 
the requirements under Article 13 are broader than the procedural duties because 
Article 13 not only requires an effective investigation but also requires that the entire 
system securing the remedy be effective.155 
The ICCPR contains a fundamental right to victims in Article 2(3): 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:(a) To ensure that any person whose 
rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
 
The Human Rights Committee has interpreted Article 2(3)156 of the ICCPR157 to 
require states to conduct an effective prosecution to remedy the harm caused to 
victims of the right to life and personal integrity violations. 
Article 2(3) provides that states must accord an effective remedy to any person 
whose rights under the ICCPR have been violated. In cases involving arbitrary 
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156 Article 2.3 of the ICCPR reads: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to ensure that any person whose 
rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
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capacity; to ensure that any person claiming a such remedy shall have his right thereto 
determine by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
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detentions, forced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial executions, the Human 
Rights Committee has ruled victims’ effective remedy under Article 2(3) of the ICCPR 
must include a criminal investigation that brings to justice those responsible. The 
Optional Protocol of the ICCPR allows the UN's Human Rights Committee to receive 
communications from victims of transgressions of the ICCPR158.  
In 2005, the UN developed basic principles and guidelines on the “right to a remedy 
and reparation for victims”.159 The guidelines provide that victims should be treated 
with humanity and respect for dignity and human rights and that appropriate measures 
should be undertaken to ensure their safety, physical and psychological well-being 
and privacy, as well as those of their families.160 
These guidelines provide for victims to have “equal access to an effective judicial 
remedy as provided for under international law.”161 Article 12 also provides for specific 
                                                          
158 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) 
of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 9. 
Article 1 
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals 
subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of 
the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall be received by the Committee 
if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present Protocol. 
Article 2 
Subject to the provisions of article 1, individuals who claim that any of their rights 
enumerated in the Covenant have been violated and who have exhausted all available 
domestic remedies may submit a written communication to the Committee for 
consideration. 
159 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 
December 2005. 
160 VI. Treatment of victims 
10. Victims should be treated with humanity and respect for their dignity and human rights, 
and appropriate measures should be taken to ensure their safety, physical and 
psychological well-being and privacy, as well as those of their families. The State should 
ensure that its domestic laws, to the extent possible, provide that a victim who has suffered 
violence or trauma should benefit from special consideration and care to avoid his or her 
re-traumatization in the course of legal and administrative procedures designed to provide 
justice and reparation. 





remedies which are available to victims; including “access to administrative and other 
bodies, as well as mechanisms, modalities and proceedings conducted in accordance 
with domestic law. Obligations arising under international law to secure the right to 
access to justice and fair and impartial proceedings shall be reflected in domestic 
laws.”162 
These guidelines set out specific obligations placed on states to ensure that victims 
are adequately protected and receive the necessary assistance to their access to 
justice; including the relevant information about all available remedies; ensure their 
safety during and after judicial proceedings; provide proper assistance to victims 
seeking access to justice. The intention therefore to draft these guidelines was to 
ensure that victims are adequately protected and receive the necessary access to 
justice. However, Article 27 of these guidelines also provides a rider that: 
  
                                                          
162 12. A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law or of a serious violation 
of international humanitarian law shall have equal access to an effective judicial remedy as 
provided for under international law. Other remedies available to the victim include access to 
administrative and other bodies, as well as mechanisms, modalities and proceedings 
conducted in accordance with domestic law. Obligations arising under international law to 
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international humanitarian law; 
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against unlawful interference with their privacy as appropriate and ensure their safety from 
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(c) Provide proper assistance to victims seeking access to justice; 
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can exercise their rights to remedy for gross violations of international human rights law or 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
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circumstances, victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the 
gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and effective 
reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23, which include the following forms: restitution, 






“Nothing in this document is to be construed as derogating from internationally or nationally 
protected rights of others, in particular the right of an accused person to benefit from 
applicable standards of due process.”163  
 
Herein lies some of the tensions alluded to in this dissertation, the balancing of the 
fair trial rights of the accused and those of the victims. 
 
Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights provides:  
 
“Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being 
and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man, 
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and 
treatment shall be prohibited.” 
 
In 2017, a general comment was issued particularly to discuss the right to 
reparations and what that entails for victims: 
 
“The right to redress encompasses the right to an effective remedy and to adequate, 
effective and comprehensive reparation. The ultimate goal of redress is transformation. 
Redress must occasion changes in social, economic and political structures and 
relationships in a manner that deals effectively with the factors which allow for torture and 
other ill-treatment. This transformation envisages processes with long-term and sustainable 
perspectives that are responsive to the multiple justice needs of victims and therefore 
restore human dignity. It requires broad interpretation of State Parties’ obligations to 
provide redress, including putting in place legal, administrative and institutional frameworks 
to give effect to the right to redress.”164 
 
It is clear that both African countries and the international community has 
recognised victim’s rights both to access to justice as well as the right to effective 
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redress in the form of reparations but that such reparations need to take account of 
the broader context of the plight of victims. 
The Rome Statute also reaffirms the rights of victims, in its Preamble to place justice 
for victims at the heart of its work. The Rome Statute, therefore, echoes the sentiments 
in the UDHR, it recalls that “during this century millions of children, women and men 
have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity.”  
The Statute expressly recognises that measures to guarantee the safety, physical 
and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims, witnesses and their 
families are essential to the work of the ICC. The participation of victims at the ICC will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 of the dissertation. 
It is therefore evident that human rights law is based on a set of values that seeks 
to protect both the accused as well as victims and to provide access to justice for both 
the accused and the victim in international criminal law proceedings. It is, therefore, 
this tension which the dissertation seeks to explore in greater detail and the rights and 
participation of victims at the ICC will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
 
1 5 8  The international community  
The interests of the international community can be summed up by the politicisation 
of international criminal law and the disappointment expressed by civil society in 
respect of the rights of victims, particularly when there have been acquittals at the ICC 
and victims are not afforded their rights to access to justice and reparations for the 
harms caused. 
It must also be borne in mind that the States Parties to the Rome Statute provide 
management oversight for the court by establishing a budget and providing funding to 
the court,165 there is an assumption of control and interest in the cases that are tried at 
the ICC. 
In terms of Article 86 of the Rome Statute, States Parties to the Rome Statute have 
an obligation to cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Article 87 regulates the modalities and 
                                                          







channels of cooperation between the Court and States as well as international 
organisations and provides for the consequences of non-cooperation for states. To 
facilitate such cooperation, States Parties are obligated to ensure that there are 
procedures available under their national law for all the forms of cooperation that may 
be required of them in terms of the Statute (article 88). If a state fails to cooperate 
effectively with the ICC, it can create delays in the effective workings of the ICC. 
Arguably, the most contentious aspect of this arrangement is the role of the Security 
Council vis-à-vis the ICC and the complexities of implementing its referrals. Among 
the areas of controversy has been the failure to refer some situations in which mass 
crimes were allegedly committed. The Council has also been relatively indifferent 
towards states’ non-cooperation with the ICC on existing referrals, refraining from 
taking action on the thirteen decisions of the court regarding the non-compliance of 
UN member states. Among the 2018 Council members, eight—Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, 
France, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden and the UK—are parties to the Rome 
Statute.166 
So far, the Council has referred only two situations to the court under Article 13(b): 
the situations in Darfur, in (2005), and in Libya, in (2011). These resolutions placed 
the financial burden of the investigations exclusively on the ICC and excluded from 
ICC jurisdiction foreign nationals operating under Council authorisation. While 
imposing an obligation on parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the ICC, the 
resolutions merely urged states other than Sudan and Libya to cooperate with the ICC, 
noting that they were under no obligation to do so. More recently, China and Russia 
vetoed a resolution referring the situation in Syria to the ICC on 22 May 2014.  
The biggest debate has been amongst African countries in respect of their criticism 
of the ICC targeting African countries. To this end, the African Union (“AU”) has taken 
the position that the ICC is overly focused on African situations and should not 
prosecute incumbent heads of state, which has resulted in several African Council 
members adopting a more negative position towards the court.  
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The ICC has made efforts to convince the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
to take more actions in demanding Sudan to cooperate fully with the ICC, yet the 
UNSC has only issued one presidential statement. This lack of support by the UNSC, 
also detected in the Libya case, undermines the authority of the ICC and has spilled 
over to some parties to the Rome Statute as they neglect to follow their obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC, especially in failing to execute arrest warrants – an obligation 
stated in article 87 of the Rome Statute. 
The UNSC is, in its entirety, a political body. Thus, there is a strong likelihood that 
decisions to refer a situation to the ICC are influenced by its political nature. Moreover, 
three of its five permanent members are not parties to the Rome Statute, but the UNSC 
can still refer situations involving states that are not parties to the same Rome Statute. 
This can be perceived as damaging to the ICC’s credibility, integrity and perception of 
legitimacy.167 
The ICC’s prosecutorial policy while guided by legal, objective criteria, necessarily 
also considers other factors, including political ones.168 
Finally, we must also understand the profound disappointment of the victims and 
the civil society organisations acting on their behalf as victim’s rights was proclaimed 
to be a central feature of the Rome Statute and the ICC. The Statute has indeed 
included the participation of victims in its proceedings, however as a result of some of 
these political influences and the international cooperation, some leaders who have 
been accused of gross human rights violations have been acquitted and left the victims 
without recourse and reparations as promised by the ICC.169 This was particularly 
widely reported in respect of the acquittal of Bemba, Gbagbo and Ble Goude. This, in 
a nutshell, summarises some of the contentious issues surrounding the international 
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community and its expectations of the ICC as well as the politicisation of the ICC, 
although a more comprehensive discussion is contained in chapter 2 on this matter. 
The former sections illustrated some of the tensions alluded to in the title of the 
dissertation and explained in the methodology section herein. It is evident that both 
the accused and victims enjoy the benefits of fair trial rights and realisation of rights in 
international human rights law.  
It is further clear that the legitimacy of the ICC is questionable and the impact of 
politicisation on the functioning of the court may be a factor in the functioning of the 
court. These tensions in and of themselves contribute to a court which is struggling to 
define itself, by creating high expectations to the accused, victims and the international 
community. This begs the question, is the ICC capable of addressing all these 
competing interests in respect of the human rights realisation that it sought to achieve 
and as enunciated in the Rome Statute, or is it a court that should operate as an 
international criminal court in a narrower sense; focusing on ensuring that the fair trial 
rights of those accused of the most heinous crimes are upheld and also ensuring that 
the rights of victims are addressed through a comprehensive reparations regime? 
 
1 6 Dissertation structure, chapter overview, and choice of case studies 
Chapter 1 has set out the research question, the rationale, the theoretical 
framework in respect of the rights of the accused and the rights of victims. It has also 
sought to provide a context for the debate regarding the demands of the international 
community and the dialectics inherent herein. 
Chapter 2, will focus on the rights of victims and their participation at the ICC, the 
inherent tensions between the rights of the accused, victims and the international 
community. The chapter will also discuss the importance of the roles of prosecutors 
and judges at the ICC. 
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 explore the research problem through the lens of various 
case studies. The reader may well wonder about the choice of case studies. A few 
observations: First, there are not many completed cases at the ICC. Not even after 
almost two decades of ICC investigative, prosecutorial and judicial activities – for the 
most part in Africa. The choice of cases was therefore informed by criteria that 
matched the research framework of this dissertation. That is to say, the first case 





as to how the competing demands of victims, the international community and the fair 
trial rights of the accused were to be viewed by the ICC. Other cases were selected 
for the way in which their respective factual and legal matrixes could be helpful to 
analyse the research question. For instance, a case like Bemba can illustrate the 
expectations of (a) victims and (b) the broader regional and international community 
in a case concerning a leader (as opposed to an accused who is merely a direct but 
relatively unimportant perpetrator). Other cases, like Katanga, illustrates the difficulties 
contained in the interpretation and application of the relevant laws and rules pertaining 
to ICC cases. “Technical” issues like these are, however, not dry and without context, 
expectations and consequences; these issues are therefore explored within the 
framework of the dialectical tension(s) underlying this study. Finally, a case like 
Ntaganda illustrates the starkness; the vividness of gross human rights violations, 
notably sexual and gender based violence, on the one hand, and the fair trial rights of 
one man, the accused, and how these play out in the course of a criminal process that 
must somehow “end impunity” without sacrificing the fair trial rights of the accused.  
Chapter 3, then, apply the general framework as explained in Chapters 1 and 2 to 
the case of Lubanga focusing on different decisions of the court in respect of the 
participation of victims as well as the application of Regulation 55 and the disclosure 
of evidence and its impact on the fair trial rights of Lubanga. 
Chapter 4 will analyse the Katanga judgment focusing on victim participation and 
the application of Regulation 55, including the important principle of double jeopardy 
and the right to life and the right to silence as fair trial rights of Katanga. 
Chapter 5 will analyse and provide a comparative analysis of the Bemba, Gbagbo 
and Ble Goude acquittals, with a particular focus on victim participation, Regulation 55 
and the no case to answer discourse which arose out of these cases in respect of the 
fair trial rights of the accused. 
 Chapter 6 will analyse the Ntaganda judgment which dealt with the crimes of rape 
and sexual slavery as war crimes. The chapter will focus on international humanitarian 
law, victim participation as well as the principle of legality. 
Chapter 7 will conclude and include key recommendations based on the analysis 
of case law in the preceding chapters. All of these selected cases will be analysed 
against the fair trial framework as set out in the current chapter, and with due regard 






CHAPTER 2: DIALECTICAL TENSIONS EXPLORED  
2 1  Introduction 
The previous chapter set out the theoretical framework for the discussion. The 
chapter focused on the dialectical tensions of the rights of the accused in relation to 
the rights and roles of other role-players within the institutional framework of the ICC.  
In this chapter, the inherent tensions between the rights of the accused, victims’ 
rights and the expectations of the international community, in lieu of the classification 
of the cases as the “most serious crimes under international law that affect the whole 
of humankind”170 will be identified. This chapter, therefore, serves to explore the 
various opinions of authors on the inherent tensions between the rights of the accused 
and the roles of victims, prosecutors and judges and the international community in 
the ICC trial process.  
As a result of the fact that the ICC has awarded a prominent role in court 
proceedings to the participation of victims, in particular, the chapter will extrapolate on 
this advancement in international criminal law as well as reviewing the roles of 
prosecutors, judges and the international community.  
 
2 2  Victims’ rights 
 The participation of victims is a unique feature of the ICC aimed at ensuring that 
victims are given the opportunity to be heard and for their truth of events to be told. 
The inclusion of the right of victims to participate in proceedings at the ICC has 
however been an immense challenge for the court as neither the Statute nor the rules 
of the court provide much guidance on the manner of such participation. However, for 
the purposes of understanding the role of victims in the international criminal law 
discourse, it is important to review how their role became more defined within the 
Rome Statute.  
A great milestone for the rights of victims in international criminal law can be 
attributed to the UN Victims Declaration which was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1985.171 This was followed almost twenty years later, by the adoption by 
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the General Assembly in 2005 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
a remedy and reparations for victims of gross violations of international human rights 
law, as referred to in more detail in chapter 1. These guidelines significantly advanced 
victim’s rights in the international criminal law arena by granting victims’ rights to 
access to justice and reparations amongst other rights. Another important victory for 
victims was the adoption in 2005 of the Guidelines on child victims and witnesses of 
crime.172 These guidelines acknowledge the particular vulnerabilities of children and 
witnesses of crime and afford protection to them and highlight their rights to dignity, 
non-discrimination and that the best interests of the child should always be taken into 
account. These guidelines were critical in the advancement of victim’s rights within the 
international criminal context and served to solidify the protections which victims of 
gross human rights violations are entitled to. 
 
2 2 1  The rights of victims in the statute and rules of procedure and evidence  
A definition of the notion of victim cannot be found in the Rome Statute but rather 
in Rule 85 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”), which states as 
follows: 
 
For the purposes of the Statute and the RPE: 
1. ‘Victims’ means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the commission 
of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
2. Victims may include organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any 
of their property that is dedicated to religion, education, art, science, or charitable 
purposes and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for 
humanitarian purposes. 
 
Article 68 introduces the protection of victims and witnesses participating in ICC 
proceedings. It is interesting to note that the participation of victims is qualified by 
wording in the Statute to the effect that such participation should “not prejudice the fair 
trial rights of the accused”: 
Article 68(3) reads as follows: 
 
                                                          






“Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views 
and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to 
be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with 
the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be 
presented by the legal representatives of the victims where the Court considers it 
appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” 
 
Article 68(3) defines the scope of victim’s participation into two processes; first, the 
court will decide at which stage of proceedings victims may participate and then this 
is qualified further by stating that the manner of such participation should not be 
prejudicial or inconsistent with the rights of the accused to a fair trial. Any reference to 
“the court” means the judges of the ICC. It is therefore evident that it is the 
responsibility of the judges to ensure a balance between the participation of victims 
and the rights of the accused. 
For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to understand the manner in which 
victims are allowed to participate in proceedings as set out in the Rules of Procedure. 
Under Rule 89, victims wanting to participate in proceedings are directed to apply to 
the Registry, which then passes on the applications to the relevant chamber. The rule 
also mentions the possibility of victims making opening and closing statements. Rule 
91(2) provides that legal representatives of victims may participate in proceedings and 
adds that the prosecution and defence shall be allowed to reply to any written or oral 
observation by a victims' representative. Rule 91(3)(a) specifies that legal 
representatives of victims may apply to put questions to a witness, the accused, or an 
expert witness.  
The participation of victims in proceedings is best explained in the ICC booklet 
which was developed to guide victims on the manner in which they may participate in 
proceedings: 
Victims’ participation in proceedings is entirely different from a victim’s possible role 
as a witness called to testify before the Court for the Prosecution, the defence or the 
victims’ legal representative. 
 
Victim as a participant:  
(i) Participation is voluntary and involves communicating to the Court their own 





(ii) Participation is possible at all stages of proceedings when considered 
appropriate by the judges  
(iii) Always entitled to be represented before the ICC by a legal representative  
(iv) Participates via a legal representative, and need not appear in person  
 
Victim as a witness:  
(i) Called by the Prosecution, the defence, the victims’ legal representative or 
the Chamber 
(ii) Serve the interests of the Court and the party that calls them  
(iii) Give evidence by testifying and answering related questions  
(iv) Called to testify at a specific time  
(v) Does not normally have a legal representative  
(vi) Normally testify in person in the courtroom  
 
Victims may also participate as witnesses in ICC proceedings and in such cases, 
these individuals have a double status (as a victim on the one hand and witness on 
the other).173 
In the case law discussion of this dissertation, it will be shown that there have been 
various problems related to the participation of victims in proceedings before the ICC. 
Some of these problems relate to the stage of proceedings at which victims are 
allowed to participate as well as the potential fair trial rights of the accused on which 
such participation may infringe. 
To this end, various authors have weighed in on the debate. Zappala,174 for 
example, elaborates on the various rights that victims enjoy including the right to 
justice, the right to the truth, the right to be heard as well as the right to obtain 
compensation. He clarifies that victims are unable to claim the same rights as those 
contained in the Statute for the accused. He goes on to note that the purpose of 
criminal procedure is to ensure that the individual is protected against any potential 
abuse or error by the public authorities conducting investigations, prosecutions and 
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trials.175 The purpose of victims participating by presenting their views and concerns 
must, therefore, not be confused by thinking that victims are parties to proceedings, 
he points out. It is clear that the accused is a party to proceedings and that there is a 
distinction between the participation of victims and the fair trial rights of the accused. 
There are, however, opposing views to this and many who support the role of victim 
participation at the ICC.  
Hobbs176 goes on to list the benefits of victim participation177 and acknowledges 
that there may be difficulties both substantively and administratively between the 
participation of victims conflicting with the rights of the accused, but he is of the opinion 
that this will be ironed out over time by the court.  
A further benefit is providing a role for victims within the criminal justice system that 
can promote knowledge, awareness, and understanding of the criminal proceedings 
that they may not otherwise be exposed to, Hobbs highlights.  
In defining who the parties to proceedings before the ICC are, given the relatively 
new concept of victim participation within the court proceedings, one author, 
Palomares clarifies the position as follows: 
 
“According to the legal text which governs the international criminal process under the ICC, 
the victims have an important role to play, certainly not as a party, but as a participant. The 
difference is that the participants cannot do the same things that the parties to the 
proceeding (prosecutor and defence) can do. They are going to be significantly involved in 
the process, albeit not at the same level as the parties. Nevertheless, the ICC system is 
regarded as an enormous trend shift as regards victim participation.”178 
 
This author therefore clarifies that the prosecutor and the accused are parties to the 
proceedings in what is considered to be a mixed accusatorial and inquisitorial 
procedure at the ICC. 
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2 2 2  The tension between the rights of the accused and the rights of victims 
While acknowledging the important reasons for the participation of victims, in 
matters of gross human rights violations which directly impact on their lives, the critical 
tension lies in ensuring that the participation of victims does not override the fair trial 
rights of the accused in proceedings before the ICC and vice versa. Equality of arms 
dictates that there should be equality between parties participating in criminal trials. 
And, as noted above, victims are participants, but not parties to the proceedings before 
the ICC.  
In this regard, Damaska179 points out that the inherent tensions exist because the 
desire to protect the defendant and victims generates conflicting demands which 
include the equality of arms potentially being compromised as well as the presumption 
of innocence of the accused.180 Therefore, the rights of victims should never be allowed 
to infringe on the defendant’s right to be deemed innocent until proven guilty. This, the 
author argues has far-reaching consequences, which are largely dependent on the 
discretion given to prosecutors, which will be discussed under the role of the 
prosecutor in this chapter.181  
Damaska, further opines that human rights should be used as a guideline in 
addressing these tensions182 – a view that supports the basis of the human rights 
framework of this dissertation in that when there is uncertainty or conflict, the court 
should revert to the international human rights framework as set out in the previous 
chapter.  
Ling183 argues that although there are competing rights and the participation of 
multiple actors, we have to distinguish between the rights and interests of role-players 
in the criminal trial to ensure that a fair trial takes place in international criminal courts. 
This point will be important in the analysis of case law in the next chapter,184 particularly 
                                                          
179 M Damaska “The Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for International 
Criminal Tribunals” (2010-2011) North Carolina Journal of International Law 365. 
180 374. 
181 See part 3 1 of Chapter 3: The role of the Prosecutor. 
182 Damaska (2010-2011) North Carolina Journal of International Law 379. 
183 W Ling “Fair Treatment in Transnational and international criminal law” (2013) 25 Singapore 
Academy of Law Journal 783. 





regarding the conflict between the rights of the defendant and the participation of 
victims.  
A fundamental concern and one that is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 of the 
dissertation relates to the stage at which victims are allowed to participate in 
proceedings. One author, McAsey,185 elaborated on this aspect by emphasising that 
the concern is that the participation of victims at the investigation stage of proceedings 
may influence the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute an unidentified accused.186  
In determining the timing or stage of proceedings for the participation of victims, 
Article 15(3)187 allows victims to make representations and Article 19(3)188 provides for 
the submission of “observations” on issues of jurisdiction and admissibility.  
Mcdermott189 recommends that the Chamber should examine whether Article 68(3) 
participation would be prejudicial to the rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial 
when victims’ personal interests are affected and at what stage participation would be 
most appropriate. Mcdermott190 is of the view that the following modalities of 
participation are unacceptable: views and concerns, criteria, presentation of points of 
law, access to the prosecutor’s documents and the introduction of evidence pertaining 
to the guilt or innocence of the accused.  
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When considering the stage of proceedings at which victims are allowed to 
participate, De Beco191 opines that the stage of participation was largely clarified by 
the Appeals Chamber judgment in Lubanga192 in which it was concluded that victims 
are no longer allowed to participate in an investigation in general and that victims have 
to demonstrate that their personal interests are affected in order to participate in 
proceedings relating to an investigation. This decision will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 3.  
Besides the stage of victim participation, other challenges related to the 
participation of victims in trial proceedings have been in relation to the presumption of 
innocence of the accused, the disclosure of evidence and the manner in which victims 
have been allowed to participate in proceedings.193 If victims were allowed to 
participate in proceedings at such an early stage, particularly in respect of jurisdictional 
issues, this would negatively affect the presumption of innocence of the accused at a 
very early stage, prior to actual evidence being led during trial. It is submitted that the 
testimony of victims at different stages of proceedings, depending on how the judges 
manage their participation, could influence the views of the judges in situations when 
they are deciding on preliminary matters in the case. It is for the prosecutor to prove 
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the participation of victims could have the effect of 
the accused having to defend his/her case both against the prosecutor and the victims. 
This is of particular importance in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. It will be described 
how the Court had to decide on the jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in the 
Ntaganda case.  
In respect of the presumption of innocence of the accused, Zappala194 opines that 
the participation of victims creates an underlying presumption that the events occurred 
in given circumstances and that certain people were there. In criminal trials, it is 
customary for the prosecutor to bear the onus, not the victims, of proving guilt beyond 
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reasonable doubt. Zappala195 argues therefore when victims are admitted to the 
proceedings on the basis of a preliminary finding that a crime was committed against 
them, there may be a presumption as to the unfolding of events and this may create a 
situation that the trial will only be limited to the legal characterisation of the events as 
presented by the victim. He confirms that irrespective of the victim’s participation in 
the trial, the defendant has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and 
the onus is on the prosecutor to prove the contrary.  
These observations are of the utmost importance in assessing whether the accused 
enjoys the full extent of his/her fair trial rights at the ICC. The presumption of innocence 
is a fundamental right and the very existence and participation of victims pose the 
potential risk of influencing not only the prosecutor but also the judges at the ICC. The 
various interpretations related to the manner of such participation will become clearer 
in the chapters on case law. The ICC has tried to address some of these challenges 
by developing the booklet for victim’s participation at the ICC as well as for their legal 
representatives.196 
Van der Wyngaert J,197 one of the judges at the ICC who also served in the Appeals 
Chamber, produced an academic paper on the role of victim participation at the ICC. 
The judge acknowledges that the judges at the ICC have given a broad interpretation 
of victims’ rights, as is evidenced in the Lubanga and Katanga cases respectively (See 
Chapters 3 and 4). The judge198 interprets Article 68(3) by emphasising that it makes 
it clear that victims’ participation must not come at the expense of the defence. She 
highlights that the Katanga case gave victims the right to disclose potentially 
exonerating evidence, which begs the question as to why the victims did not have a 
corresponding duty to disclose exculpatory material. The judge199 further asserts that 
in a criminal trial, victims do not appear in person but have legal representatives, which 
serves to slow down proceedings.  
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Another author, Fedorova200 particularly challenges the role of legal representatives 
for victims and argues that in both the Lubanga (Chapter 3) and Bemba decisions 
(Chapter 5) victim participation was approached from a broad perspective and legal 
representatives were allowed to ask questions going beyond the charges against the 
accused for the purpose of establishing the guilt of the accused, almost on the same 
footing as the prosecution.  
On the flip side, arguments in favour of victim participation are equally compelling. 
The basic norms as discussed in the previous chapter were developed to ensure that 
victims are given equal access to justice and as such are entitled to participate in trials, 
particularly insofar as the prosecution of the crime has a direct bearing on their 
experience as a victim thereof.  
For example, Aldana-Pindell argues that the purpose of these emerging norms has 
been to alleviate victims' exclusion from the criminal process. The norms establish that 
states must guarantee victims an effective prosecution as a remedy whenever violent 
crimes are committed against them. Furthermore, these norms grant victims certain 
participatory rights in criminal proceedings by establishing mechanisms by which 
victims may have input into the criminal process.201 And, Aldana-Pindell points out, 
that surviving human rights victims, participate in prosecutions against those accused 
of gross human rights violations but that the level of participation has varied depending 
on the degree of risk, resources, and the parameters established by law in their 
respective countries.202 She avers that International norms have been developed 
specifically to grant victims standing to participate in the criminal process and this 
participation allows victims to monitor the states actions and to advance their interests 
in truth and justice. An example of this is evident in the Rome Statute of the 
International Court and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.203  
A further argument advanced is that procedural justice for victims involves access 
to redress and fair treatment within proceedings. In this regard, Moffett emphasises 
the following measures which needs to be put in place to ensure the effective 
participation of victims in criminal trials; including a number of provisions including 
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protection measures, participation in proceedings which affect their interests, access 
to legal representation, assistance and support, and the ability to claim reparations.204  
Conversely, Moffett argues that substantive justice comprises the outcomes of 
judicial processes and therefore redress for the harm they have suffered.205 Therefore 
human rights law for victims includes truth, justice and reparations. And, importantly, 
that the right to truth involves determining what international crimes occurred, the 
context and consequences, as well as the fate and whereabouts of those who died.206 
It is furthermore argued that the right to justice entails victims' procedural access to 
redress as well as to seek prosecution of those responsible. However, the right to 
justice does not grant victims a particular outcome, such as a conviction, due to 
limitations in evidence or other public interest concerns rather it is confined to pursuing 
criminal redress against a responsible actor.  
Lastly, the right to reparations allows victims the right to appropriate remedial 
measures to alleviate their harm. In comparison to the other two rights, reparations 
can provide more tangible measures to victims that can improve their quality of life but 
is limited by economic considerations.207 Moffett, therefore, contextualises the rights 
afforded to victims and the meaning equated with their participation in criminal trials 
as well as the limitation that their participation does not always guarantee a conviction.  
Garduno reviews the manner in which victim participation has occurred within the 
trials at the ICC and argues that various Chambers have held that victim participation 
needs to be “meaningful” rather than “purely symbolic.”208  
She argues that Article 68(3) does not provide an “unfettered right for victims to 
participate”, nor is there an unqualified right for victims to participate individually in the 
proceedings. 
She further goes on to note that the ICC has adopted an approach of deciding victim 
participation on a case-by-case basis in light of the evidence/issue at stake and 
considering the rights of the accused, the need to ensure that the proceedings are 
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effective and expeditious, and the interests of the victims concerned.209 To date, she 
argues that the ICC has demonstrated an interest in pursuing a collective approach to 
victim participation instead of the original highly individualised system. Since 2012, 
decisions of the ICC have indicated that certain judges also recognise the value of a 
more collective approach. It can therefore be argued that the collective approach can 
reduce the participation of individual victims and could mute or dilute the voices of 
victims, particularly vulnerable victims such as women, children, and minorities.210  
The collective approach was adopted mainly to streamline the application process, 
as will be demonstrated in the case law pertaining to victim participation in Chapter 4 
which is based on the Katanga case. 
These arguments demonstrate that there are both benefits and potential challenges 
with victim participation particularly between the rights of the accused to a fair trial and 
the rights of victims to access to justice, redress and reparation for the harm suffered. 
The argument is not that victim’s rights do not hold value, in fact, their rights are of the 
utmost concern in relation to the harm which they have suffered. The argument, 
however, is premised on the fact that the rights and participation of victims need to be 
clearly defined within the context of an international criminal trial, bearing in mind the 
competing interests of the accused and victims.  
 
2 2 3  Proposals for addressing the challenges in victim participation 
The fact that the Statute provides insufficient guidance on the manner of 
participation nor does it provide mechanisms for addressing the challenges related to 
the participation of victims at the ICC, requires the judges of the court to develop 
guidelines and direction in this matter. This is evidenced in Chapter 6 of the 
dissertation.  
However, some recommendations have been made to address some of the 
challenges as is evidenced by Tonellato,211 who, in considering the issue of victim 
participation and the stages at which such participation should occur, concluded that 
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the rules of the court in respect of victims should be interpreted narrowly, in light of the 
defendant’s rights, while bearing in mind the restorative purpose of victim participation. 
Tonellato argues for a nuanced approach that takes into account the rights and 
interests of both the victim and the accused.  
She furthermore stresses the wide discretion granted to judges in respect to victims’ 
participation, which has left several gaps, and notes that the chamber has struggled 
to balance divergent interests.212 In order to avoid general uncertainty, clear criteria 
and boundaries to victim’s participation should be provided.213  
Once again it becomes clear that the judges play a fundamental role in providing 
guidance on this matter and the dissertation will demonstrate that the decisions of the 
different chambers in different cases were often confusing, but over time there seems 
to be a clearer proposal for a way forward (as discussed in Chapter 6 regarding the 
Ntaganda judgment’s further guidelines for the participation of victims as produced by 
the Chamber).  
Zappala214 supports the argument regarding the importance of the role of judges 
and opines that there is a lack of clarity regarding victim participation and this requires 
that judges provide direction on modes of participation on a case-by-case basis.215 
Zappala reiterates that victims should be given very limited powers to intervene in the 
trial process and that the general principle is that participation must be consistent with 
the rights of the accused, furthermore, judges are entrusted with ensuring the 
appropriate balance.216 
Moffett argues that there have been concerns that state parties wish to see a more 
coherent victim participation regime emerge, but judges have defended such moves 
to protect their discretion in responding to the circumstances in each case. He 
recommends that as a compromise, judges should have some flexibility to determine 
exceptional rights for victims, such as anonymous participation, but that modalities of 
presenting evidence, etcetera, remain the same in each case. He furthermore agreed 
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and supported the annex of the revised ICC Victim Strategy217 which outlines the 
“rights or possibilities” of victim participation as a welcome step towards making 
participation more harmonised.218 
Van den Wyngaert J219 suggests that the Court needs to establish whether the 
participation of victims is meaningful and whether it justifies the number of resources 
and time expended. She suggests that a possible alternative may be to transform the 
TFV into a reparations commission that would deal directly with reparation claims. 
This, the judge argues would remove the victims from criminal proceedings and allow 
victims to take their claims directly to the TFV Reparations Commission.220 This is a 
very valid recommendation as it does not discount the rights of victims to be heard, to 
tell their truths and to be compensated accordingly, it also provides a more contained 
environment for victims to express their views and to be heard. The value of Truth 
Commissions is clearly evident in the South African perspective in relation to apartheid 
crimes and how they were dealt with taking into account both the transgressors of the 
crimes as well as the victims. 
Moffett holds a different view to Van den Wyngaert and, in fact, responds: 
 
“Judge Van den Wyngaert has suggested that 'it may be too much to expect from the ICC 
to be a retributive (fighting impunity) and a restorative mechanism at the same time. 
However, while Judge Van den Wyngaert is correct, the ICC cannot deliver justice to all 
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victims, this does not mean sole resort to restorative justice or dissociating justice for 
victims from ending impunity.”221 
 
He argues that we should instead be focusing our efforts on how to improve justice 
for those victims before the ICC and concentrating attention on what states should be 
doing to redress international crimes.222  
Notably, both views hold value in the discourse related to the participation of victims 
at the ICC and there seems to be an acknowledgement that the current system of 
victim participation at the ICC may not be sustainable in the long term. The view 
supported in this dissertation is not that the rights and participation of victims within 
international criminal law is not valid, the view instead is that the participation of victims 
may well not be fulfilled in the context of the international criminal court setting. This 
is based on the premise that even though, the Rome Statute proposes the inclusion 
of international human rights law and the participation of victims, the court itself may 
not have the capacity to implement such a noble notion and succeed in upholding the 
rights of both the victims and the accused. 
 
2 3  The importance of the roles of the prosecutor, the judges and the 
international community 
2 3 1  The prosecutor 
Due to the significant role that victims play at the ICC, the role of the prosecutor in 
proceedings becomes vitally important explicitly so in relation to the fair trial rights of 
the accused person. Fedorova223 observes that even though the prosecutor has to fulfil 
different roles, ultimately due to the complexity of the cases before international 
criminal courts, and the widespread victimisation, the prosecutor will focus his/her 
efforts on securing convictions. This issue was explored briefly in chapter 1 which 
discussed the role of the prosecutor both legally but also potentially as a political actor. 
The duties and powers of the prosecutor is set out in Article 54 of the Statute as 
follows: 
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1. The Prosecutor shall:  
 
“(a) In order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence 
relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, 
and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally;  
(b) Take appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, respect the interests and 
personal circumstances of victims and witnesses, including age, gender as defined in 
article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and take into account the nature of the crime, in particular 
where it involves sexual violence, gender violence or violence against children; and  
(c) Fully respect the rights of persons arising under this Statute.” 
 
Subsection (c) is of particular importance in this Article of the Statute as it places 
an obligation on the prosecutor to respect the rights of accused persons as well as in 
subsection (b) victims. Subsection (a) makes it clear that a critical role of the 
prosecutor is to establish the truth. In establishing such truth, it is submitted that part 
of the respect which the prosecutor should accord to the accused person in respect of 
fair trial rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, 
the prosecutor should also ensure that the accused person understands the charges 
against him/her in order to adequately prepare a defence and most importantly the 
prosecutor has a duty to disclose relevant evidence to the accused person. Similarly, 
the prosecutor has to afford respect to the interests and personal circumstances of 
victims, taking into account the nature of the crime, particularly where it pertains to 
sexual violence, gender violence and violence against children. The prosecutor, 
therefore, has a duty to balance the rights of the accused and the rights of victims 
equally. 
Fedorova224 opines that the mandate of a prosecutor demands not only an active 
search for all the relevant evidence but also the presentation of such evidence to the 
court. This role, Fedorova explains, places the prosecutor in a position that obliges 
him to protect the accused as well as to fight his case against him. In the chapters on 
case law (Chapter 3) some of the difficulties encountered by the prosecutor, including 
the obligation to disclose evidence, particularly exculpatory evidence, will be 






discussed in greater detail.225 In addition to such disclosure of evidence, the 
Prosecutor also has a duty to make available for inspection by the Defence, materials 
in the possession or control of the Prosecutor that are important to the preparation of 
the defence. This duty contributes to the fair trial right of the accused to ensure the 
adequate preparation of a defence. Stewart226 opines that the ICC disclosure regime 
is fundamental to the guarantee of a fair trial and that disclosure has a significant 
impact upon the ability of the accused to make full answer and defence to the charges. 
Stewart further notes the dual role that the prosecutor plays by having to be sensitive 
to the interests and well-being of victims and witnesses but also being respectful of 
the rights of the accused.  
Closely linked to the disclosure obligation, is the right of the accused to be informed 
promptly and in detail of the nature and content of the charges. This is a fundamental 
right as it ensures that the accused is able to present a proper defence. Stewart227 is 
of the view that this right places an onus upon the prosecutor to draft the document 
containing the charges (“DCC”) in clear language that informs the defence of the case 
he or she has to meet.  
Another problem or concern that arises consistently in the case law chapters of the 
dissertation relates to the re-characterisation of charges contained in Regulation 55. 
Stewart228 explains this further and states that the DCC does not preclude the 
possibility of changes in the legal characterisation of the facts in the course of the trial, 
without a formal amendment to the charges, as long as those underlying facts and 
circumstances remain unchanged. The case law will reveal the extreme difficulties 
encountered by the chambers at the ICC in respect of the application of this 
Regulation. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the presumption of innocence is the 
right of the accused and the onus to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable 
doubt rests with the prosecutor. A challenge as discussed earlier in this chapter is the 
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influence that the participation of victims may have on the accused’s fundamental right 
to be presumed innocent.  
Another difficulty with the role of the prosecutor has been that the prosecutor has 
been criticised for having too wide discretionary power at the ICC, particularly in 
respect of his/her selection of cases to investigate and prosecute. At the ICC, 
situations for investigation may arise as a result of a Security Council referral (Article 
13), State Party referral (Article 14) and prosecutorial initiative (Article 15). Article 15229 
contains the essence of the roles and duties of the prosecutor at the ICC particularly 
in respect of the initiation of investigations. Lepard230 is of the view that Article 15 gives 
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the prosecutor the greatest degree of discretion in respect of launching investigations 
into situations. He states:  
 
“More broadly, many critics have observed that all of the situations under investigation to 
date have occurred on the continent of Africa. This lends support to suspicions that the 
Prosecutor is biased against developing countries and in favor of Western countries-that 
the ICC is, in the words of Professor Schabas's Article written for this symposium, a twenty-
first century agent of "victor's justice.” 231  
 
In addition, Aptel232 highlights the following conflicts and discretionary powers 
granted to the prosecutor: the preliminary components in the decision to investigate 
or prosecute; determination of specific entities falling within the limits set by the 
applicable jurisdiction; individual targets to be investigated or prosecuted;233 selection 
of the specific factual allegations to be listed in the charges; the legal characterisation 
of the offence;234 and the discretionary choice of witnesses, including victims.235 These 
authors allude to the wide range of potential challenges that the prosecutor may face.  
In addressing these criticisms, the prosecutor published Regulations in 2009 and 
issued a policy paper on the “interests of justice” criteria.236 Commenting on the 
aforesaid, Lepard237 is of the view that the guidelines and policy paper demonstrates 
some progress, but that these could be more precise in respect of how the prosecutor 
selects cases and the author proposes the use of human rights as a guiding principle. 
However, the prosecutor has relied on the gravity threshold when  selecting cases.238 
The key provisions related to the gravity threshold is contained in Articles 17(1)(d), 
53(1)(b) and 53(2)(b) and Article 17(1)(d) of the Statute. These articles of the Statute 
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require a case to be of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court; and Article 
53239 places an obligation on the prosecutor to consider the gravity of a situation or 
case when deciding whether to initiate an investigation or a prosecution.  
A statement240 made by the previous prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, on the 
issue of gravity, reads, in part, as follows: 
 
“Among the most important of these criteria is gravity. We are currently in the process of 
refining our methodologies for assessing gravity. In particular, there are several factors that 
must be considered. The most obvious of these is the number of persons killed - as this 
tends to be the most reliably reported. However, we will not necessarily limit our 
investigations to situations where killing has been the predominant crime. We also look at 
number of victims of other crimes, especially crimes against physical integrity. The impact 
of the crimes is another important factor.” 
 
It is noteworthy that the office of the prosecutor (“OTP”) has produced guidelines 
related to their selection of cases and decisions to prosecute crimes, however, it must 
be noted that to date, the cases that have been selected are still mainly from African 
states.  
In addition to gravity, Aptel241 argues that you cannot ignore the political pressure 
that prosecutors must face in making their decisions regarding cases. Aptel242 argues 
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240 Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Informal 
meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs New York (2005) <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9D70039E-4BEC-4F32-9D4A-
CEA8B6799E37/143836/LMO_20051024_English.pdf> (accessed 12-06-2016) 6. 






that the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and widespread or systematic 
war crimes are usually perpetrated as the result of state-sponsored policies and is by 
their very nature political.  
 
“Therefore, prosecuting those accused of these crimes impact on the politics of a country 
and the discretionary powers afforded to prosecutors impact on politics, on the perception 
of individual and collective guilt and innocence, on the historical recognition of the crimes, 
and also on the victims.”243 
  
This is an important point that is also true for the role of judges and how it affects 
independence and impartiality at the ICC. However, the final decision regarding 
initiating and the pursuance of investigations rests with the decision of the pre-trial 
chamber. Therefore, the role of judges becomes extremely important in making any 
final decisions pertaining to the cases to be tried at the ICC.  
The wide discretion given to the prosecutor in the selection of cases coupled with 
having to take into account both the victims’ rights as well as the rights of the accused 
poses potential challenges at the ICC. It must also be borne in mind that the prosecutor 
has an immense amount of pressure placed on him/her from the international 
community to ensure successful convictions at the ICC. It is with this in mind that the 
obvious tensions related to the role of the prosecutor come into play particularly in light 
of ensuring that the fair trial rights of the accused are secured. Fedorova244 
encapsulates the tensions in the role of the prosecutor quite eloquently as follows: 
 
“As the representative of the international community in general, and the victims of the most 
serious crimes in particular, the prosecutor has a duty to vigorously pursue the institution’s 
primary objective to prosecute those most responsible for international crimes and, thus, to 
end impunity.”  
 
Whether or not this is true can only be seen through the analysis of the case law 
that will extrapolate more clearly on how the prosecutor approaches conflicting rights 
and interests in the exercise of his or her duties. A further recommendation to the vast 
discretionary power granted to prosecutors as well as the conflicting roles have been 







made by Markovic,245 who is of the view that the prosecutor requires a code of conduct, 
which would provide a common framework for conceptualising the prosecutor’s 
obligations under the Rome Statute. He asserts that such a code would serve to 
protect the rights of the defence, create a historical record and educate those affected 
by war crimes. This recommendation, as well as ensuring that prosecutors are held 
accountable for their actions and misconduct, is found in Chapter 3 of the dissertation.  
 
2 3 2  The role of judges 
Arguably, the most important role player in the international criminal trial is the judge 
as the final arbiter of proceedings and decisions. The role of the judge is important in 
ensuring fairness in trial processes, equity between the parties and ameliorating the 
contentious issues that may arise between the participation of victims and the fair trial 
rights of the accused. In addition, it is the judge and the chambers of the ICC who 
exercise judicial oversight over the conduct of the prosecutor. 
Banach-Gutierrez,246 in discussing the mandate of judges at the ICC, avers that 
criminal processes should achieve both substantive and procedural justice. Put simply 
this means that each due process must be fair and just, and he quotes Schomburg J 
as follows: 
 
“the mandate of each judge or chamber is to strike a proper balance, on a case-by-case 
basis, among the due process rights of the accused, the public interests in transparency 
and the safety and dignity of victims and witnesses”.247 
 
Therefore, in exercising their mandate, judges have the following duties as 
espoused in Article 64(3) of the Statute: 
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“Upon assignment of a case for trial in accordance with this Statute, the Trial Chamber 
assigned to deal with the case shall:  
(a) Confer with the parties and adopt such procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair 
and expeditious conduct of the proceedings;  
(b) Determine the language or languages to be used at trial; and  
(c) Subject to any other relevant provisions of this Statute, provide for disclosure of 
documents or information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance of the 
commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.” 
 
And further, Article 64(8)(b): 
 
“At the trial, the presiding judge may give directions for the conduct of proceedings, 
including to ensure that they are conducted in a fair and impartial manner. Subject to any 
directions of the presiding judge, the parties may submit evidence in accordance with the 
provisions of this Statute.” 
 
It is clear from the provisions of the Statute that the judges are primarily responsible 
for giving direction and further for protecting the fair trial rights of the accused and 
victims. More importantly, in weighing up and mediating various interests, Article 64(2) 
provides that the rights of the accused and the protection of victims are equally 
important when determining the role of judges. This article states as follows: 
 
“The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with 
full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and 
witnesses.” 
 
The provisions of this article are twofold, first the Trial Chamber or judges should 
ensure that a trial is both fair and expeditious and secondly, such assurance provided 
by the chamber dictates that judges should have full respect for the rights of the 
accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.  
Zappala,248 who supports the fair trial rights of the accused as of primary importance 
in international criminal trials, is of the view that the balance of rights between the 
victim and the accused should be attained by international criminal courts and that the 
primacy of the fair trial rights of the accused should be attained at three levels:  
 
                                                          





“Firstly, it must be recognised within the relevant normative instruments regulating the 
activities of each given court; secondly, it must be ensured by the judges in the proceedings 
on a case by case basis; thirdly, there should be some mechanism of redress in case of 
violations.”  
 
In terms of this view,249 the importance of the role of judges in balancing the rights 
between the accused and the victims is reiterated. Nevertheless, Zappala 
acknowledges that the manner in which judges are currently dealing with the balancing 
of rights on a case-by-case basis may not be ideal because it allows room for different 
defendants in different cases being treated differently. He, therefore, suggests that 
some level of consistency should be applied but also that judges should ensure judicial 
management of court functions. 
In the words of an international committee of experts of the Association 
Internationale de Droit Penal in 1982:  
 
“A fair and equitable system of administration of justice and the effective protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms depend as much on the independence of lawyers 
as on the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. The independence of lawyers and 
the judiciary mutually complement and support each other as integral parts of the same 
system of justice.”250 
 
Hence, one can conclude that the judges play a significant role in all proceedings 
before the court and that they should not be swayed by any external influences. The 
role of judges will be expanded on significantly in all the cases that are analysed in 
this dissertation. Particularly, the dissertation will demonstrate the inconsistencies of 
judges in the application of Regulation 55, in the participation of victims and finally in 
their decision making, as well as how many divergent, dissenting and separate 
opinions have arisen out of the case law (particularly evident in Chapter 5). 
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2 3 3  The role of the international community 
In 1998, Kofi Annan stated:251 
 
“Some small States fear giving pretexts for more powerful ones to set aside their 
sovereignty. Others worry that the pursuit of justice may sometimes interfere with the vital 
work of making peace. But the overriding interest must be that of the victims, and of the 
international community as a whole. I trust you will not flinch from creating a court strong 
and independent enough to carry out its task. It must be an instrument of justice, not 
expediency. It must be able to protect the weak against the strong. We have before us an 
opportunity to take a monumental step in the name of human rights and the rule of law. We 
have an opportunity to create an institution that can save lives and serve as a bulwark 
against evil. So let us rise to this challenge. Let us give succeeding generations this gift of 
hope. They will not forgive us if we fail”. 
 
This statement clarifies the external expectation of the ICC in that it makes it 
emphatically clear that the prevailing interests are of the victims and the international 
community. As mentioned earlier in this chapter in respect of the political influence on 
prosecutors, one must remember that the international community, as well as State 
parties, are relying heavily on the ICC to convict those accused of the most heinous 
crimes against humanity. The impact of the ICC’s judgments will have an impact on 
victims and communities within war-torn countries. However, in order to ensure 
legitimacy, in addition to convicting and sentencing offenders, the court should be seen 
as upholding the fair trial rights of the accused and ensuring some form of deterrence 
towards future criminals. In order to achieve legitimacy and respect for the rule of the 
law, the ICC needs to not only ensure that victims’ interests are taken into account but 
also ensure that its trials are conducted in a fair manner. 
 
2 3 3 1  Demands of the international community – African states 
Many African states (and certainly the AU as a political collective) do not view the 
ICC as legitimate due to it being seen as targeting mainly African states.252This is 
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evidenced by South Africa and some other African states wishing to withdraw from the 
ICC. This view is supported by Rothe and Collins253 who argue that the ICC selectively 
enforces the law and, so far, it has mainly enforced its powers towards African 
situations and cases. The authors argue that the ICC has limited powers of 
enforcement and cite as example the re-election of (now former president) Al Bashir 
as president of Sudan while he was facing an international arrest warrant. The authors 
indirectly question the role of the prosecutor in the selection of cases and how this has 
affected the ICC’s perceived ineffectiveness.  
In understanding the underlying tensions inherent in the debate between Africa and 
the ICC, it is important to look at some viewpoints. In this regard, Benyera opines as 
follows: 
 
“In response, Africa stands almost united against the ICC particularly in light of the AU’s 
refusal to cooperate with the court regarding the arresting of the ICC’s most wanted war 
criminal, Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir. Bashir is still at large and enjoying the 
support of most African countries except Malawi, Botswana and Uganda. These countries 
reaffirmed their commitment to abide by their international legal obligation to arrest ICC 
suspects in the wake of the July 2009 AU summit’s decisions calling for non-cooperation in 
the execution of such requests The AU’s official position on the ICC issue was reached at 
their 17th summit held from 30 June to 1 July 2011 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea where 
African leaders decided to withdraw their cooperation regarding the effecting of ICC 
warrants of arrest as outlined in paragraph 6 of the Decision on the Implementation of the 
Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court.”254 
  
He argues that part of the problem includes the mechanism of self-referrals that 
demonstrate Africa’s problematic relationship with the ICC. The author avers that “at 
a glance, the role played by other African countries in these cases challenges the 
allegations that Africa is being unfairly targeted.255 He presents an interesting counter 
argument by suggesting that:  
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“Africa is not being targeted but is rather being prioritised, a situation which must be 
celebrated by those who side with the victims of human rights abuses and desire to see 
despots held to account, the argument goes.”256 
 
The following facts support this counter argument: 
Three of the seven situations under investigation by the ICC involving the DRC, 
Uganda and the CAR were self-referrals, thereby defeating the claim for victimisation. 
Only two situations, Kenya and Ivory Coast were opened at the insistence of the 
Prosecutor. Sudan (UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005)) and Libya (UNSC Resolution 1970 
(2011)) were UNSC referrals.257  
The author refers to the case of Laurent Gbagbo from the Ivory Coast, although it 
was then not a member of the ICC, it is the accused who accepted ICC jurisdiction in 
April 2003 when he was the leader of the country as provided under the provisions of 
Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute.  
The author concludes that:  
 
“[T]he number of African cases at the ICC can be taken as a manifestation of Africa’s 
commitment to end impunity. This view takes the alleged targeting of Africa as a victory for 
victims of human rights violations in Africa.”258 
 
Nkansah, agrees that the problem began with the arrest of Bashir, but holds a 
slightly different viewpoint referring to the political contexts of the ICC’s intervention as 
critical to its effectiveness of obtaining the indictees and also ensuring that its 
intervention supports the countries involved and does not aggravate the already fragile 
situation. The author avers that the ICC confronts major challenges in its interventions 
in situations of ongoing conflict and situations where the indictees have the upper hand 
or have not been subdued and that in these instances, the ICC is unsuccessful in 
obtaining the surrender of indictees to the ICC.259  
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The author concludes by recommending that a suitable way forward for the ICC is 
to take account of: 
 
“The sociocultural conditions of the African people, namely their literacy and economic 
status, cultural approaches to dispute resolution and their priority concerns vis-à-vis justice 
are critical factors to their interest, cooperation and support for the ICC.”260  
 
In presenting some recommendations to correct this perception of the ICC, 
Gegout,261 however, argues that the legitimacy of the ICC rests on institutional 
autonomy that is dependent on the support and goodwill of State Parties and non-
parties to the Rome Statute. She argues that the legitimacy and credibility of the ICC 
could increase if the ICC were able to: 
 
i)  act independently from states;  
ii)  investigate criminals on all continents, whether state officials or not;  
iii)  have the means to deliver justice in a fair way and in a short period of time; and  
iv)  where possible, defer prosecutions at the local level.  
 
All the aforementioned authors provided a context for some of the challenges and 
criticisms faced by the ICC in respect of targeting African countries. The debates 
however also served to provide a platform for meaningful introspection in terms of 
concrete recommendations for the ICC moving forward with African states in respect 
of capacity-building initiatives. 
 
2 4  Conclusion  
 This chapter has extrapolated on the rights of the victims and the accused, the 
roles of the prosecutor and judges and the international community, with a particular 
focus on African countries in the discourse related to the influence of international 
communities. The chapter further described the tensions between the rights of the 
accused and the victims at the ICC. It highlighted the challenges faced by the role-
players within the ICC.  
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The next chapter will focus on the fair trial rights of Mr Lubanga who was the first 
accused convicted at the ICC. The Chapter will focus on Mr Lubanga’s fair trial rights, 
specifically related to the implementation of Regulation 55 and the specificity of the 
charges against him, his rights to disclosure of evidence and the role of the prosecutor 








CHAPTER 3: THE FIRST CASE TRIED AT THE ICC - THOMAS LUBANGA 
3 1  Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the framework of the dialectical tensions in respect 
of the accused, victims as well as the international community (with a particular focus 
on African States), also focusing on the role of the prosecutor and judges within the 
framework of the ICC. 
This chapter will explore these tensions in the context of the jurisprudence with a 
particular focus on the fair trial rights of Mr Lubanga. This chapter seeks to unpack the 
key issues which the ICC faced in respect of the Lubanga decisions which arose from 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) and which comprises the first decision 
of the court.  
In respect of the application of fair trial rights to the Lubanga judgment, some key 
issues include the specificity of the charges, the re-characterisation of the facts, the 
disclosure of evidence, length of the trial and how the court interpreted victim 
participation. Of particular importance in this case is the manner in which the 
prosecutor handled the case, which informs my opinion that the trial was not 
conducted in a fair manner.  
 
3 2  Introduction and background to the Thomas Lubanga case 
As the alleged leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots (“UCP”) and the 
commander in chief of its military wing, the Forces patriotiques pour la libération du 
Congo (“FPLC”), Lubanga was accused of enlisting and conscripting children under 
the age of fifteen and using them to participate actively in hostilities, from September 
2002 to 13 August 2003.262 
He was found guilty, on 14 March 2012, of the war crimes of enlisting and 
conscripting of children under the age of fifteen years and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities. He was sentenced, on 10 July 2012, to a total of fourteen years 
imprisonment.263  
                                                          
262 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Case Information Sheet ICC-01/04-01/06 (2017) 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/LubangaEng.pdf> (accessed 20-03-2018). 





The Lubanga judgment was the first conviction by the ICC and the case also 
highlights the gravity of recruitment, enlistment and conscription of child soldiers. The 
case was not only the first conviction of an accused before the ICC; in many respects, 
the case also tested the Rome Statute in an institutional, systematic and legal sense 
and highlighted the rights of victims and their participation in the trial, which also sets 
legal precedent in terms of their participation in trials in the future discourse of the 
Court. 
 
3 3 The fair trial rights of the accused in various decisions of the Court 
3 3 1  The function of the Pre-trial Chamber – Confirmation of charges 
The ICC has introduced various phases in trial proceedings, one of which is the pre-
trial phase, which is a new and innovative measure, introduced into international 
criminal proceedings.  
The Pre-trial Chamber in terms of Article 57(2) of the Statute issues an arrest 
warrant if it is satisfied that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and if the person’s arrest 
appears necessary for one or more of the grounds enumerated in subparagraph 
(b).”264  
However, the confirmation of charges in terms of Article 60 of the Statute takes 
place only once the person has been surrendered to the court or has appeared before 
it on the basis of a summons to appear. Article 61265 sets out the procedures to be 
followed in a confirmation of charges hearing. Article 61(1) therefore states: 
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“Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, within a reasonable time after the person's 
surrender or voluntary appearance before the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall hold a 
hearing to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial.”266 
 
If one reviews the drafting history of the Rome Statute, it appears that Article 61 
was initially adopted with two distinct goals in mind. 
First, the confirmation of charges process was created as a check against the 
Prosecutor’s authority to determine the appropriate charges in a case. By vesting the 
Presidency – and then later the Pre-Trial Chamber – with the authority to review the 
indictment against the suspect, the Chambers would be able to ensure prosecutorial 
fairness and effectiveness in investigations. 
Second, the confirmation of charges process was created to protect the rights of 
the suspect, as it would allow a suspect to challenge the charges before proceeding 
to trial.267 It is also self-evident, that this process would allow the accused the right to 
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know the charges against him in order to adequately prepare his defence, which is a 
key fair trial right, hence this reflection of the process and charges. 
At the confirmation hearing, the Prosecutor must support each charge with sufficient 
evidence to establish “substantial grounds to believe” that the suspect has committed 
the crimes charged. Article 74(2) is of importance to the charges confirmed at the pre-
trial stage of proceedings as during a conviction decision, the Trial Chamber may “not 
exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges.”  
According to one author, Lindsay268 the Pre-trial Chamber has the power to take 
steps to preserve the rights of the Defence; it may act when unique investigative 
opportunities arise, the chamber may also appoint ad hoc defence counsel to 
represent the general interests of the Defence.  
It is also important to note that the Pre-trial Chamber plays an important role in 
supervising the prosecutorial discretion in two ways; by reviewing the participation 
applications by victims and establishing the modalities of their participation. The Pre-
trial Chamber is further responsible for determining if there is sufficient evidence to 
support an arrest warrant or a summons to appear. The Pre-trial Chamber may well 
have unique investigative powers as espoused by Lindsay, but the prosecutor also 
has too much discretion in respect of the selection of cases and the issuance of arrest 
warrants as well as his disclosure of evidence, which will be discussed further in this 
chapter.  
According to Safferling269 the rights of the defence is open to infringement in various 
ways; for instance, the Rome Statute does not protect the right to physical and mental 
integrity of a person or the right to privacy or data protection vis-à-vis prosecutorial 
measures such as search and seizure, interception of telecommunication or forensic 
testing.  
He goes further to identify the following interests of the defence at the pre-trial 
phase of proceedings; adherence to procedural provisions, which means that defence 
counsel should be informed of the procedural steps being undertaken by the 
prosecutor and be given the opportunity to attend the taking of evidence and the 
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questioning of witnesses; legitimacy of investigative measures, which refers to 
evidence that could potentially have been obtained in an illegal manner; examination 
of witnesses or expert witnesses, which may be problematic particularly in respect of 
the transporting of the results of evidence to the trial without an in-depth analysis of 
the testimony before declaring admissibility; and lastly coordination of different 
national legal systems and the Rome Statute, which means that defence counsel must 
ensure that despite the complexity of applying different legal systems there is no 
disadvantage to the defence.270  
It is worthwhile to note that, in addition to the list of procedural rules, which the 
defence must comply with at the pre-trial phase, the defence often does not have the 
same resources at its disposal as the prosecutor. This situation worsens if charges 
against the accused lack specificity and the accused is, therefore, placed in the 
unfortunate position of not having legal certainty in respect of the case against him/her, 
which also affects his or her ability to prepare an adequate defence. 
Therefore, the Pre-trial Chamber may be an innovative concept, but the application 
of the laws must be viewed with caution and applied with the rights of the accused in 
mind. Further, the discretion given to the prosecutor to select cases for investigation 
and to decide on the charges to be brought is quite broad within the context of the pre-
trial Chamber, which could act contrary to the fair trial rights of the defendant. A 
balance must be struck between the discretion given to the prosecutor and the rights 
of the defendant to ensure that a fair and effective international trial runs smoothly. 
 
3 3 2  Lubanga Confirmation of Charges hearing – The right to be informed promptly 
and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge 
In Lubanga, the Pre-trial Chamber confirmed charges not only in respect of the war 
crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers in non-international armed conflict but 
also in respect of the war crime, committed in international armed conflict, without 
inviting the Prosecutor to first amend the charges.271  
An important aspect to this part of the trial is that it defines the subject matter. In 
this regard, Article 74(2) of the Statute states that the Trial Chamber, in its decision, 
may “not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges.” This was 
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particularly significant in Lubanga where the charges against him were limited to the 
conscription, enlistment and use of child soldiers. During the trial, however, witnesses 
testified to the sexual abuse that they suffered as child soldiers.  
The Pre-trial Chamber in the confirmation of charges hearing further characterised 
the conflict in Ituri as international because of Uganda’s presence in the DRC.272 It is 
important to understand the difference between the characterisation as national or 
international in relation to the charges brought against Lubanga. In an international 
context, child soldier crimes are listed as “[c]onscription or enlisting children under the 
age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively 
in hostilities”. In a non-national armed conflict, the crimes are listed as: “Conscripting 
or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using 
them to participate actively in hostilities.”273  
The Pre- Trial Chamber decided that: “Accordingly, the Chamber finds that there is 
sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that from early 
September 2002 to 13 August 2003, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo incurred criminal 
responsibility as a co-perpetrator within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute 
for the crimes referred to in Section IV of this decision.274 Mr Lubanga was therefore 
charged with three counts of war crimes including: 
 
(i) enlistment of children under the age of fifteen,  
(ii) conscription of children under the age of fifteen, and  
(iii) use of children under the age of fifteen to actively participate in hostilities.275 
 
The crimes and charges confirmed against Mr Lubanga were serious gender-based 
crimes which had a direct bearing on many children and victims.276 
                                                          
272 Para 204. 
273 S Kammer “Deconstructing Lubanga, The ICC’s First Case: The Trial and Conviction of 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo” (07-09-2012) American Non-Governmental Organisations Coalition 
for the International Criminal Court 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/274975434/Deconstructing-Lubanga> (accessed 28-02-
2019) 11. The distinction and importance between crimes in an international or national 
context, will be explained in more detail in Chapter 6. 
274 Para 410. 
275 Lubanga Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN (29 January 2007) section IV. 






3 4  The right to disclosure of evidence 
3 4 1  Background to the disclosure of evidence:  
Right to prepare an adequate defence and the Right to an expeditious trial 
The principles of disclosure of exculpatory evidence received much attention in the 
Lubanga trial. It must be borne in mind that the disclosure of evidence is a fundamental 
right, which an accused has to a fair trial as contained in Article 67(2) of the Statute. 
A point of much debate in the Lubanga judgment was between the context of Article 
67(2) and the prosecutor’s use of “confidentiality” agreements under Article 54(3)(e) 
of the Rome Statute. The Article allows the prosecutor to “agree not to disclose, at any 
stage of the proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the 
condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence 
unless the provider of the information consents.” The failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence also has a direct bearing on the accused’s right to an expeditious trial. This 
is evidenced by the failure of the prosecutor to disclose the information timeously. 
The background to this case is that the prosecutor obtained confidential information 
from the UN in respect of the Lubanga case and the evidence that the prosecutor 
obtained was exculpatory in nature. At various times, the prosecutor averred that he 
tried to obtain the consent of the UN to disclose the information, which consent was 
denied.277  
 
3 4 2  Disclosure of evidence – Trial Chamber decision 
On 9 November 2007 the Trial Chamber rendered its “Decision regarding the timing 
and manner of disclosure and the date of trial”, wherein it held that “from the moment 
the prosecution entered into the agreements and was thereafter presented with 
exculpatory materials, it has been under an obligation to act in a timely manner to lift 
the agreements in order to ensure a fair trial without undue delay.” The Trial Chamber 
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ordered the disclosure of the information by 14 December 2007.278 The Chamber held 
that the “prosecution would be under an obligation to withdraw any charges where 
non-disclosed exculpatory material has a material impact on the Chamber's 
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the prosecution were in doubt 
as to whether any material falls into this category, the Chamber directed that it should 
be put before the Trial Chamber for its determination.”279 
During the Status Conference of 10 June 2008, the prosecution provided 
information to the Chamber about the undisclosed material and its sources. The 
prosecutor informed the chamber that there were 156 documents provided by the UN 
under Article 54(3)(e) for which authorisation to disclose had been refused. Of those 
156 documents, the prosecution advised that 112 documents fell under the heading 
of Rule 77 while the remaining 95 were considered potentially exculpatory or mitigating 
in nature.280 The prosecution divided the evidence into two categories: evidence that 
would not materially affect the Chamber's determination of the guilt or innocence of 
the accused and evidence that had that potential.281 
In respect of the evidence which could not impact upon the Chamber's decision as 
to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the prosecutor disclosed the following: 
“evidence which purported to establish that children voluntarily joined the UPC/FPLC 
or were sent by their parents; evidence which purported to establish the use of child 
soldiers by the Lendu or other armed groups in Ituri; reported benevolent acts by 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo; material relating to the political nature of the UPC/FPLC and 
its aim of pacifying Ituri or references to it as an “all-inclusive” organisation282 and 
information falling within the scope of Rule 77283 (which, in the prosecution's 
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of exculpatory materials Para 20 referring to Prosecution submission on undisclosed 
documents containing potentially exculpatory information (28 March 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-
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submission, did not go to the guilt or innocence of the accused but was material to the 
preparation of his defence).”284 
In respect of the evidence which the prosecution submitted could materially impact 
on the Court's determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, the following 
was included: “evidence indicating that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo suffered from a mental 
condition; that he was intoxicated thus impairing his capacity to control, or understand 
the unlawfulness of his conduct; that he was under duress or compulsion; that he acted 
in self-defence; that he made efforts to demobilise child soldiers; that he had 
insufficient command over people who committed the crimes with which he is charged; 
that the UPC/FPLC was under the control of Uganda, Rwanda and other countries.”285  
However, the prosecutor was of the view that none of the evidence contained in this 
list revealed control as regards the recruitment of children, and that these categories 
of evidence would only impact in principle on the Chamber's decision, but that it would 
not materially impact on the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.286 
The defence averred that the documents outlined in the prosecution's description of 
the categories of undisclosed potentially exculpatory materials were, in fact, 
exculpatory and should be disclosed.287  
The length of time the prosecutor took to resolve this issue is of particular 
importance in respect to the accused’s fair trial rights as well as the determination by 
the prosecutor that certain information as listed above would not impact on the guilt or 
innocence of the accused is of concern. In this case, the prosecutor also relied on an 
enormous amount of confidential information. The continuous failure on the part of the 
prosecutor to disclose the exculpatory evidence resulted in further decisions discussed 
hereunder. 
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3 4 3  Trial chamber decision and Appeals Chamber judgment in respect of 
Disclosure of Exculpatory evidence 
The Trial Chamber found that the Prosecutor had used Article 54(3)(e) of the 
Statute to obtain evidence to be used at trial, instead of using the material obtained to 
generate new evidence and that this constituted “a wholesale and serious abuse, and 
a violation of an important provision which was intended to allow the prosecution to 
receive evidence confidentially, in very restrictive circumstances.”288  
The Trial Chamber concluded the matter as follows: 
  
“i) The disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecution is a 
fundamental aspect of the accused's right to a fair trial; ii) The prosecution has incorrectly 
used Article 54(3)(e) when entering into agreements with information-providers, with the 
consequence that a significant body of exculpatory evidence which would otherwise have 
been disclosed to the accused is to be withheld from him, thereby improperly inhibiting the 
opportunities for the accused to prepare his defence; and iii) The Chamber has been 
prevented from exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 64(2), Article 64(3)(c)289 and Article 
67(2), in that it is unable to determine whether or not the non-disclosure of this potentially 
exculpatory material constitutes a breach of the accused's right to a fair trial.”290  
 
The Trial Chamber stated emphatically that: 
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of exculpatory materials Trial chamber I (13 June 2008) para 73. 
289 Article 64(2):  
The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full 
respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and 
witnesses. 3. Upon assignment of a case for trial in accordance with this Statute, the Trial 
Chamber assigned to deal with the case shall: (a) Confer with the parties and adopt such 
procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the 
proceedings; (b) Determine the language or languages to be used at trial; and (c) Subject 
to any other relevant provisions of this Statute, provide for disclosure of documents or 
information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance of the commencement of the 
trial to enable adequate preparation for trial. 
290 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure 





“the consequence of the three factors set out in the preceding paragraph has been that the 
trial process has been ruptured to such a degree that it is now impossible to piece together 
the constituent elements of a fair trial.”291  
 
Due to the prosecutor’s non-disclosure of evidence, the Trial Chamber stayed the 
proceedings indefinitely in respect of Mr Lubanga and halted the trial process.292  
Notably, even though the Trial Chamber found the failure on the part of the 
prosecutor to disclose the information contrary to the fair trial rights of the accused, 
particularly contained in Article 67(2) of the Statute, instead of taking decisive action 
to reprimand the prosecutor, the decision was made to stay the proceedings. The stay 
of proceedings negatively impacted the accused right to an expeditious trial as 
contained in Article 67(c) “to be tried with undue delay” and Article 64(2): 
 
“The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with 
full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and 
witnesses.”  
 
The Court refers to the relevant Articles of the Statute and admits that it is unable 
to proceed with the trial because it is unable to guarantee a fair trial in the absence of 
the disclosure of the evidence and furthermore that the evidence was not made known 
to the Court by the prosecutor for the court to evaluate the evidence. In this regard, 
Rule 81(2) is relevant and reads as follows: 
 
“Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor which must 
be disclosed in accordance with the Statute, but disclosure may prejudice further or ongoing 
investigations, the Prosecutor may apply to the Chamber dealing with the matter for a ruling 
as to whether the material or information must be disclosed to the defence. The matter shall 
be heard on an ex parte basis by the Chamber. However, the Prosecutor may not introduce 
such material or information into evidence during the confirmation hearing or the trial 
without adequate prior disclosure to the accused.” 
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Arguably, the application of this Rule by the prosecutor may have assisted the court 
to understand the nature of the evidence and to decide on the disclosure of this 
evidence to the defence.  
On appeal, the Prosecutor submitted that: 
 
“the realities of investigations in situations of ongoing conflict make it necessary that 
information may be provided on a confidential basis and that this ability ‘actually serves as 
a safeguard to the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.”293  
 
On the contrary, Mr Lubanga argued that:  
“confidentiality agreements inhibit the Prosecutor from publicly establishing the truth and 
therefore should only be relied upon if there is no other opportunity to obtain the material. 
Given that recourse to Article 54(3)(e) of the Statute may also put in peril the right of the 
defence to disclosure of material pursuant to Article 67(2)294 of the Statute and to Rule 77295 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, even more caution is necessary.”296 
 
The Appeals Chamber, in arriving at its decision to uphold the decision of the Trial 
Chamber, considered that Article 54(3)(e) of the Statute indicates that the Prosecutor 
may only rely on the provision for the purpose of generating new evidence.297 Further, 
that the use of Article 54(3)(e) of the Statute must not lead to breaches of the 
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exculpatory materials (October 2008) para 25. 
294 Para 29. Article 67(2) In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the 
Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's 
possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the 
accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of 
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295 Rule 77 Inspection of material in possession or control of the Prosecutor The Prosecutor 
shall, subject to the restrictions on disclosure as provided for in the Statute and in rules 81 and 
82, permit the defence to inspect any books, documents, photographs and other tangible 
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the defence or are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence for the purposes of the 
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obligations of the Prosecutor vis-à-vis the accused person as Article 54(1)(c) of the 
Statute expressly provides that the Prosecutor shall “fully respect the rights of persons 
arising under this Statute.”298 The Appeals Chamber emphasised that a fundamental 
right of the accused person in proceedings before the Court is the right to disclosure 
of “evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she believes shows 
or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, 
or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence.”299 In this regard, the 
chamber referred to Article 67(2), first sentence, of the Statute.300 
The Appeals Chamber cautioned the prosecutor that when he relies on Article 
54(3)(e) of the Statute he should apply the provision in a manner that will allow the 
Court to resolve the potential tension between the confidentiality to which the 
Prosecutor has agreed and the requirements of a fair trial.301  
The Appeals Chamber, therefore, took issue with the fact that the Prosecutor, by 
not disclosing the information to the chamber, prevented it from assessing whether a 
fair trial could be held in spite of the non-disclosure to the defence of certain 
documents.302 The Appeals Chamber went further to explain its role in the process by 
quoting the last sentence of Article 67(2) of the Statute which provides that “[i]n case 
of doubt as to the application of [article 67(2) of the Statute], the Court shall decide.”303  
The Appeals chamber, therefore, decided as follows: 
 
“In sum, as of 13 June 2008, the Trial Chamber was faced with a situation in which a large 
number of documents containing potentially exculpatory information or information relevant 
to the preparation of the defence was in the possession of the Prosecutor, but could not be 
disclosed to Mr. Lubanga Dyilo. Nor could the Trial Chamber have access to the documents 
in order to assess whether a fair trial could be held even without the disclosure of the 
documents. As explained above, the Appeals Chamber has no reason to fault the 
assessment of the Trial Chamber on 13 June 2008 that this situation would continue. If the 
trial of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo had taken place in such circumstances, there would always have 
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been a lurking doubt as to whether the disclosure of the documents in question would have 
changed the course of the trial.”304 
 
Notably, both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber carefully considered the 
impact of the prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the accused 
considering the rights of the accused to such disclosure. Both chambers upheld the 
accused’s rights in relation to the fundamental fair trial right of disclosure of evidence.  
 
3 4 3 1 Separate Appeal Chamber Opinion of Pikis J 
The judge reinforced the fair trial rights of defendants in respect of the disclosure of 
information and stated that:  
 
“the right to disclosure, more so to disclosure of exonerating evidence, is a fundamental 
right of the accused, denial of which makes trial according to law unattainable.”305  
 
The judge reprimanded the prosecutor for incorrectly applying Article 54(3)(e) and 
not allowing the Trial Chamber to make a determination in respect of the disclosure of 
evidence.306 The judge also touched on the expeditiousness of trial proceedings and 
the manner in which the prosecutor dealt with the disclosure of evidence that caused 
the stays in proceedings and therefore the delays in the trial.307  
The judge concluded by asking and answering the following question: 
 
“The pertinent question in this appeal is whether the finding of impossibility to hold a fair 
trial and the sequential order to stay the proceedings are justified. The answer is in the 
affirmative. The finding of impossibility to hold a fair trial seals the end of the 
proceedings.”308 
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On 18 November 2008, Trial Chamber I lifted the stay of proceedings against Mr 
Lubanga, considering that the reasons for the suspension had fallen away due to the 
exculpatory evidence being disclosed.309 
One author, Kaoutzanis310 puts it quite plainly that the disclosure of evidence to the 
defence has historically been a central precept of criminal procedural law throughout 
the world and is a key element of a fair trial. For international courts, disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence to the defence is important and has been enshrined in most 
human rights instruments.311 The ECHR held that the obligation to disclose material 
that may assist the accused stems from the principle of the “equality of arms.”312 This 
aspect has a direct bearing on the rights of the defence in respect of ensuring that it 
adequately engages with the evidence put forward by the prosecutor. In terms of 
Article 67(2), the prosecutor is required to disclose exculpatory evidence as soon as 
practicable. The decisions discussed above reiterate that the prosecutor acted outside 
of the scope of his mandate. This is an important issue in ensuring that prosecutors 
do not overreach their roles and thereby infringe upon the fair trial rights of the 
accused. 
It is undisputed that the courts upheld the fair trial rights of the accused in relation 
to the disclosure obligations placed on the prosecutor in these judgments. However, 
a key concern is to what extent the court will allow the prosecutor to continually act 
outside the scope of his/her duties to the detriment of the accused. It is apparent from 
both judgments that the judges were unhappy with the fact that the prosecutor refused 
to disclose the evidence timeously and further that the prosecutor did not afford the 
court the opportunity to intervene and determine the extent to which the evidence 
could or could not be disclosed and the potential impact on the fair trial rights of the 
accused.  
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In this regard, it is my considered view that the ICC should lean on the jurisprudence 
of the tribunals in relation to the misconduct of prosecutors. 
 
3 4 4  Disclosure of evidence at the ICTY 
The ICTY contains a similar rule to Article 54(3) of the Rome Statute, which is 
contained in Rule 68313 dealing with the “Disclosure of Exculpatory and Other Relevant 
Material.” However, the ICTY rules also include Rule 68 bis314 which cover the 
sanctions imposed on prosecutors who refuse to disclose such evidence. The ICTR 
does not have a similar rule. At the ICC, a similar misconduct article is contained in 
Article 71315 of the Statute. The difference is that Rule 68 bis specifically refers to the 
                                                          
313 Rule 68 Disclosure of Exculpatory and Other Relevant Material (adopted 11 Feb 1994, 
amended 30 Jan 1995, amended 12 July 2001, amended 12 Dec 2003, amended 28 July 
2004) Subject to the provisions of Rule 70, (i) the Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, 
disclose to the Defence any material which in the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor may 
suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or affect the credibility of 
Prosecution evidence: (ii) without prejudice to paragraph (i), the Prosecutor shall make 
available to the defence, in electronic form, collections of relevant material held by the 
Prosecutor, together with appropriate computer software with which the defence can search 
such collections electronically; (iii) the Prosecutor shall take reasonable steps, if confidential 
information is provided to the Prosecutor by a person or entity under Rule 70 (B) and contains 
material referred to in paragraph (i) above, to obtain the consent of the provider to disclosure 
of that material, or the fact of its existence, to the accused; (iv) the Prosecutor shall apply to 
the Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved from an obligation under paragraph (i) to disclose 
information in the possession of the Prosecutor, if its disclosure may prejudice further or 
ongoing investigations, or for any other reason may be contrary to the public interest or affect 
the security interests of any State, and when making such application, the Prosecutor shall 
provide the Trial Chamber (but only the Trial Chamber) with the information that is sought to 
be kept confidential; IT/32/Re v 50 66 8 July 2015 (v) notwithstanding the completion of the 
trial and any subsequent appeal, the Prosecutor shall disclose to the other party any material 
referred to in paragraph (i) above. 
314 Rule 68 bis Failure to Comply with Disclosure Obligations (Adopted 13 Dec 2001) The pre-
trial Judge or the Trial Chamber may decide proprio motu, or at the request of either party, on 
sanctions to be imposed on a party which fails to perform its disclosure obligations pursuant 
to the Rules. 
315 Article 71 of the Sanctions for misconduct before the Court:  
1. The Court may sanction persons present before it who commit misconduct, including 
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misconduct of the prosecutor in relation to disclosure of evidence whereas Article 71 
refers to misconduct generally referring to all misconduct.  
However, it must be borne in mind that Article 67(2) bears relevance as both the 
Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber referred to this Article of the Statute, the 
relevant portion of the Article being: “In case of doubt as to the application of this 
paragraph, the Court shall decide.” It was evident from both the Chambers, that the 
prosecutor did not refer the matter to the court to decide and it is for this reason that 
the argument is made that the ICC should learn from the tribunals in this regard.  
At the tribunals, it was evident that the courts placed the onus on the accused to 
prove that a violation of Rule 68 bis occurred and the accused had to demonstrate 
how such non-disclosure affected the accused’s fair trial rights. However, the 
importance of the tribunals’ decisions is that the tribunals implemented mechanisms 
besides staying of proceedings, to ensure disclosure on the part of the prosecutor.  
By way of example in the Oric316 case at the ICTY, there had been continuous 
complaints of the prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and the Trial 
Chamber ordered the Prosecutor to conduct a comprehensive search for Rule 68 
material and to provide the Trial Chamber with a declaration stating what searches 
had been made, where they had been made, and the results of such searches. In the 
Krnojelac317 case, the ICTY ruled that because there had been a number of problems 
in trials with the obligations imposed by Rule 68 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (“RPE”), the judge proposed that a case manager takes responsibility to 
ensure that there had been a complete search for the material to which Rule 68 applies 
and that this would be similar to an affidavit of discovery as it is known in common law 
systems.  
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In the Krstic318 case, the tribunal came to an interesting conclusion in respect of the 
sanctions of the prosecutor. The court found that the right of an accused to a fair trial 
is a fundamental right and that even though the disclosure practices of the Prosecution 
fell short of its obligations under the applicable Rules, the Appeals Chamber could not 
conclude that the Prosecution deliberately breached its obligations.319 As a result of 
the court being incapable of finding material prejudice to the Defence, the Appeals 
Chamber did not issue a formal sanction against the Prosecution for breaching its 
obligations under Rule 68.320 However, the Appeals Chamber stated that it 
 
“will not tolerate anything short of strict compliance with disclosure obligations, and 
considers its discussion of this issue to be sufficient to put the OTP on notice for its conduct 
in future proceedings.”321  
 
This effectively amounts to a warning given by the tribunal to the prosecutor, which 
would serve as a preventative measure towards the prosecutor to desist from similar 
conduct in the future. Even though the Appeals Chamber found that the defendant 
suffered no prejudice, the tribunal was still very strict in its approach towards the 
importance of the disclosure of evidence. 
Admittedly, these cases did not specifically deal with confidential evidence as the 
Lubanga decisions did, it still carries weight in respect of the approaches taken at the 
ICTY to the non-disclosure of evidence and demonstrates the value that the 
international tribunal placed on the disclosure of evidence. It is evident from these 
cited decisions, that despite the ICTY having Rule 68 bis, the tribunal was hesitant to 
impose proper sanctions against the prosecutor.  
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3 5  The implementation of Regulation 55 – Right to know and understand the 
charges and to prepare an adequate defence 
Regulation 55322 allows a Trial Chamber to change what crime is established by the 
facts in a case if those facts are more suitable to make out another crime under the 
Rome Statute. This is a very contentious regulation and has caused many problems 
and delays in the fair trial proceedings of the defence as will become evident in the 
case law chapters following this one (particularly in Chapter 4 – Katanga). This 
regulation effectively has the ability to change the charges against the accused and 
hence the course of the trial by affecting evidence being brought and is capable of 
hampering the accused’s ability to defend him or herself appropriately in court. This 
regulation impacts the right of an accused to understand the charges against him, to 
adequately prepare a defence, particularly given the timing of the implementation of 
the regulation as well as impacting the length of proceedings. 
In the Lubanga case, victims applied to have the facts in the case legally re-
characterised to include charges of “inhumane treatment and sexual slavery”. In this 
instance, the Trial Chamber gave notice to the parties in terms of Regulation 55 that 
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Regulations of the Court ICC-BD/01-01-04 32: 
1. In its decision under article 74, the Chamber may change the legal characterisation of 
facts to accord with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8, or to accord with the form of 
participation of the accused under articles 25 and 28, without exceeding the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges.  
2. If, at any time during the trial, it appears to the Chamber that the legal characterisation 
of facts may be subject to change, the Chamber shall give notice to the participants of such 
a possibility and having heard the evidence, shall, at an appropriate stage of the 
proceedings, give the participants the opportunity to make oral or written submissions. The 
Chamber may suspend the hearing to ensure that the participants have adequate time and 
facilities for effective preparation or, if necessary, it may order a hearing to consider all 
matters relevant to the proposed change.  
3. For the purposes of sub-regulation 2, the Chamber shall, in particular, ensure that the 
accused shall: (a) Have adequate time and facilities for the effective preparation of his or 
her defence in accordance with article 67, paragraph 1 (b); and (b) If necessary, be given 
the opportunity to examine again, or have examined again, a previous witness, to call a 
new witness or to present other evidence admissible under the Statute in accordance with 





the legal characterisation of the facts may be modified so as to include crimes of sexual 
violence.323  
 
3 5 1 Trial chamber decision – Right to adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of a defence and the Right to legal certainty 
The Trial Chamber324 discussed the interpretation of Regulation 55 and noted that 
a potential change in the legal characterisation of facts at that particular stage of 
proceedings is subject to a number of different and specific safeguards that are set 
out in Regulation 55(2) and (3). The purpose of the safeguards is to ensure that the 
modification is implemented in accordance with the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
The Trial Chamber then proceeded to make a distinction between the subsections of 
Regulation 55 by stating that “the powers conferred on the Chamber pursuant to 
Regulation 55(1) are distinct from the powers conferred by Regulation 55(2) and that 
as a result of such distinction the provision of adequate time and facilities for the 
effective preparation of the defence as well as an opportunity to examine witnesses or 
present evidence is mandatory only under Regulation 55(2).”325 The Trial Chamber 
found that the limitations imposed by Regulation 55(1) to the “the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges” were not applicable to the procedural 
situation at the time of the judgment and that those limitations were governed by 
Regulation 55(2) and (3) respectively.326 The Trial Chamber, therefore, concluded that 
the re-characterisation may occur because the submissions of the legal 
representatives of the victims and the evidence that the Trial Chamber had heard 
during the course of the trial were persuasive enough for the majority to conclude that 
the re-characterisation may go ahead.327  
Notably, the Trial Chamber separated the subsections of Regulation 55 in this 
decision and interpreted the regulation in such a manner so as to undermine the fair 
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trial rights of the accused by in essence finding that the legal re-characterisation would 
not impact on Lubanga’s fair trial rights. In fact, the court came to this conclusion 
without considering the possible safeguards which should be put in place to ensure 
that the accused was placed in a position to defend himself adequately in light of the 
modification of the charges. The possible safeguards, which could have been put in 
place, is to ensure that Lubanga properly understood how the re-characterisation 
would potentially alter his defence strategy and further to award him sufficient time to 
prepare for what effectively amounts to new charges being brought against him. 
 
3 5 1 1  Dissenting Opinion Fulford J 
In quite a damning dissent, Fulford J disagreed with the majority opinion. The judge 
stated that Article 61(9)328 leaves the control over framing and effecting any changes 
to the charges exclusively to the Pre-trial Chamber. The judge reiterated that the 
manner of proceedings was devised in such a way as to ensure that once the trial has 
begun the charges are not subject to any further amendment, addition or 
substitution.329  
Fulford J went further to state that in the event that sub-regulation 1 is separated 
from sub-regulations 2 and 3, the only material protection afforded to an accused is 
that the modification cannot exceed the facts and circumstances described in the 
charges and that in his view, unless the Chamber incorporates significant additional 
measures to protect the rights of the accused, changes to the legal characterisation of 
the facts made at the very end of the case will infringe the safeguards for the 
accused.330  
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The judge acknowledged that even by including such safeguards, the re-
characterisation would still affect the rights of the accused to finality and certainty of 
the charges against him.331 On the issue of the actual charges, the judge found quite 
strongly that the five “proposals” brought by the victims involve changes to the DCC 
to such a degree that they constitute additional charges. The judge stated as follows:  
 
“On the formulation advanced by the victims, the accused would be at risk of conviction on 
11 (rather than 6) charges, because the Chamber may only convict on charges: under 
Article 74(2) ‘[...] [t]he decision shall not exceed the facts and circumstances described in 
the charges and any amendments to the charges [...].’ In these circumstances, in my view, 
each of these five ‘proposals’ amounts to an application to add an additional charge, which 
is unlawful.”332 
 
The judge raised the locus standi of parties to the proceedings and the role of 
victims in that, in his view, it is only the Prosecutor who is entitled to apply to amend, 
add or substitute charges and in each instance, it is only the Pre-trial Chamber that 
has jurisdiction to allow or refuse the application and then only before the 
commencement of the trial.333 The judge therefore strongly voiced his objection by 
stating that the “application is made by the representatives of the victims, who do not 
have locus standi under Article 61(9), and it is addressed to the Chamber, which would 
be acting ultra vires.”334  
The judge was emphatic about the role of the prosecutor and the Pre-trial chamber 
to amend charges. In this instance, the prosecutor did not object to any of these 
aspects and neither did the prosecutor protect his rights to amend the charges.  
Of particular significance, is the judge’s inference that the re-characterisation of the 
charges will infringe the accused’s right to legal certainty which is contained in Article 
22335 of the Statute. The principle of legality seeks to protect accused persons from 
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being confronted by a case or charges that may be unforeseen. The very essence of 
the Article is to ensure that an accused can prepare a proper defence based on 
charges that he/she understands and knows. 
 
3 5 2  Appeals Chamber 
The appeals judgment336 was Lubanga’s saving grace as the chamber reversed the 
decision of the Trial Chamber. In respect of the participation of victims, the Appeals 
Chamber found337 that the 27 applicants fulfilled all the criteria for participation in the 
appeals as they had been recognised as victims in the case. In addition, the Appeals 
Chamber considered that the victims’ personal interests were affected insofar as they 
claim that they were children enlisted in a militia and that they had suffered sexual 
slavery, inhuman treatment and/or cruel treatment.338  
 
3 5 2 1  The Right to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause 
and content of the charge 
In addressing Mr Lubanga’s concern in respect of whether Regulation 55 is 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused, the Appeals Chamber held that Article 
67(1)(a) of the Statute does not preclude the possibility that there may be a change in 
the legal characterisation of facts in the course of the trial.339 The Appeals Chamber 
held that:  
                                                          
2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. 
In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being 
investigated, prosecuted or convicted.  
3. This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under 
international law independently of this Statute. 
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“this is supported by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Article 6(3)(a) of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights on Article 8(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights.”340  
 
3 5 2 2  The Right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the 
defence 
The Appeals Chamber did, however, acknowledge that human rights law demands 
that the legal characterisation of facts at the trial must not render that trial unfair. In 
this regard, the Appeals Chamber noted that Article 67(1)(b) of the Statute provides 
for the right of the accused person to “have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of the defence” and it is for this reason that Regulation 55(2) and (3) set 
out several stringent safeguards for the protection of the rights of the accused.341 In 
respect of the accused’s right to a trial without delay, the Appeals Chamber did not 
find that a change to the legal characterisation of the facts pursuant to Regulation 55 
would automatically lead to undue delay of the trial.342 This conclusion is quite 
concerning as any modification would lead to a delay in proceedings, as the accused 
would have to be given more time to review the evidence and prepare adequately for 
what effectively would amount to new charges being laid against him. 
In reviewing Regulation 55 in light of Article 74(2),343 the Appeals Chamber found 
that Article 74(2) of the Statute confines the scope of Regulation 55 to the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendment thereto and therefore 
Regulation 55 is consistent with Article 74(2) of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber 
also found that Regulation 55 is in fact in conflict with Article 61(9)344 and the Appeals 
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Chamber was persuaded by the arguments of Mr Lubanga and the Prosecutor that 
new facts and circumstances not described in the charges may only be added under 
the procedure of Article 61(9) of the Statute.345 The Appeals Chamber, therefore, 
reversed the decision of the Trial Chamber and the legal re-characterisation of the 
facts was not allowed to proceed. This decision reinforces the importance of the role 
of the confirmation of charges stage as discussed at the beginning of the chapter in 
determining the scope of the charges against the accused. 
 
3 6  Victim participation in the Lubanga trial 
The rights and participation of victims have been referred to in Chapter 2 and this 
is the first case, which sought to define the extent of victim participation in ICC 
proceedings. The judgments and guidelines of the court are therefore important in 
terms of establishing the extent of the participation of victims in relation to the fair trial 
rights of the accused.  
 
3 6 1  First Decision on victim participation at investigation stage of proceedings 
The first decision on victim participation took place within the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
January 2006. In this decision victims required the chamber to consider the following 
issues pertaining to victim participation:346 
 
i)  whether, in the light of Article 68(3) of the Statute, proceedings may be 
considered to exist at the investigation stage;  
ii)  the conditions of application of Article 68(3) during the stage of investigation of a 
situation; and  
(ii)  the modalities of the participation of victims in the proceedings at the 
investigation stage. 
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The Trial Chamber in arriving at its decision to allow victims to participate at the 
investigation stage drew a distinction between “situations” and “cases” in terms of the 
different kinds of proceedings and defined the two as follows: Situations, “entail the 
proceedings envisaged in the Statute to determine whether a particular situation 
should give rise to a criminal investigation as well as the investigation as such. Cases 
comprise specific incidents during which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court seem to have been committed by one or more identified suspects and entail 
proceedings that take place after the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to 
appear.”347 The Trial Chamber therefore decided that in light of this distinction, during 
the stage of investigation of a situation, “the status of victim will be accorded to 
applicants who seem to meet the definition of victims set out in rule 85 of the Rules in 
relation to the situation in question. At the case stage, the status of the victim will be 
accorded only to applicants who seem to meet the definition of victims set out in rule 
85 in relation to the relevant case”.348 However, the discussion around victim 
participation at the investigation stage of proceedings is now moot given that on 19 
December 2008, the Appeals Chamber overruled the decision for victim participation 
at the investigation stage of proceedings.349  
 
3 6 2  Second Decision on victim participation: Trial Chamber decision 
However, in January 2008,350 the Trial Chamber made another decision concerning 
victim participation, which was later taken on appeal. The important aspects of the 
decision follow hereunder. 
In summary, the court developed guidelines for the participation of victims in trial 
proceedings and also reflected on the following key issues: 
In deciding on the manner of victim participation under Article 68(3), the court 
reiterated that the proceedings at the ICC are sui generis in nature and the court must, 
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therefore, develop trial procedures that meet the criteria in this regard for international 
cases and that in applying such criteria, it will not give rise to unfair trial proceedings.351 
The Trial Chamber indicated that when making a decision regarding the participation 
of victims, the following criteria must be met:352  
 
(i) first, whether the applicant is a victim of a crime under the jurisdiction of the 
Court, as provided for in Rule 85 of the Rules; and  
(ii) second, whether the interests of the victim are affected in the proceedings in 
accordance with Article 68(3) of the Statute.  
 
The Trial Chamber indicated that once the Chamber had determined that an 
applicant is a natural or legal person, it will consider if there is evidence that the 
applicant suffered any harm as a result of the commission of a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.353 The Trial Chamber also deliberated on the aspect of the 
causal link between the victim and the harm suffered and determined that Rule 85(b) 
of the Rules provide that legal persons must have “sustained direct harm.” Rule 85(a) 
of the Rules does not include the stipulation for natural persons and the court therefore 
decided that people can be the direct or indirect victims of a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court.354  
The significance of these decisions is that the Trial Chamber decided that victims 
were allowed to introduce evidence as the court has the right to request the 
presentation of evidence in order to establish the truth – thus victims may be allowed 
to tender and examine the evidence, if the court so allows.355 The Trial Chamber further 
advised that Rule 91(3)356 enables participating victims to question witnesses with the 
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leave of the Chamber (including experts and the defendant). This decision is 
problematic, as an accused person at the ICC now has to face what amounts to two 
accusers; that being the prosecutor and the victims. In a normal criminal trial, in 
adversarial proceedings, the accused only must defend his case against the 
prosecutor. The effect of this decision could therefore seriously impact the manner in 
which the accused is able to prepare his defence. 
The Trial Chamber indicated further that it will not restrict questioning by victims to 
reparation issues, but instead will allow appropriate questions to be put by victims 
whenever their personal interests are engaged by the evidence under consideration.357 
The Trial Chamber indicated that when they received requests from the victims' legal 
representatives to have the opportunity to challenge the admissibility or relevance of 
evidence when their interests were engaged, this would be allowed, as the Trial 
Chamber is not prohibited from doing so in terms of the Rome Statute.358 The chamber 
decided that victim’s participation included making opening and closing statements 
during trial proceedings.359  
As has been discussed earlier in this dissertation, disclosure of evidence is a 
fundamental right which an accused has to a fair trial and the fact that victims are now 
allowed to challenge the admissibility of evidence may effectively subject the accused 
to a second prosecutor, as it is within the purview of the prosecutor to disclose and 
challenge the admissibility of evidence within a trial in order to prove the guilt of the 
accused beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
3 6 2 1  Dissenting opinion of Blattman J 
Blattman J provided an important dissenting opinion in the Trial Chamber decision, 
which is of significance to the fair trial rights of the accused.360 
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The judge disagreed with the chamber’s view regarding which victims will have the 
right to participate and the judge recommended the following:361  
 
“I would suggest that in order to determine which victim applicants will have the right to 
participate in the proceedings before the Trial Chamber, the Chamber must: 
i) first, assess whether the applicant is a person who has suffered harm as a result of 
the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court related to the 
confirmation of the charges against the accused.  
ii) If found to meet the definition, the Chamber must then determine whether the victim 
applicant's interests are affected in the particular case.  
iii) If this element is met, the Trial Chamber should then assess whether participation 
by the victim is appropriate at the particular time and stage within the proceedings, 
and finally whether their manner of participation would prejudice the rights of the 
accused to a fair, impartial and efficient proceeding.” 
 
The judge stated further that: 
 
“By providing the possibility of victims' status to applicants who have suffered harm not 
linked to the charges in the present case, the rights of those victims who do fulfill the criteria 
of victim are compromised. The application process for victim applicants must not be over 
burdensome.”362 
 
The judge is therefore of the view that victims should not be allowed to participate 
in proceedings simply as a result of harm suffered but that such harm must have been 
suffered in relation to the particular case and that such participation should occur in 
relation to the time at which the court has decided on the confirmation of charges 
against a particular accused. The judge is also reinforcing the rights of victims and by 
implication saying that the court should not provide unrealistic expectations to victims 
who have actually suffered harm and that the application process should be simplified. 
This is an important point; if victims were allowed to show an interest at any time, it 
could effectively disrupt proceedings and their participation should be linked to the 
crimes which have been confirmed and not those which are still being decided as they 
may then have an unfair advantage on influencing whether or not the potential charges 
against the accused are indeed confirmed or even potentially adding new charges.  
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3 6 3 Appeals judgement on victim participation  
On 11 July 2008, the decision of the Trial Chamber was taken on appeal and the 
court found the following: In respect of the harm suffered, the Appeals Chamber held 
that “the harm does not have to be direct but it must be of a personal nature. For the 
purposes of participation in the trial proceedings, the harm alleged by a victim and the 
concept of personal interests under Article 68(3) of the Statute must be linked with the 
charges confirmed against the accused.”363 On this aspect, the Appeals Chamber held 
the same view as Blattman J and confirmed that the harm and personal interests must 
be linked to charges, which have been confirmed and therefore overturned the Trial 
Chamber’s decision on this point. 
In respect of the Trial Chamber’s decision that victims and their representatives may 
lead evidence, the Appeals Chamber stated that: 
 
“[T]he right to lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused and to 
challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence lies primarily with the parties, namely, 
the Prosecutor and the Defence but this does not preclude the possibility for victims to lead 
evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused and to challenge the 
admissibility or relevance of evidence during the trial proceedings.”364  
 
The Appeals Chamber agreed with the guidelines provided by the Trial Chamber in 
the examination and tendering of evidence by witnesses and lists these guidelines as 
follows:365 
 
“(i) a discrete application, (ii) notice to the parties, (iii) demonstration of personal interests 
that are affected by the specific proceedings, (iv) compliance with disclosure obligations 
and protection orders, (v) determination of appropriateness and (vi) consistency with the 
rights of the accused and a fair trial.”  
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The Appeals Chamber found that the safeguards ensured that the participatory 
rights of victims to lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused 
and to challenge the admissibility or relevance of the evidence, is not inconsistent with 
the onus on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused nor is it inconsistent with 
the rights of the accused to a fair trial. The court confirmed that the Trial Chamber did 
not create an unfettered right for victims to lead or challenge evidence, instead victims 
are required to demonstrate why their interests are affected by the evidence or issue, 
upon which the Chamber will decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not to allow 
such participation.366  
This decision is concerning, as on the one hand, the chamber acknowledges that 
the only parties to proceedings are the prosecutor and the defendant and that in 
essence, the defence should only face one accuser, that being the prosecutor. 
However, the court then confirms that victims may still be able to lead evidence 
pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused as well as to challenge the 
admissibility of evidence. This judgment truly reflects the confusion on the part of the 
judges in interpreting the participation of victims. It also illustrates a flagrant disregard 
for the accused’s right to be presumed innocent until guilt is proven beyond reasonable 
doubt by the prosecutor. 
 
3 6 3 1  Dissenting Opinions by Pikis J and Kirsch J  
Two judges provided dissenting opinions to the appeal decision. Dissenting mainly 
on the majority finding that victims participating at trial may lead evidence pertaining 
to the guilt or innocence of the accused and challenge the admissibility or relevance 
of evidence. 
The first partly dissenting opinion was by Pikis J who raised some key issues. The 
judge was of the view that victims can neither adduce evidence on the guilt or 
innocence of the accused nor challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence.367 
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The judge’s reasons were that the Statute does not permit the participation of anyone 
in the proof or disproof of the charges other than the prosecutor and the accused.368  
The judge stated further that in an adversarial trial, the accused cannot have more 
than one accuser and that it is not for the accused to prove his innocence as he is 
already presumed to be innocent, however, it is for the prosecutor to prove the guilt of 
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.369 The judge expressed the view that the 
participation of victims in proceedings should only be to express their views and 
concerns.370 The judge raises very important points for the fair trial rights of the 
accused particularly in respect of Article 66, which encompasses the accused’s right 
to be presumed innocent, and in respect of Article 67(2), which encompasses the 
accused’s rights to disclosure of evidence.  
Another dissenting opinion was provided by Kirsch J. The judge responded to the 
issue of evidence by stating that in his opinion it was not the intention of the drafters 
that victims should lead evidence on guilt or innocence. The judge opines that if victims 
were to lead evidence, the accused would be confronted by multiple accusers.371 
Similarly to Pikis J, Kirsch J reinforces the role of the prosecutor and refers to Article 
66(2) of the Statute, making it clear that it is the prosecutor who bears the onus of 
proving guilt at the trial.372  
Various authors have different opinions on the judgments of the court on victim 
participation. McAsey373 extrapolates quite eloquently by stating that admitting victims 
to proceedings where guilt has not been established, presupposes that a crime has 
occurred which will affect the perception of the accused and his/her presumption of 
innocence. McAsey374 also raises an important point as to the potential impact on 
procedural fairness, which this situation creates in that there are no disclosure 
obligations imposed upon victims by the Rome Statute or ICC Rules and therefore by 
allowing victims to lead evidence casts them as a second prosecutor, potentially to the 
                                                          
368 Para 6. 
369 Para 14. 
370 Para 15. 
371 Para 23. 
372 Para 24. 






detriment of the principle of equality of arms. McAsey375 opines that the only manner 
to ensure that this does not happen is dependent on how the judges decide on victim 
participation in the cases before them.  
Another important point, which was raised in the appeal judgment, was the right of 
victims to question the accused. In this regard, Friman376 correctly asks whether 
victims are now third parties to proceedings before the court, given that they now have 
the rights to lead evidence and question witnesses. Friman377 opines that it is a 
balancing act, which has been left for the court to decide. This view that the final 
decision is left for the court to decide is shared by McAsey378 who argues that victim 
participation is now largely left to the chambers to decide and this has also created 
great uncertainty, largely due to the inconsistent approaches taken by the chambers.  
In finding a solution to the problem of victim participation, Baumgartner379 opines 
that the ICC needs to ensure that it defines the participation of victims more effectively 
and comprehensively as it is clear that due to capacity constraints, the ICC is already 
unable to manage the sheer volume of victim applications. She argues that solutions 
must therefore be found to allow the ICC to discharge its mandate to ‘‘put an end to 
impunity, while at the same time according due respect to the opposing interests of 
the accused, the prosecution, the public and the victims and complying with general 
standards of a fair, impartial and expeditious trial.”380 
 
3 7  Conviction Decision and Appeals Judgment of Mr Lubanga and 
dissenting view vis-à-vis fair trial 
On 14 March 2012, the Trial Chamber381 convicted Thomas Lubanga and found him 
guilty of the crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years 
into the FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities within the meaning 
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of Articles 8(2)(e)(vii) and 25(3)(a) of the Statute from early September 2002 to 13 
August 2003. This judgment is considered to be a victory for the rights of the victims 
as it particularly dealt with children and their protection. The judgment also set the tone 
for the manner in which the rights of victims were being dealt with comprehensively by 
the Court. Hence, the final judgment strongly upheld the rights of victims and their 
participation in the international trial of Mr Lubanga. 
In Lubanga, the Appeals Chamber upheld his conviction and sentence in respect of 
war crimes related to child soldiers. Usacka J, however, issued a strong dissenting 
opinion in relation to the breach of fair trial rights of the accused. 
 
3 7 1  Right to be informed in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charges  
Lubanga’s first ground of appeal related to his rights under Article 67 of the Rome 
Statute to be informed in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charges against 
him. He alleged that this right was violated because the charges were vague and 
general in nature.382 Usacka J, in her dissenting opinion found that the charges lacked 
specificity and therefore did not afford Mr Lubanga sufficient notice to prepare a 
defence and that this violated his right to a fair trial.383 The majority of the court found 
that the vagueness in the original arrest warrant was rectified by the provision of further 
information during the legal proceedings. However, Usacka J disagreed with this and 
further noted that “the range of dates provided by the prosecution was too broad, that 
the locations of the events were not clear and the identities of the alleged victims were 
not specific.”384 In the majority judgment, the argument of the prosecutor with regard 
to this was that the level of detail in the charges were sufficient and that, depending 
on the case, it may “neither be possible nor necessary to provide specific information 
on the identity of victims.”385 The majority of the Appeals Chamber found the following 
in this regard:  
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The DCC submitted by the Prosecutor, prior to the confirmation of charges 
proceedings as well as the amended document submitted before the trial set out the 
factual allegations relevant to the underlying crimes in two parts; the first presenting a 
“pattern” of enlistment, conscription and use of individuals under the age of fifteen 
years to participate actively in hostilities, which was the same in both documents and 
the second set out factual allegations relevant to named alleged child soldiers.386 The 
majority noted that the “pattern” in the DCC did not change.387 The majority of the court 
therefore found that Mr Lubanga failed to substantiate his argument that the charges 
were insufficiently detailed and that he failed to substantiate the prejudice he suffered 
because of the allegedly missing detail.388 
Usacka J389 was of the view that “it was only at the end of the trial, when the Trial 
Chamber found that none of the individual cases had been established, that the focus 
shifted from the individual cases to the ‘pattern section’ of the charges, which was then 
unsupported by any reference to identified child soldiers.” The judge found therefore 
that the Trial Chamber convicted Mr Lubanga based on vaguely formulated allegations 
that had previously played a peripheral and subsidiary role in the case. The judge went 
further and questioned the evidence relied upon in respect of what she considered to 
be vague charges. She was of the view that none of the evidence “identified a single 
child under the age of fifteen and much of the witness testimony relied upon did not 
specify the location where or the date when the person who allegedly appeared to be 
under the age of fifteen was encountered.”390 The judge was quite strong in her 
criticism of the majority decision and stated that Mr Lubanga’s right to be informed of 
the charges against him had been violated and that during the course of the trial up 
until his conviction, he was unaware that the nine individual cases against him would 
be struck and he would only be convicted on “general charges”. 391 
Usacka J in her dissenting opinion focused on the Trial Chamber’s findings on the 
evidence relating to the age of the alleged child soldiers and expressed reservations 
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with the method employed in identifying the age of the children via their physical 
appearance.392 In the majority judgment, Lubanga had submitted that the Trial 
Chamber invited the Prosecutor to consider calling an expert on age determination, 
but that the prosecutor failed to do so.393 The Trial Chamber disputed this by indicating 
that the Trial Chamber had invited both parties to consider calling expert witnesses. 
The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber did not exclude the possibility of 
assessing age based on physical appearance and dismissed Mr Lubanga’s argument 
that he was led to believe that the Trial Chamber was of the view that age 
determination based on appearance was not possible.394 In my view, the court erred 
in not calling an expert to determine the age of the children, particularly given that Mr 
Lubanga was charged with conscripting children. This was such a fundamental part of 
the trial in terms of Mr Lubanga’s conviction and the fact that the court in various 
instances could not determine the age of the children, should have resulted in Mr 
Lubanga not having been found guilty. 
 
3 7 2  Presumption of Innocence – Guilt beyond reasonable doubt 
Usacka J further raises Article 66(3) of the Statute, which provides that to convict 
the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt. She goes further to state that her understanding of the meaning of 
this Article means that conviction should not occur unless all reasonable hypotheses 
based on the evidence presented indicate guilt.395 The judge states that in her view 
this standard should apply to the fact-finding stage, specifically to the facts necessary 
to establish the elements of the crimes charged and that the onus rests on the 
prosecutor to prove that the accused is guilty according to this standard.396  
She points out that the Trial Chamber did no fulfil its obligations in establishing that 
the children conscripted, enlisted, and used in hostilities were under the age of fifteen 
and she states that the reasoning of the Trial Chamber in respect of evidence relied 
on to establish the age of children, was insufficient.397  
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She records her disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s lack of addressing the 
“burden of proof” and states that the Trial Chamber employed a lower standard in this 
case.398 The judge is quite correct, in the Conviction decision, the Court referred to the 
“burden of proof” briefly and merely stated that for a conviction, each element of the 
particular offence charged must be established “beyond reasonable doubt.”399  
Usacka J concluded by stating the following: 
 
“It is my hope that future prosecutions of these crimes at the Court will adduce direct and 
more convincing evidence and preserve the fairness of proceedings, which lies at the heart 
of criminal prosecutions and should not be sacrificed in favour of putting historical events 
on the record.”400 
 
3 8 Reflection on the impact of the case on the rights of victims and the 
international community 
In a statement released by the presiding judge, Adrian Fulford regarding the 
sentence of Mr Lubanga, the judge reflected on the following key aspects of the trial 
and its impact on the rights of victims and the international community: 
 
“He highlighted that the crimes for which Mr Lubanga has been convicted, comprising the 
crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to 
participate actively in hostilities, are undoubtedly very serious crimes that affect the 
international community as a whole. The Presiding Judge added that the “vulnerability of 
children mean that they need to be afforded particular protection that does not apply to the 
general population, as recognised in various international treaties.”401 
 
As is evidenced by the review of the decisions on victims’ participation, the Lubanga 
case determined a framework for victim participation. As we noted in chapters 1 and 
2 of the dissertation reparations for victims is also important in ensuring that they 
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receive justice for the crimes that had been committed against them. In this regard, in 
2018, the ICC made important decisions in respect of victims as follows: 
 
“On 18 July 2018 In its decision, the Trial Chamber held Mr Lubanga liable for reparations 
to the sum of USD 10,000,000 in respect of 425 victims it found eligible for reparations and 
‘any other victims who may be identified’.” 402 
 
The separate opinion of Ibáñez Carranza J, however, best characterises the 
experiences of victims and their rights in respect of reparations. In her view, the 
ultimate goal of reparations consists of restoring human dignity and restructuring the 
human being both in his or her individual and social dimensions. In the view of the 
judge: 
 
“the specific damage to the project of life of the former child soldiers must be adequately 
considered and repaired, restoring opportunities and capacities aimed at enabling them to 
reconstruct themselves as complete and fulfilled human beings.”403  
 
Finally, Ibáñez J observed that, given the extremely difficult situation in which 
victims are immersed (contexts of ongoing conflict or post-conflict environments) 
which often prevent them from obtaining evidence sufficient to prove their status as 
victims, the harm suffered and/or the link of causation, the burden of proof must be 
shared between the victims and the system established in the Rome Statute, and 
ought to be approached by the Court in an institutional and technical manner.404 
The judge, therefore, contextualises the importance of reparations as not just 
monetary compensation for victims, but also in terms of restoring dignity and respect 
for the victims of the crimes being tried at the ICC. 
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In respect of the focus of the prosecutor on the DRC itself, two authors, Kambale 
and Rotman reflect on the situation as follows: 
 
“Ituri is closer to Uganda and Rwanda than to Kinshasa. These two neighboring countries 
allegedly have created and controlled rebel militias that, though aspiring to exercise power 
at the national level, have exploited long-standing ethnic tensions between Ituri's local 
Hema and Lendu ethnic populations.”405  
 
The authors allude to the fact that international actors are motivated in part by their 
desire to control the region's rich mineral resources, including diamonds, gold, timber 
and cobalt; the national rebel militias hope to materially benefit from their relationships 
with the international actors and to gain political power at the national level; the local 
ethnic disputes are rooted in land ownership disagreements, among other things. Over 
time, this three-tiered conflict has produced a number of actors, each of whom has 
focused at some point or another on gaining administrative control of Bunia, Ituri's 
principal city.  
The authors weigh up the pros and cons of the ICC’s focus on the DRC in 
prosecuting crimes and recommend that it is necessary to be mindful of who would 
enjoy the benefits or endure the costs: the ICC, the donor countries, the DRC or the 
victims of the crimes. The authors argue that in the end, all advocates for international 
justice must recognise that the interests of the court, the donors, the state, and the 
victims are seldom perfectly aligned, and thus consider how their decisions impact 
different constituencies.406 
Therefore, the current context of the DRC is imperative in understanding the 
potential impact of the conviction of Mr Lubanga. The conviction may not restore peace 
to the DRC, but we hope that the involvement of the ICC in prosecuting not only Mr 
Lubanga, but Messrs Katanga and Ntaganda will have an impact on procedural justice 
and restorative measures which the DRC will implement in the future to the benefit of 
all the people living in the DRC. 
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3 9  Conclusion 
In this chapter, notably a lack of specificity of charges and Mr Lubanga’s right to 
disclosure of evidence as well as the attempt by the victims to re-characterise the 
charges created uncertainty for Mr Lubanga in respect of the charges being brought 
against him and his ability to prepare an adequate defence. 
The trial of Mr Lubanga took six years to complete, which meant that he was in 
detention for six years. In 2012, he was sentenced to a prison term of fourteen years 
of which the six years already served would be deducted.407 In this regard, Mr 
Lubanga’s right to an expeditious trial was infringed and he was kept in detention for 
this entire period which is in contravention of his rights to liberty and security as 
guaranteed by the ICCPR. The case analysis also raised critical concerns in relation 
to the burden of proof placed on the prosecutor to prove her/his case beyond 
reasonable doubt as well as the prosecutor’s lack of adherence to the proper rules in 
respect of the disclosure of evidence. 
The next chapter will review the proceedings in relation to Mr Katanga, also from 
the DRC. The chapter will review the relevant decisions of the court in relation to Mr 
Katanga’s general fair trial rights, with a specific focus on the implementation of 
Regulation 55, his right to an expeditious trial, his right to silence and his fundamental 
right to life. The chapter will further review the decisions in respect of the participation 
of victims. 
 
                                                          







CHAPTER 4: GERMAIN KATANGA 
4 1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the case law pertaining to the fair trial rights of Mr 
Lubanga, who was the first accused convicted at the ICC. In particular, the chapter 
reviewed the implementation of Regulation 55, Mr Lubanga’s right to legal certainty 
and raised concerns related to the manner in which the prosecutor approaches the 
right to disclosure of evidence.  
This chapter will focus on Mr Katanga and his rights pertaining in particular, similarly 
to the previous chapter, to the implementation of Regulation 55 and its impact on his 
fair trial rights.  
In particular, the following fair trial rights of the accused will be reviewed within the 
context of the relevant case law; the right to be informed of the nature, cause and 
content of the charges, his right to an expeditious trial, his right to silence and his 
fundamental right to life. The chapter will also explore the decisions in respect of the 
participation of victims. 
 
4 2 Introduction and background to the Germain Katanga case 
The DRC ratified the Rome Statute on 11 April 2002. On 3 March 2004, the 
Government of the DRC referred the situation (all events within the jurisdiction of the 
Court) to the ICC. After preliminary analysis, the Prosecutor initiated an investigation 
on 21 June 2004. In 2007, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Germain Katanga (also 
known by the alias “Simba”) accusing him of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
in relation to an attack on Bogoro, a village in the Ituri district of the eastern DRC, 
which took place in early February 2003.408 
The Prosecutor alleged Germain Katanga’s involvement in the attack in his capacity 
as the leader of the Forces de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri (FRPI; Patriotic 
Resistance Force in Ituri). Katanga is alleged to have been the highest-ranking leader 
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of the FRPI since the beginning of 2003.409 Between January 2002 and December 
2003, over 8 000 civilians died and more than half a million persons were displaced 
from their homes in Ituri, as a consequence of the armed conflict between the FRPI 
and other armed militias in the region. Between January 2003 and March 2003, the 
FRPI and the Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI; Nationalist and 
Integrationist Front) were reported to have conducted attacks, in a systematic or 
widespread manner, against the civilian population in various parts of Ituri. On 24 
February 2003, members of Katanga’s militia allegedly entered the village of Bogoro 
and launched an attack, targeting mainly civilian members of the Hema ethnic group.410 
It was alleged that the FRPI had children under the age of fifteen participate in the 
attack during which at least 200 civilians were killed. It was further alleged that women 
and young girls were abducted to be turned into sexual slaves. 
 
4 2 1  Joinder of cases and confirmation of charges 
This was the second case to be tried at the ICC arising out of the DRC. On 10 March 
2008, Pre-Trial Chamber I joined Katanga's case with that of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
(“Ngudjolo”), based on the alleged sharing of responsibilities of crimes which had been 
committed in Bogoro.411 
The Confirmation of the Charges hearing took place on 26 September 2008 and 
the following charges were confirmed against both Katanga and Ngudjolo: 
The Chamber confirmed seven counts of war crimes under Article 25(3)(a) of the 
Statute (using children under the age of fifteen to take active part in hostilities, directing 
an attack against civilians, wilful killing, destruction of property, pillaging, sexual 
slavery, and rape) and three counts of crimes against humanity (murder, rape, and 
sexual slavery). However, it declined to confirm three charges on the grounds of 
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insufficient evidence: the charges of inhumane treatment and outrages upon personal 
dignity (war crimes), and inhumane acts (a crime against humanity).412  
The trial commenced on 24 November 2009 and the presentation of evidence 
began on 25 November 2009 and ended on 11 November 2011. The parties and 
participants then made oral submissions during hearings held between 15 and 23 May 
2012. The two accused made an oral statement as provided for in article 67(1)(h)413 of 
the Statute.414  
Thereafter, the Chamber continued its examination of evidence on the record of the 
case and noted that both during his testimony and his defence, Germain Katanga 
emphasised his contribution as co-ordinator of preparations for the attack on Bogoro 
while maintaining that its aim was to dislodge the UPC and asserting that it had been 
carried out by a group of local combatants linked to the APC. A number of witnesses 
called by both the Prosecutor and the Defence teams also highlighted Germain 
Katanga’s contribution to the attack, albeit in different terms.415 It appeared to the 
Majority of the Chamber that Germain Katanga’s mode of participation could be 
considered from a different perspective from that underlying the Confirmation Decision 
and it was, therefore, appropriate to implement Regulation 55, while ensuring that the 
Defence is able to exercise his rights effectively, in accordance with Regulation 55(2) 
and 55(3).416 
 On 21 November 2012, the two cases were severed and on 18 December 2012, 
Ngudjolo was acquitted of all charges against him.417 However, the trial against 
Katanga continued. The reasons for the severance of the cases and other judgments 
pertaining to the fair trial rights of Katanga will, therefore, be discussed in detail in this 
chapter.  
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4 3  The implementation of Regulation 55 – Right to know and understand the 
charges and to prepare an adequate defence and the right to an expeditious trial 
4 3 1  Trial Chamber decision 
On 21 November 2012,418 the majority of Trial Chamber II informed the parties that 
it was considering a re-characterisation of the facts of the case concerning the mode 
of liability applicable to Katanga. The Chamber then severed the cases and 
announced the judgment for Katanga’s co-accused, Ngudjolo, would take place as 
planned and he was acquitted in December 2012. It is evident that the joining and later 
severing of the two cases created an unnecessary delay in proceedings for Katanga 
as this process alone took four years. Further, it seems to be a very unfair manner in 
which the court implemented Regulation 55 at a stage of proceedings which coincided 
with the severance of the case with his counterpart. In the event that the prosecution 
had dealt with its investigation and charges effectively at the Pre-Trial stage, this 
situation may not have arisen and placed such strain on Katanga’s defence at the end 
of his trial with the co-accused, Ngudjolo, who was acquitted and yet Katanga at the 
same time had to prepare for a new trial based on new facts. 
On 21 November 2012, Trial Chamber II decided to re-characterise the facts against 
Katanga based on oral submissions which Katanga made during hearings held 
between 15 and 23 May 2012.419 The majority confirmed that one of the modes of 
liability for Katanga alone would be: 
 
“on the basis of article 25(3)(d) of the Statute (complicity in the commission of a crime by a 
group of persons acting with a common purpose) and no longer solely on the basis of article 
25(3)(a) of the Statute (commission of a crime in the form of indirect co-perpetration).”420  
 
The Majority confirmed that it would not examine the crime of using children under 
the age of fifteen years to participate actively in hostilities (direct co-perpetration) in 
                                                          
418 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Nngudjolo Chui Decision on the 
implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the court and severing the charges 
against the accused persons No.: ICC-01/04-01/07 (21 November 2012) Trial Chamber II para 
6. 
419 Para 4. 





light of Article 25(3)(d). The Trial Chamber deliberated as follows in regard to the re-
characterisation and its impact on the fair trial rights of Mr Katanga: 
 
4 3 1 1  The right to be informed of the nature, cause and content of the 
charges  
The majority relied on the ECHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
emphasising that these courts considered that the right to be informed of the nature, 
cause and content of the charges includes the right of the accused to be informed of 
the legal characterisation of the facts upon which the charges were initially based.421 
The majority held the view that the proposed legal re-characterisation, in fact, seeks 
to limit Katanga’s liability only to facts and circumstances already contained in the 
decision on the confirmation of charges, and thereby fulfils the requirements of 
Regulation 55(1) and ensures full respect for the rights guaranteed by Article 67(1)(a) 
of the Statute.422  
In sum, the majority of the court did not find that the re-characterisation of facts, at 
such a late stage in proceedings, infringed on Katanga’s rights to a fair trial. This 
finding is troubling since this re-characterisation was based on Katanga’s testimony 
and infringed his right to remain silent as contained in Article 67(1)(g) of the Statute. 
The re-characterisation was only made known to Katanga at the end of the trial with 
his co-accused and so for all intents and purposes, Katanga was preparing and 
awaiting the court’s final judgment and not expecting to be confronted with new 
charges. 
 
4 3 1 2  The right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence 
On this issue, the Chamber invited the defence, the victims and the prosecutor to 
make submissions on the re-characterisation.423 The court regarded this invitation of 
allowing Katanga to make submissions on the re-characterised facts as sufficient to 
fulfil the accused’s right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence. The court failed to consider that the re-characterisation came at the end of 
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Katanga’s case and the extent to which it could materially impact on his defence 
strategy at such a late stage.  
 
4 3 1 3  The right to be tried without undue delay  
The majority acknowledged that triggering Regulation 55 at such a late stage of the 
proceedings will prolong the proceedings against Katanga, but the majority denied that 
this would automatically infringe the right of the two accused to be tried without undue 
delay based on the following reasoning:  
 
“(i)       Firstly, because the situation of the co-Accused Mathieu Ngudjolo is being treated 
separately.  
(ii) Secondly, because, at this juncture, the Majority is satisfied that it is possible to 
enable the Accused to prepare an efficient and effective defence under regulation 
55(3), without prolonging the proceedings such as to entail an undue delay. As 
attested to by the present decision, the Majority felt the need to provide Germain 
Katanga with certain information in order to facilitate the preparation of his defence 
on the basis of article 25(3)(d) of the Statute.  
(iii) Finally, because this prolongation of the proceedings resulting from the application 
of regulation 55(2) and 55(3) is, without prejudice to the rights of the defence, 
strictly regulated by the Chamber, which will ensure that the application of this 
regulation does not engender a future unjustified or undue delay.”424  
 
The court also made it clear that it has wide discretion to implement Regulation 55. 
It is unfortunate that the court took the view that it did by; first, acknowledging that it is 
activating Regulation 55 late in the proceedings, but at the same time finding that even 
though the court is now charging Katanga on new charges, that no undue delay would 
occur. The court failed to take into account Katanga’s right to prepare an adequate 
defence to the new charges, which would entail finding new witnesses, disclosure of 
evidence and in essence starting a new defence from the beginning. 
 
4 3 1 4  The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself  
On this issue, the majority admitted that it was the first time the Court was asked to 
deliberate on the application of Article 67(1)(g) when Regulation 55 is triggered. The 
majority found that in the case against Katanga and in light of ECHR case law, this 
                                                          





right is not being infringed by the use of this procedure.425 The majority concluded that 
Katanga’s evidence was not given under duress and emphasised that he chose freely, 
in the presence of his counsel, to testify before the chamber and that no duress had 
been exerted upon him to do so and that as a result thereof, Katanga’s right not to be 
compelled to incriminate himself had not been violated.426  
This argument by the majority seems absurd, given that when Katanga chose to 
testify, he had not been informed by the court that his testimony may be used against 
him and that a re-characterisation may occur. If Katanga had been informed of the 
potential re-characterisation, it is argued that he would not have testified as freely as 
he did. It must also be borne in mind that his testimony was being given considering 
the charges against him as confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber and his defence 
strategy and decision to testify was informed by rebutting the charges, as confirmed, 
against him. It was not foreseeable to him, at the time, that the Chamber was 
considering re-characterisation of the facts against him and he incriminated himself 
based on omissions on the part of the Chamber. The chamber made it quite clear in 
its introductory paragraphs, that its decision to re-characterise the facts at the stage 
that it did, was largely based on the evidence it received in Katanga’s oral testimony. 
At the time of giving his oral testimony, it will be recalled that it was at the conclusion 
of his trial and it is submitted that he could not have known that effectively a new trial 
would commence after such testimony. 
It is evident from this decision that the implementation of Regulation 55 at the stage 
at which Katanga was effectively preparing for the end of his trial, could not have been 
anticipated or expected by a reasonable person. Arguably this was a completely 
unexpected turn of events for Katanga, first his case was severed from his co-
accused’s case, the co-accused was acquitted which means that if the re-
characterisation did not occur, Katanga may have been acquitted too because the 
decision of the court to re-characterise implies that there was insufficient evidence to 
convict Katanga of the initial charges in terms of Article 25(3)(a) and he should have 
been acquitted at the same time as Mr Ngudjolo.  
The implementation of Regulation 55 at this stage of proceedings was contrary to 
Katanga’s rights to legal certainty and his fair trial rights as contained in Article 22.  
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4 3 2  Dissenting Opinion of Van Den Wyngaert J 
Van den Wyngaert J wrote a strong dissent to the majority decision emphasising 
that the Majority’s decision potentially leads to a reopening of the trial, more than a 
year after the evidentiary hearings have come to an end.427 The judge criticised the 
timing of the initiation of Regulation 55 and argued that in terms of Article 64(2) of the 
Statute, the Trial Chamber has the duty to ensure that the trial is both fair and 
expeditious and that she was of the view that triggering Regulation 55 at such a late 
point in the deliberations, puts both the fairness and the expeditiousness of the trial in 
grave jeopardy. The judge428 referred to the Lubanga judgment on Regulation 55 and 
noted a two-step process which the majority should have followed in deciding whether 
or not to utilise Regulation 55:   
 
“i) it must be determined whether it is possible for the proposed re-characterisation of facts 
‘to accord with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8, or to accord with the form of participation 
of the accused under articles 25 and 28, without exceeding the facts and circumstances 
described in the charges and any amendments to the charges’ (‘First Step’); and  
ii) the Chamber must exercise its discretion and determine whether modifying the legal 
characterisation of the facts would render the trial unfair (‘Second Step’).” 
 
The two-step process reflected by Van den Wyngaert J reiterates that the Court, in 
arriving at its final judgment in this case, must abide by Article 74(2) of the Statute and 
may not “exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges.” It is advanced 
that Article 74(2) of the Statute limits the manner in which the court arrives at its 
decision and places a duty on the judges to make their decision within the context of 
confirmed charges against the accused.429 The second step proposed by the judge 
was not adhered to by the majority as they failed to conduct a proper assessment of 
whether the re-characterisation would render the trial unfair.  
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The judge430 was of the view that by using the Article 25(3)(d) Notice Decision, the 
Majority threatened the right to a fair and impartial proceeding and that the majority’s 
decision created the perception that:  
 
“(i) they would have had to acquit Germain Katanga on the indirect co-perpetration charges 
which he is facing and (ii) that Article 25(3)(d)(ii) is seen as a provision which could sustain 
a conviction. This perception is created because, had the Majority been prepared to convict 
the accused under Article 25(3)(a), then it stands to reason that they would have just 
convicted on that basis, rather than resorting to a Regulation 55(2) notice decision.”  
 
This argument fundamentally reflects the position that the majority knew that they 
would acquit Katanga’s co-accused and therefore opted for a re-characterisation to 
ensure a conviction of Katanga. 
The judge431 also highlighted the potential encroachment by the majority on the role 
and duties of the prosecutor in that the “truth-seeking mission” of the majority cannot 
justify an encroachment by the Trial Chamber on the role of the prosecution. It is the 
duty and role of the prosecutor to formulate the charges against the accused and to 
ensure that the facts are correctly characterised at the confirmation of charges phase 
of proceedings. In this case, it appears that the charges formulated against the 
accused were too weak to secure a conviction, hence the court’s decision to re-
characterise the facts. 
In respect of the accused’s right under Article 67(1)(g) of the Statute, the judge 
argued432 that the relevant provision guarantees the accused the right “not to be 
compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent” and that this right may be 
infringed by a Regulation 55(2) decision if the Chamber uses the accused’s own 
testimony at trial as a justification for considering re-characterisation.433 She argued 
that: 
 
“Mr Katanga testified in the context of an indirect co-perpetration case, and it was 
reasonable for the accused to not have contemplated Article 25(3)(d)(ii) when he chose to 
testify and waived his right to remain silent. Had Germain Katanga known he had to defend 
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himself against Article 25(3)(d)(ii) as well, then it cannot be discounted that he may not 
have testified.”434 
 
Notably, the court discounted this argument by stating that the accused was not 
forced to testify and that he was not placed under duress, that his testimony was given 
freely. However, the majority’s view is contrary to what the Statute intended by 
including the right against self-incrimination as the accused could not have known at 
the time he decided to testify that his own testimony would be used against him to 
formulate a new charge. 
The judge concluded435 by reiterating that, whether or not the implementation of 
Regulation 55 is fair, it must “be done on a case-by-case assessment in light of the 
Court’s procedural structure and that the court must be mindful of how the trial has 
been conducted when a re-characterisation is proposed.” Consequently, the judge436 
found the Majority’s decision to be in violation of Regulation 55(1), Article 64(2) and 
Articles 67(1)(a), (b), (c), (g) and (i) of the Statute.  
This was indeed a damning but fundamental dissent from the judge for the 
protection of the fair trial rights of the accused. The most alarming element of the 
majority’s decision is that the accused’s own testimony was used as the basis for the 
implementation of Regulation 55.  
 
4 3 3  The appeal and dissenting views on Regulation 55 
Katanga appealed the decision to implement Regulation 55 and the judgment on 
Appeal was delivered on 27 March 2013. At the appeal, Katanga had raised his right 
to be informed promptly of the charges and to have adequate time and facilities to 
prepare his defence had been compromised because he: 
 
a) should have been informed prior to the defence case, or in a timely fashion about the 
legal re-characterisation, 
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b) his defence strategy, including his decision to testify, may have been different had he 
known that his alleged form of participation would be changed.  
 
He concluded that this amounted to an infringement of his right not to be compelled 
to testify.437 
The Appeals Chamber unpacked the provisions of Regulation 55 and found in 
respect of the timing of the impugned decision, that while it is preferable that notice 
under Regulation 55(2) should be given as early as possible, Katanga’s argument that 
the timing of the Impugned decision is incompatible with Regulation 55(2) is not 
persuasive.438 The Appeals Chamber considered all the accused’s fair trial rights in 
the appeal decision but upheld the Trial Chamber decision. 
 At this point of the proceedings, the Appeals Chamber should have set out clear 
safeguards for the Trial Chamber to adhere to in the conduct of the trial against 
Katanga based on the re-characterisation. Such safeguards should have included 
being informed in detail of the new charges against him in order that he may be 
afforded time and facilities to prepare a new defence strategy. The decision to leave 
this matter to be dealt with at the end of the trial, as we will see further herein, in fact, 
prejudiced the accused’s rights. 
 
4 3 3 1  Dissenting opinion Tarfusser J 
Tarfusser J439 dissented to the appeal decision and held the view that Regulation 
55 vests in a Chamber the authority “to modify the legal characterisation of facts” and 
to do so “at any time during the trial.” In so doing, it places itself at the crossroads 
between two fundamental tenets of the right to a fair trial:  
 
“the right to be tried without undue delay, on the one hand, and  
the right to be adequately informed of the nature, cause and content of the charges, on the 
other, both of which are contained in the Statute under Article 67(1)(c) and Article 67(1) (a) 
respectively.”440 
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Tarfusser J raised the right to legal certainty:  
 
“I believe that the ensuing degree of uncertainty and unpredictability is so high as to make 
this approach incompatible with the obligation of the Court to construe its instruments in 
such a way as to make them consistent both with the principle of legality and with 
internationally recognised human rights.”441  
 
Tarfusser J also took a firm stance in relation to the right to be adequately informed 
of the nature and content of the charges and found that in giving notice of their intention 
to consider a re-characterisation, the relevant Chamber should have provided 
adequate information as to the factual and legal scope of that change, with a view to 
allowing the accused to review his defence strategy.442  
The implementation of Regulation 55 so late in proceedings against Katanga 
resulted in a serious violation of Katanga’s fair trial rights as demonstrated by the 
dissenting opinions of both Van den Wyngaert J and Tarfusser J. The principle of 
legality was also not upheld by the court as the re-characterisation was not 
foreseeable by the accused and he remained uncertain about the new charges being 
brought against him.  
 
4 4  Victim participation 
For the purposes of assessing the extent to which the participation of victims 
influences the accused’s fair trial rights, key judgments on this matter arose in the 
Katanga case, in which a broad interpretation to victim participation was confirmed. 
For the purposes of this analyses, it is important to recall that Article 68(3) of the Rome 
Statute recognises the balance between the rights of victims and the accused in that 
the participation of victims must “not [be] prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights 
of the accused and a fair and impartial trial”.443 
The decision of the ICC in relation to the mode of participation granted to victims in 
the proceedings against Katanga and Ngudjulo was a matter of controversy as the 
judgments reflected that victims were now being given broad participation rights at the 
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ICC. On 22 January 2010, Trial Chamber II issued a ruling, setting out the modes in 
which victims could participate during the trial.444  
 
4 4 1  Background to victim participation decision 
Initially in 2008, prior to the commencement of the trial, the PTC had granted 57 
victims the right to participate.445 For the purpose of a status conference which took 
place in late November 2008, the parties were requested to make submissions on 
victim participation. Ngudjolo specifically raised concerns as to the participation of 
victims at the trial stage of proceedings. Subsequent to the Status conference, the 
parties were once again asked to set out their concerns in relation to victim 
participation.446 On 31 July 2009, the Trial Chamber allowed 288 victims to participate 
in proceedings.447 On 23 November 2009, the Chamber granted leave to fourteen 
additional victims to participate in the proceedings and requested seven other 
applicants to provide it with further information.448 On 27 November 2009 and 1 
December 2009 respectively, the legal representatives of the victims were allowed to 
view the list of evidence disclosed by the parties as well as incriminating evidence filed 
by the prosecutor.449 
 
4 4 2  Trial Chamber decision – Victim’s participation 
In this particular case, Katanga raised the following concerns in respect of victim 
participation: 
 
(i) “The defence wanted the court to define the scope and modalities of victim 
participation;450 
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(ii) That evidence led by victims should not have the effect of expanding or modifying the 
nature or scope of the prosecution’s case;451 
(iii) The defence proposes that the presentation of evidence be subject to four conditions: 
timely notice thereof, leave of the Chamber, timely notice of disclosure of documents, 
and admissibility of the documents tendered;452 
(iv) Victims should not conduct investigations as this is the role of the prosecutor;453 
(v) The Defence further argued that the victims participating in the proceedings may 
appear only as witnesses for one of the parties, that is, the Prosecution or the 
Defence, or at the Chamber’s request, but they cannot be called by their own legal 
representatives;454 
(vi) The Defence for Germain Katanga further requested the Chamber to order the victims 
participating in the proceedings and their Legal Representatives to disclose to the 
Defence any information in their possession which tended to show the innocence of 
the accused or mitigate his guilt, irrespective of their entitlement to lead incriminating 
evidence at trial;455 
(vii)  Lastly the defence requested that victims disclose all exculpatory information.”456 
 
The Katanga and Ngudjolo cases provided the Court with its first opportunity after 
the Lubanga Appeals Chamber judgment to consider the participation of victims during 
the trial phase of proceedings. In this instance, even though victims and their legal 
representatives were given broad rights of participation, the Trial Chamber also placed 
various limitations on these rights. By way of example, Trial Chamber II made it clear 
that victim’s participation began at the commencement of trial proceedings but that 
such participation was limited to the extent that their involvement would contribute to 
the determination of the truth, did not prejudice the rights of the accused, and did not 
impact on the expeditiousness of proceedings.457 The Trial Chamber inserted a 
proviso in respect of legal representatives who were able to attend and participate in 
public and in-camera hearings, only under conditions defined by the chamber and 
where hearings were held on an ex parte basis, the chamber would also assess 
whether or not they should attend on a case-by-case basis.458 
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In respect of the questioning of witnesses or the accused, the Trial Chamber held 
that the legal representative must make an application to the Chamber and that the 
Chamber may make an order that the questions be formulated in writing and 
communicated to the Prosecutor and to the Defence, for their observations.459 The 
Trial Chamber made it clear that it has the prerogative to issue directions on the 
manner and order of the questions and production of documents. The chamber also 
stated that it reserved its right to put questions to witnesses, an expert or the accused 
on behalf of the legal representative.460  
The Chamber reiterated that the legal representatives may put questions to 
witnesses but the questions should not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights 
of the accused and the requirements of a fair and impartial trial.461 The chamber 
specified that the questions which the Legal Representatives may put are limited to 
points of clarity or to supplement evidence already given by the witness and that a 
neutral style of questioning should be adopted.462  
This decision grants victims the right to participate during the trial phase of 
proceedings and gives them broad rights of participation in respect of questioning the 
accused as well. This could potentially create a situation where the accused is now 
facing two prosecutors. The paperwork envisaged for these procedures will also create 
a burden on the ICC and may impact on the length of proceedings. The decision also 
places a great burden on the judges to constantly ensure that the questions are not 
prejudicial to the rights of the accused.  
The Trial Chamber recognised the possibility that a victim might submit 
incriminating or exculpatory evidence but reiterated that such a submission would be 
contingent on the outcome of weighing up the victim’s interests, the rights of the 
accused and the requirements of a fair and impartial trial.463 This decision is a bit 
concerning as victims are not regarded as parties to proceedings in terms of the Rome 
Statute and it is only the prosecutor and defendant who are allowed to submit evidence 
in terms of either proving or disproving the guilt or innocence respectively. Even with 
the court’s intervention and monitoring which it proposes, this decision places victims 
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almost on an equal footing to the prosecutor and this could substantially affect the 
accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by the prosecutor. 
In respect of the presentation of evidence, the Chamber stated that this will only be 
allowed, provided that it is not prejudicial to the defence or to the fairness and 
impartiality of the trial.464 The Chamber stressed that even though the victims are 
authorised to present incriminating or exculpatory evidence during the trial, this does 
not mean that they are entitled to conduct investigations in order to establish the guilt 
of the accused as this would amount to them taking over the role of the prosecutor.465  
In response, Mr Katanga’s view was that the victims and their Legal 
Representatives are obliged to disclose to the Defence any evidence in their 
possession, whether incriminating or exculpatory, the chamber held that neither the 
Statute nor the Rules impose such an obligation on victims.466 The court also clarified 
this matter by stating that victims do not have the right to present evidence, only the 
possibility of applying to the Chamber for leave to present evidence and because of 
this, there is no justification for obliging them generally to disclose to the parties any 
evidence in their possession, whether incriminating or exculpatory.467  
The chamber’s decision is contradictory in this regard, the Statutes and Rules do 
not confer the status of victims as parties to proceedings and yet they are being given 
rights in respect of presenting evidence on the same footing as a prosecutor or 
defendant.  
The Chamber noted that neither the Statute nor the Rules prohibit victim status from 
being granted to a person who already has the status of a prosecution or defence 
witness. Further, that Rule 85 of the Rules does not prohibit a person who has been 
granted victim status from subsequently giving evidence on behalf of one of the 
parties.468 
This decision reflects that the chamber awarded broad access to victims’ 
participation, including their participation at the trial stage of proceedings. Up to now, 
given the Lubanga judgment, we know that victims were not allowed to participate in 
the investigation stage but are allowed to participate in the Pre-Trial and trial stages 
                                                          
464 Para 101 
465 Para 102. 
466 Para 105. 
467 Para 105. 





of proceedings. However, this wide degree of participation afforded to victims has 
received criticism, mainly due to the fact that while the participation of victims is a 
noble quality at the ICC, it remains to be seen whether their active participation to the 
degree afforded in this decision, will be adequately balanced by the judges in relation 
to the rights of the accused.  
  
4 4 3  Appeals Chamber judgment on victim’s participation 
On 16 July 2010, the Appeals Chamber469 upheld the decision of the Trial Chamber 
on the modalities of victim participation, despite the accused raising arguments related 
to his fair trial rights. Both the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber relied heavily on 
the decisions in the Lubanga trial regarding the participation of victims and in essence, 
confirmed the modalities of participation as per the Lubanga judgment and as 
mentioned herein. Therefore, in light of the Trial Chamber’s decision, victims now have 
extensive participatory rights at the trial phase of proceedings and a proper 
assessment of whether or not the judges are able to balance the rights of the accused 
versus the participation of victims, can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis 
because the Court’s jurisprudence is still at a developmental stage. 
To this end, Zago470 opines that the reasons for allowing victims to participate in 
proceedings are to ensure that the victims are given a chance to be heard but that this 
does not necessarily mean that they should have a role in the adjudication of the case. 
Zago471 argues quite strongly that victims’ participation would require a more judge-
led procedure particularly regarding the submission of evidence but that this should 
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also be approached with caution as the judges should not be guilty of overriding the 
prosecutor’s role by sharing the burden of proof.  
Van den Wyngaert J472 argues that the participation of victims in the criminal trials 
may not be sustainable in the long run for the ICC. The judge argues that despite the 
limitations which the Court has proposed, participatory rights for victims are quite 
extensive, both during pre-trial and trial and the implication of this is that the Chambers 
have to consider the submissions of victims in addition to the submissions of the 
defence and prosecution which ultimately increases the length of time of proceedings. 
The judge473 reiterates that in terms of the jurisprudence of the Court, victims have 
access to and are notified of all public filings, public decisions and all the evidence 
disclosed between the parties, they are also allowed to make short opening and 
closing statements and could request permission to make oral submissions. She 
argues that a paradox remains between the ICC trying to ensure a balance between 
the interests of victims and those of the accused and this is evident as victims have 
an interest in seeing the accused found guilty and convicted.474  
Inman and Magadju have a different view, they believe that by allowing victims to 
participate in the criminal proceedings, promotes accountability and the rule of law in 
post-conflict transitioning countries.475 Their argument is that by providing a role for 
victims within the criminal justice process, this can promote knowledge, awareness 
and understanding of the process involved in criminal proceedings, for victims. 
Secondly that such participation can promote individual healing by providing the 
victims with a sense of agency, empowerment and closure, leading to higher levels of 
overall satisfaction with the criminal justice system. Finally, participation can contribute 
to reconciling a community by promoting truth-finding in criminal proceedings.476 
Moffett, holds a similar viewpoint in that he believes that justice for victims comprises 
both the procedural and substantive aspects, complementing each other as a means 
to redress their harm. He, however, expresses the view that because the ICC has 
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limited resources and jurisdictional bounds, it cannot provide a full account of justice 
to all victims of international crimes, but needs to be complemented with domestic 
processes.477  
Once again, the balance between the rights of the accused and the victim becomes 
apparent. Inasmuch as the participation of victims is important, both for their personal 
healing as well as for the court to obtain the perspective of victims, it is arguable, that 
the ICC may not necessarily be the best-suited institution to meet their expectations. 
 
4 5  Conviction decisions Katanga majority and minority decisions 
4 5 1  Introduction 
Due to the sheer volume of the majority decision (consisting of 660 pages), key 
selected fair trial rights of the accused are highlighted from the summary of the majority 
judgment as well as some aspects from the detailed majority judgment, mainly to 
review whether or not the fair trial rights of the accused had been addressed. The main 
fair trial rights which bear relevance in this section is the implementation of Regulation 
55 on his right to know and understand the charges against him, to be given clear 
notice of the charges, his right to remain silent and to be tried without undue delay. 
Most of these discussions are already contained in the section discussing the 
implementation of Regulation 55 and will only be addressed briefly hereunder to 
demonstrate the impact the re-characterisation had on the findings of guilt against Mr 
Katanga. 
 
4 5 2  Majority decision 
The majority of the chamber found that in respect of the war crime of using children 
under the age of 15 years to participate actively in hostilities, that there were 
substantial grounds to believe that the members of the FRPI had committed them 
intentionally, this crime was alleged to have been committed only by Germain Katanga 
himself, and not by the militia members. However, the Chamber was unable to identify 
a direct nexus indicating that the accused used these children to participate in the 
                                                          






hostilities.478 The Chamber, therefore, found that the Prosecutor failed to establish that 
Germain Katanga had committed the alleged crimes within the meaning of Article 
25(3)(a) of the Statute. Van den Wyngaert J (who wrote the dissenting opinion 
expressed hereunder) concurs with this finding.479 
Therefore, on 7 March 2014,480 Mr Katanga was convicted and found guilty under 
Article 25(3)(d) of the Statute, as an accessory to the crimes committed on 24 February 
2003 of: 
 
(i) Murder as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(a) of the Statute; 
(ii) Murder as a war crime under Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute; 
(iii) Attack against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians not 
taking a direct part in hostilities, as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the 
Statute; 
(iv) Destruction of enemy property as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(xii) of the 
Statute; and 
(v) Pillaging as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute.481 
 
4 5 3  Key fair trial rights discussed in the majority and minority decisions 
4 5 3 1 Re-characterisation – Article 67 fair trial rights of the accused and 
presumption of innocence and burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt 
The chamber found that the proposed re-characterisation did not exceed the facts 
and circumstances described in the charges since the Chamber confined its 
examination to the same acts and same conduct relied on by the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
concerning Germain Katanga’s coordinating role in the implementation of the common 
plan. The Chamber was also of the view that the re-characterisation concerns factual 
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allegations which underpin one of the legal elements of the criminal responsibility 
charged.482 
It is on this point that Van den Wyngaert and the majority of the chamber 
substantially  disagreed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
The judge stated quite emphatically that in her view the re-characterisation was made 
in repeated violation of the accused’s fair trial rights set out under Article 67 of the 
Statute and Regulation 55(2) and (3) of the Regulations of the court.483 
 She was of the view that essential evidence was missing from the case record and 
that many witnesses were unreliable and on this basis, she found that it was 
impossible to enter findings beyond reasonable doubt.484 The judge made it clear that 
under the circumstances of the case, she would have acquitted Mr Katanga because 
the Prosecution failed to prove Germain Katanga’s responsibility as initially charged, 
that is, as an “indirect co-perpetrator” to the Bogoro attack under Article 25(3)(a) of the 
Statute.485 
  
4 5 3 2  Right to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and 
content of the charge 
The majority held that: 
  
“Having regard to the circumstances and particulars set out in the Decision on the 
confirmation of charges and the specific measures taken during the pre-trial proceedings 
and as of implementation of regulation 55, the Chamber considers that the Accused was 
duly informed in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charges.”486  
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The chamber also argued that it had invited further submissions from the defence487 
and that the chamber allowed the defence to undertake further investigations.488  
Van den Wyngaert argued that Article 67(1)(a) had been infringed by the majority 
of the chamber refusing to provide the accused with clear and precise notice of the 
altered charges.489 On this point, she went further to raise her disagreement with the 
fact that the majority of the chamber did not afford Mr Katanga the opportunity to 
conduct further investigations in order to effectively respond to the new charges under 
the re-characterisation.490 In this regard, the majority only provided Mr Katanga with 
the opportunity to make submissions which in her view was insufficient. The judge 
stated that the final judgment relied on facts and allegations that clearly fell outside the 
“facts and circumstances” of the Confirmation Decision. The judge argued that the 
majority failed to engage with the legal question on how to interpret the concept of 
“facts and circumstances” and the majority instead introduced totally new factual 
elements into the charges under Article 25(3)(d)(ii).491  
 
4 5 3 3  Right to remain silent 
 The majority of the chamber reflected on Mr Katanga’s objections in this regard 
and held that in its 21 November 2012 decision, the Chamber considered that the 
accused’s decision to testify was deliberate and that he had in no way been forced or 
coerced.492 
On this point, the chamber made the following statement: 
 
“the Accused waived his right to remain silent. He willingly made an informed decision, with 
the guidance of counsel, to testify and take the initiative to raise or dwell on various topics 
which he deemed significant to the charges against him. Hence, the Chamber cannot be 
accused of not respecting his right to remain silent. Accordingly, the Chamber considers 
the Defence prayer unfounded in this regard.”493 
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On the accused’s right to remain silent, Van den Wyngaert J made it clear that when 
an accused waives his right to remain silent, he should understand the consequences 
of such a waiver.494 The judge argued that Mr Katanga waived his right to remain silent 
under the confirmed charges in Article 25(3)(a) and that the chamber’s questions went 
beyond the scope of these charges.495 By implication, therefore, the judge intimates 
that Mr Katanga did not understand the extent of the waiver of his right to remain silent. 
The judge questioned why the chamber did not inform the accused that his testimony 
may be used against him in a possible re-characterisation.496 
 Van den Wyngaert J497 referred to Katanga’s testimony where he freely answers 
all questions pertaining to his role as a co-ordinator and which at the time undermined 
the prosecutor’s theory that he had control over the crime as follows: 
 
“However, now the Majority relies heavily on Germain Katanga’s role as a co-ordinator for 
its finding that he made a ‘significant contribution’ in the sense of article 25(3)(d). In other 
words, the majority has turned a perfectly legitimate defence against the confirmed charges 
into a major point of self-incrimination under a different form of criminal responsibility498.” 
 
This judgment effectively means that he was found guilty based on re-characterised 
crimes. 
 
4 5 3 4  The right to be tried without undue delay  
The Chamber was of the view that it had overseen the fair and expeditious conduct 
of the trial with due regard to the rights of the accused. The Chamber found that the 
difficulties which the defence encountered during investigations did not entail any 
violation of the rights of the Accused, and articles 67(1)(b), 67(1)(c) and 67(1)(e) in 
particular.499 
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Van den Wyngaert J500 also reflected on the delay in proceedings and the impact 
on Mr Katanga as follows:  
 
“It is also now more than six years since Germain Katanga was surrendered to the Court 
by the DRC. The trial was lengthy in itself, beginning on 24 November 2009. The last 
witness testified in November 2011, evidence closed on 7 February 2012 and the 
arguments of the parties and participants closed on 23 May 2012. A delay of 182 days 
eventuated until the Majority rendered its Notice Decision on 21 November 2012. The 
Further Notice Decision was not issued until 15 May 2013. The Decision refusing further 
investigations did not come until 19 November 2013. Today, 444 days after the acquittal of 
Mathieu Ngudjolo, 471 days after the Notice Decision, 653 days after the closing arguments 
and 759 days after the closing of the evidence, we now have the final judgment. To me, 
this is an inordinately long delay.”501  
 
She considered the delays to be exceptionally long and completely in violation of 
Mr Katanga’s right to a speedy trial. 
 
4 5 3 5  Discussion on the fundamental aspects of fair trial rights – Katanga 
decision 
One author, Dastague,502 argues that both the prosecutor and defendant rely 
primarily on the initial confirmation of charges before and during the trial to prepare for 
their cases. Therefore the invocation of Regulation 55 at the trial stage of proceedings 
means that the minimum safeguards as provided for in Regulation 55(2) provides 
insufficient protection for the accused insofar as it can be assumed that he was always 
informed of the charges throughout the proceedings.503  
Another author, Heller504 confirms this view that to establish an effective criminal 
defence, the focus will be on rebutting facts and rebutting legal characterisations. 
Therefore, re-characterising facts to support new legal characterisations during or after 
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trial will almost always substantially undermine the accused’s right to effectively 
prepare his defence. Heller505 argues further that the re-characterisation undermined 
the defence’s entire trial strategy, which focused solely on rebutting the Prosecution’s 
claim that the accused was responsible for the charged crimes as an indirect co-
perpetrator. 
The importance of the confirmation of charges hearing is once again reinforced in 
respect of the accused knowing the charges against him but also in terms of his 
defence and ensuring that he can create enough doubt regarding the charges being 
brought against him. 
On the matter of the burden of proof; beyond reasonable doubt, Van den Wyngaert 
stated that she disagreed with the majority judgment that Mr Katanga’s responsibility 
under Article 25(3)(d)(ii) had been proven beyond reasonable doubt and that she 
would have acquitted Mr Katanga.506 She also raised the fact that in her view, the 
prosecution’s case was weak, there were witnesses and Mr Katanga himself who were 
not interviewed and that Mr Katanga’s testimony was used improperly. In the latter 
instance, the judge stated that it is quite telling that the main source of incriminating 
evidence under Article 25(3)(d)(ii) is the testimony of Mr Katanga.507  
Heller508 argues that when the judges decided to re-characterise, they were acting 
as advocates, not as decision-makers and they were trying to compensate for the 
weak prosecution case. Elaborating on this point he states that this manner of dealing 
with the trials does not accord with the ICC system of trials which is largely adversarial 
in nature and the Trial Chamber’s interference fundamentally encroached on the 
accused’s fair trial rights in Article 67(1), the accused is guaranteed a “fair and impartial 
trial.”509 
There are two issues here; one in respect of the burden of proof and two in respect 
of the weak prosecution case and the fact that the Trial Chamber felt the need to 
intervene and ensure a conviction at all costs, all of which is problematic and in direct 
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conflict with the accused’s rights both in respect of being presumed innocent until 
proven guilty and in terms of his right to a fair and impartial trial. 
In respect of the right to remain silent, Heller510 argues that Mr Katanga chose to 
testify on the assumption that the prosecution had to prove that he was guilty of the 
charged crimes as an indirect co-perpetrator. However, as a result of his testimony, 
he effectively conceded both the mental and physical elements of contributing to a 
group crime which was part of his defence strategy as he did not foresee that this may 
be used against him by the chamber re-characterising the charges to include common 
purpose liability under Article 25(3)(d). Heller considered the majority’s narrow view of 
‘free will’ and the fact that the accused was not coerced to testify as demonstrating the 
extent to which Regulation 55 undermines the right to silence enshrined in Article 
67(1)(g) of the Rome Statute. Heller511 concludes that in future trials, no rational 
accused will ever testify in his own defence again as a result of the way Mr Katanga’s 
testimony was used against him to re-characterise the charges. 
The conclusion of Van den Wyngaert J’s512 dissenting opinion is one which the 
prosecutor and judges can learn from at the ICC as it sets out procedural fairness in 
exacting terms. The judge shares the following reflection on the Katanga trial as a 
whole: 
 
“Trials like these are difficult and complex matters, both from a legal and evidentiary point 
of view. Moreover, they are challenging on the human level. Sympathy for the victims’ plight 
and an urgent awareness that this Court is called upon to “end impunity” are powerful 
stimuli. Yet, the Court’s success or failure cannot be measured just in terms of “bad guys” 
being convicted and innocent victims receiving reparation. Success or failure is determined 
first and foremost by whether or not the proceedings, as a whole, have been fair and just.”513 
 
An important consideration is that one of the judges wrote an opinion which so 
clearly considered the rights of the accused to a fair trial. Even though this opinion was 
not that of the majority of the chamber, it holds weight and merit in respect of ensuring 
that the international community knows that not all aspects of a fair trial was adhered 
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to and such a dissenting view will cast doubt in the mind of the international community 
in terms of whether or not the ICC did, in fact, conduct the proceedings in a just 
manner. The decision to re-characterise the facts and the manner in which it was 
undertaken coupled with this minority opinion conceivably casts serious aspersions on 
the legitimacy of the ICC as a criminal court, first and foremost.  
 
4 5 4  Lessons from the tribunals on fair trial rights and amendment to the charges 
An equivalent Rule at the ICTY and ICTR to Regulation 55, is Rule 50514 which 
allows for an amendment to an indictment, admittedly it is not the same as Regulation 
55 which allows for a re-characterisation of the charges at any stage of the 
proceedings, however, the manner in which the tribunals considered the fair trial rights 
of the accused and the impact of the amendment is of importance to the current 
argument.  
In reviewing the jurisprudence concerning this Rule and whether or not fair trial 
rights of the defendant were protected, I wish to draw the reader’s attention to the 
                                                          
514 Rule 50 Amendment of Indictment (Adopted 11 Feb 1994) (A) (i) The Prosecutor may 
amend an indictment: (a) at any time before its confirmation, without leave; (Amended 17 Nov 
1999, amended 14 July 2000) (b) between its confirmation and the assignment of the case to 
a Trial Chamber, with the leave of the Judge who confirmed the indictment, or a Judge 
assigned by the President; and (Amended 10 July 1998, amended 17 Nov 1999, amended 14 
July 2000) (c) after the assignment of the case to a Trial Chamber, with the leave of that Trial 
Chamber or a Judge of that Chamber, after having heard the parties. (Amended 17 Nov 1999, 
amended 14 July 2000) (ii) Independently of any other factors relevant to the exercise of the 
discretion, leave to amend an indictment shall not be granted unless the Trial Chamber or 
Judge is satisfied there is evidence which satisfies the standard set forth in Article 19, 
paragraph 1, of the Statute to support the proposed amendment. (Amended 10 July 1998, 
amended 17 Nov 1999, amended 14 July 2000, amended 28 July 2004) (iii) Further 
confirmation is not required where an indictment is amended by leave. (Amended 28 July 
2004) (iv) Rule 47 (G) and Rule 53 bis apply mutatis mutandis to the amended indictment. 
(Amended 18 Jan 1996, amended 3 Dec 1996, amended 12 Nov 1997, amended 10 July 
1998) (B) If the amended indictment includes new charges and the accused has already 
appeared before a Trial Chamber in accordance with Rule 62, a further IT/32/Re v 50 42 8 
July 2015 appearance shall be held as soon as practicable to enable the accused to enter a 
plea on the new charges. (Amended 18 Jan 1996) (C) The accused shall have a further period 
of thirty days in which to file preliminary motions pursuant to Rule 72 in respect of the new 
charges and, where necessary, the date for trial may be postponed to ensure adequate time 
for the preparation of the defence. (Amended 18 Jan 1996, amended 12 Nov 1997, amended 





ICTR case of Akayesu.515 In this case, following the evidence of two witnesses about 
sexual violence, one of whom testified to being raped in Akayesu’s presence, the 
Chamber granted the Prosecution’s Rule 50 application to amend the indictment a 
month after the close of the Prosecution’s case to include charges of sexual violence, 
which is very similar to the stage at which Mr Katanga had been informed of the re-
characterisation in his case. In the decision, the Trial Chamber opined that it had 
permitted the amendment at such a late stage as “the investigation and presentation 
of evidence related to sexual violence is in the interests of justice.”516 On Appeal, 
Akayesu argued that he had been prejudiced by the late amendment of the indictment 
which was rejected by the Appeals Chamber on the following grounds: the three new 
counts related to sites and a material time which were referred to in the initial 
Indictment and does not constitute a new indictment. The court held that the defence 
was granted a four-month adjournment following the amendment to defend against 
the new charges and did not object to their inclusion and therefore there was no 
prejudice.517 In this case the defendant was given four months to prepare a defence 
strategy against the new charges, this, however, was denied to Mr Katanga as he had 
requested time to investigate further and the court had denied his request. 
In another case, Kovacevic,518 the Trial Chamber considered Article 20(4)(c)519 
Statute, another Article which is similar to Article 67 of the Rome Statute, which is to 
be “tried without delay”. In this case, the ICTR Appeals Chamber asked the question: 
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517 The Prosecutor v Akayesu AC Judgement (1 June 2001) paras 119-123. 
518 The Prosecutor v Kovacevic No. IT-97-24-AR73, Decision stating reasons for Appeals 
Chamber’s Order of 29 May 1998 (2 July 1998). 
519 Article 20:  
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Rights of the Accused 1. All persons shall 
be equal before the International Tribunal for Rwanda. 2.In the determination of charges 
against him or her, the accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to 
article 21 of the Statute. 3.The accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
according to the provisions of the present Statute. 4.In determination of any charge against 
the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following 
minimum guarantees, in full equality: a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language 
which he or she understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her; b) 
To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence and to 






“whether the additional time which the granting of the motion for leave to amend would 
occasion is reasonable in light of the right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial.”520  
 
The Appeals Chamber gave some guidance in interpreting this section in light of an 
amendment by stating that the Article “must be interpreted according to the special 
features of each case.”521The court went further to state: 
  
“The timeliness of the Prosecutor’s request for leave to amend the Indictment must be 
measured within the framework of the overall requirement of the fairness of 
proceedings.”522  
 
In the Katanga case, the court found that Mr Katanga’s fair trial rights were not 
affected by the re-characterisation. In another case at the ICTR, Karemera et al,523 the 
Appeals Chamber stated that  
 
“a postponement of the trial date and a prolongation of the Pre-Trial detention of the 
accused” are some but not all of the considerations relevant to determining whether a 
proposed amendment would violate the right of the accused to a trial “without undue delay.”  
 
                                                          
d) To be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person or through 
legal assistance of his or her own choosing; to be informed, if he or she does not have legal 
assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case 
where the interest of justice so require, and without payment by him or her in any such case 
if he or she does not have sufficient means to pay for it; e) To examine, or have examined, 
the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses 
on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her; f) To have 
the free assistance of an interpreter if her or she cannot understand or speak the language 
used in the International Tribunal for Rwanda; g) Not to be compelled to testify against 
himself or herself or to confess guilt.  
520 The Prosecutor v Kovacevic No. IT-97-24-AR73, Decision stating reasons for Appeals 
Chamber’s Order of 29 May 1998 (2 July 1998) para 28. 
521 Para 30. 
522 Para 31. 
523 The Prosecutor v Karemera et al No ICTR-98-44-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor’s 
interlocutory appeal against Trial Chamber II Decision of 8 October 2003 Denying leave to File 





The court stated that in making this assessment, it should also consider such factors 
as the nature and scope of the proposed amendments, whether the prosecution was 
diligent in pursuing its investigations and in presenting the motion, whether the 
accused and the Trial Chamber had prior notice of the prosecution’s intention to seek 
leave to amend the indictment, when and in what circumstances such notice was 
given, whether the prosecution seeks an improper tactical advantage and whether the 
addition of specific allegations will actually improve the ability of the accused to 
respond to the case against them and thereby enhance the overall fairness of the 
trial.524 The Trial Chamber must further consider the risk of prejudice to the accused 
and the extent to which such prejudice may be cured by methods other than denying 
the amendment, such as granting of adjournments or permitting the accused to recall 
witnesses.525 
 In this case, it is significant that the court also considered the ‘diligence’ of the 
prosecutor in his investigations, which was not a consideration by the majority in 
Katanga and which is a matter that was highlighted by Van den Wyngaert in her 
dissent to the majority that the prosecution’s case was weak both in evidence and in 
relation to the credibility of witnesses. Further, this case also reviews whether or not 
through the amendment, the prosecutor is seeking a tactical advantage. It is 
unfortunate that in the Katanga case no such assessment can be made as it was not 
the prosecutor who sought the amendment but the judges. 
The only difference between the cases at the tribunals and the Katanga case is that 
the judges sought the change in the mode of liability in Katanga and most of the 
tribunal’s cases refer to the prosecutor’s case. However, it is clear from the cases at 
the tribunals that the accused’s fair trial rights are of paramount importance in 
determining any amendment to charges and in relation to the stage of proceedings at 
which such amendments are proposed. 
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4 6  Post-judgment and sentencing: Article 108 
4 6 1  Background and context 
On the 29 February 2016, the Presidency of the ICC received a letter in which the 
DRC requested that the ICC approves the prosecution of Mr Katanga in the DRC 
before the Haute Cour Militaire (military court in the DRC) in terms of Article 108(1)526 
of the Rome Statute.527 
The background to this request is that when requested by the ICC in 2015 to elect 
where he wished to serve the remainder of his sentence, Mr Katanga elected to serve 
the remainder of his sentence in the DRC as the term of his sentence would end in 
January 2016. Therefore, on the 19 December 2015, Mr Katanga was transferred to 
a prison facility in the DRC as per his request.528 Shortly thereafter, on 13 January 
2016, a number of documents, including a Decision de renvoi (decision to refer) was 
filed at the ICC by the Haute Cour Militaire against Mr Katanga which referred to 
offences allegedly committed by Mr Katanga between 2002 and 2006.529 These 
documents were accompanied by a letter referring to Article 108(1) of the Rome 
Statute.  
On 14 January 2016, the ICC Presidency requested the DRC to explain the legal 
consequences of the Decision de renvoi and the next procedural steps foreseen, 
taking into consideration the fact that Mr Katanga’s sentence would be completed on 
18 January 2016. The court further requested clarity as to whether the letter referring 
                                                          
526 Article 108: Limitation on the prosecution or punishment of other offences  
1. A sentenced person in the custody of the State of enforcement shall not be subject to 
prosecution or punishment or to extradition to a third State for any conduct engaged in 
prior to that person's delivery to the State of enforcement, unless such prosecution, 
punishment or extradition has been approved by the Court at the request of the State of 
enforcement.  
2. The Court shall decide the matter after having heard the views of the sentenced person.  
3. Paragraph 1 shall cease to apply if the sentenced person remains voluntarily for more 
than 30 days in the territory of the State of enforcement after having served the full 
sentence imposed by the Court, or returns to the territory of that State after having left 
it. 
527 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga Decision pursuant to article 108(1) of the Rome Statute 
No.: ICC-01/04-01/07 The Presidency (7 April 2016) para 1. 
528 Para 3. 





to Article 108(1) constituted a request for the Court’s approval of the prosecution and 
punishment of Mr Katanga.530 It is important to note that as a result of these court 
documents, Mr Katanga was not released from custody upon completion of his 
sentence on 18 January 2016. On 20 January 2016, the DRC clarified to the ICC that 
it intended to conduct domestic criminal proceedings against Mr Katanga and referred 
to its sovereignty and the principle of complementarity.531 
 
4 6 2  Defence rights: non bis in idem and right to life 
On the 21st of January 2016532 he applied for his release before the Haute Cour 
Militaire, on the basis of his unlawful detention, and on 22 January 2016 the defendant 
filed “Preliminary observations by the defence concerning the continued and unlawful 
detention of Mr Germain Katanga by the Democratic Republic of Congo.” In essence, 
this document stated that Mr Katanga’s continued detention was unlawful and Mr 
Katanga requested an oral hearing for his views on the matter to be heard.533 In order 
to determine whether Mr Katanga would face a fair trial in the DRC, the defence 
requested that the proper forms, charges and legal provisions be provided to Mr 
Katanga and that he is adequately advised of the specific charges against him in order 
for him to prepare a proper defence.534 Broadly and not in an official format, the DRC 
listed the following offences which it was pursuing against Mr Katanga:535 
 
i) “As Commander in Chief, participated in a rebel movement named FNI/FRPI between 
2002 and 2005, led the FRPI militia and occupied by armed force a large part of the 
District of Ituri, notably Mungwalu territory, as well as the villages situated along Lake 
Albert. 
ii) In the period 2003-2005, as War Crime, as Commander in Chief of the FNI/FRPI 
militia, co jointly with the President of the movement, namely Floribert NDJABU, 
incorporated children less than 15 years in the FNI militia and made them participate 
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532The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga Preliminary observations by the defence concerning 
the continued and unlawful detention of Mr Germain Katanga by the Democratic Republic of 
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actively in hostilities. During 2003, as a Crime against Humanity, in Bunia, conjointly 
with General Goda Sukpa, committed in the framework of a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population, the murder of fourteen persons, among others Mr 
Dema and Madam Ktura at the home of Mr Bunu Tbamwenda Pelerin. 
iii) In the period between 2002 and January 2005, as a Crime against Humanity, 
conjointly with his troops, provoked the murder of several persons at the villages of 
Mandro, Largu, Tchomia, Blukwa and Lengabo.” 
 
The defence536 referred to Article 20 which encompasses the non bis in idem 
principle which prevents the prosecution and punishment of a person for conduct for 
which he or she has already been prosecuted.537 The DRC has legal provisions which 
incorporate this principle. The defendant referred to Article 108 which he stated offers 
greater protection to the defendant than Article 20 and stated further that the ICC is 
obliged to refuse authorisation to prosecute under Article 108 if the accused faces 
abuse of its own process, the human rights conditions of detention as well as the 
imposition of the death penalty must be taken into account, when the court makes 
such a decision.538 The defence argued that the ICC, in making its decision under 
Article 108, should take into account fair trial principles. The defendant argued further 
that the DRC should only be allowed to prosecute Mr Katanga for charges which fall 
outside the scope of the investigations conducted by the ICC prosecutor.539 
In the defence’s “further observations following the defence mission to Kinshasa”, 
Mr Katanga submits540 that in considering whether it is appropriate and fair to 
prosecute Mr Katanga for additional offences: 
 
(i) “The alleged offences for which the DRC seeks approval are offences of a similar 
nature to those for which Mr Katanga was tried at the ICC, committed at a similar 
period of time and in the same capacity.541 
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(ii) The ICC trial and sentencing was a long and complex process that inflicted 
considerable hardship on him. 
(iii) The DRC charges came eleven years after the event with no prior notice that the 
DRC intended to proceed with them. The prosecution is therefore unfair, in 
appropriate and oppressive and would reflect adversely on the ICC. 
(iv) In striking a balance that takes into account the principle of complementarity the court 
must guard against permitting a regime of prosecution that is unfair or oppressive.”542 
 
In his plea to the ICC, Mr Katanga summarised his fair trial concerns as follows; 
excessive delay, lack of legal aid, lack of adequate facilities for the preparation of a 
defence, confirmed availability of the death penalty, systemic failures of DRC justice 
system, political or executive interference and lack of impartiality.543 Mr Katanga 
submitted that the Presidency has supervisory powers which should be used in Mr 
Katanga’s case to prevent the DRC from prosecuting him and that the president should 
provide a remedy for the violation of the accused’s fair trial rights in this instance.544 
 
4 6 3  Presidency Decision – Article 108 
In considering Article 108 in relation to non bis in idem, the Presidency reviewed 
the crimes for which Mr Katanga was found guilty by the ICC and found that the DRC’s 
Decision de renvoi relates to crimes other than those for which he has been convicted 
and acquitted by the Court and that the principle of non bis in idem has not been 
undermined.545 In respect of the death penalty, the ICC stated that it had received 
assurances from the DRC that the death penalty would not be imposed against Mr 
Katanga.546 
In respect of Mr Katanga’s submissions that he may not receive a fair trial in the 
DRC, the Presidency stated “that under Article 108(1) of the Rome Statute, the 
approval of the prosecution, punishment or extradition of a sentenced person should 
only be denied when it undermines fundamental principles or procedures of the Rome 
Statute or otherwise affects the integrity of the Court. Further,  
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“the presidency noted that the Appeals Chamber emphasised that the Court was not 
established to be an international court of human rights, sitting in judgment over domestic 
legal systems to ensure that they are compliant with international standards of human 
rights.”547  
 
The presidency also justified its decision based on the fact that the DRC had 
confirmed that Mr Katanga will be prosecuted in accordance with the rights of the 
defence contained in the Constitution and that the DRC is a party to relevant 
international instruments recognising minimum guarantees in relation to the right to a 
fair trial, including the ICCPR and the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights.548 In line with this reasoning, the Presidency therefore approved the 
prosecution of Mr Katanga by the DRC. 
 
4 6 4 Double jeopardy  
The core of the rule against double jeopardy is the idea that a person should not be 
tried more than once for the same offence.549 While it is clear from the ICC judgment 
above, the rule of double jeopardy did not find application because Mr Katanga was 
not tried in respect of the same crimes, it is important to analyse the principle in light 
of the fair trial rights of defendants generally. The ICC decision also raises very real 
questions on what will happen to defendants in the future in a similar scenario. 
One author, Finlay argues550 that the principle of double jeopardy reflects the 
importance of finality in the criminal justice system and protects against inconsistent 
results. The rule against double jeopardy reinforces the need for investigations and 
prosecutions to be thorough and diligent. In the ICC, Article 20551 deals with the 
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549 L Finlay “Does the International Criminal Court protect against Double Jeopardy: An 
analysis of Article 20 of the Rome Statute” (2009) 15 University of California, Davis 221 223. 
550 223-224. 
551 Article 20 of the Rome Statute Ne bis in idem 1. Except as provided in this Statute, no 
person shall be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes 
for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court. 2. No person shall be tried 
by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for which that person has already been 
convicted or acquitted by the Court. 3. No person who has been tried by another court for 
conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the 





principle of double jeopardy. Finlay argues552 that the reasons for the inclusion of 
Article 20, were related to concerns about fairness to the accused, individual human 
rights, and the protection of the integrity of the judicial system. At the same time, 
however, the creation of the ICC introduces an additional jurisdiction in which double 
jeopardy issues may arise, particularly in respect of the question of state sovereignty 
and the relationship between national courts and the ICC.553 Therefore in analysing 
the operation of Article 20 of the Rome Statute, it is necessary to also consider the 
principle of complementarity reflected in Article 17 of the Statute.554 Article 17 prevents 
the ICC from asserting jurisdiction where such jurisdiction has already been asserted 
                                                          
the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
or (b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms 
of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the 
circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
552 Finlay (2009) University of California, Davis 225-227. 
553 225-227. 
554 Article 17 Issues of admissibility: 
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine 
that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a 
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry 
out the investigation or prosecution; 13 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State 
has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; (c) The person concerned has 
already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court 
is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; (d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to 
justify further action by the Court. 2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, 
the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by 
international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: (a) The 
proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the 
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5; (b) There has been an unjustified delay in 
the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice; (c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted 
independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in 
the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due 
to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is 
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable 





by a national judicial body. Article 20(1)555 on the other hand prevents the ICC from 
trying a person who has already been convicted or acquitted by the ICC. Finlay 
opines556 that the comprehensive nature of the non bis in idem protection under Article 
20(1) follows from the reference to the “conduct which formed the basis of crimes.” 
This approach means that the characterisation of the offence and its legal elements 
are irrelevant in determining the application of non bis in idem, and that the prosecution 
is barred from pursuing a subsequent trial based on the same facts even if it charges 
the accused with a technically different offence.” Finlay, argues that this conduct-
based approach provides strong protection for an accused and is illustrative of a broad 
application of the non bis in idem principle.557  
In the Katanga matter, the defence argued similarly by stating that Article 108 of the 
Statute has a wider ambit than the principle of non bis in idem in Article 20(2)558 which 
refers to ‘crimes’ while Article 108(1) speaks of ‘conduct’. The defence here referred 
to another case before the ICC, Ble Goude case559 in which it was stated that the word 
“conduct” under Article 108 should receive a wider interpretation than that given to 
“crimes”. The judge in the Ble Goude case noted that: “Article 101(1)560 not only refers 
                                                          
555 1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with respect 
to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or 
acquitted by the Court. 
556 Finlay (2009) University of California, Davis 228-229 
557 228-229. 
558 2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for which that 
person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court. Article 5 Crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court 1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in 
accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; 
(b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression. 
559 The Prosecutor v Charles Ble Goude Decision on the ‘Defence request to amend the 
document containing the charges for violation of the rule of speciality’, ICC-02/11-02/11-151 
(11 September 2014) para 10, referred to by the defence in Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, 
‘Further observations following the defence mission to Kinshasa’ ICC-01/04-01/07 (26 
February 2016) para 18. 
560 Article 101 Rule of speciality:  
1. A person surrendered to the Court under this Statute shall not be proceeded against, 
punished or detained for any conduct committed prior to surrender, other than the conduct 






to specific offences or conduct but also to the broader term of ‘course of conduct.’” 
The defence argued that the alleged offences for which the DRC seeks approval to 
prosecute are of a similar nature to those for which Mr Katanga was tried at the ICC, 
committed at a similar period of time and in the same capacity.561 Further, that the 
offences fell within the temporal and geographical ambit of the ICC investigation and 
which were in plain view of the OTP at the time of the investigation and did not come 
to light later.562 
Carter563 introduces the tests used in determining whether crimes are the same and 
have been prosecuted before, in the following way: the “same elements” test looks at 
“whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are 
the 'same offence' and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive 
prosecution.”' In contrast, the “same conduct” test provides that “if, to establish an 
essential element of an offence charged in that prosecution, the government will prove 
conduct that constitutes an offence for which the defendant has already been 
prosecuted, ‘a second prosecution may not be had’.” While there is a range of 
interpretations for terms, such as “same conduct” and “same offense,” the latter is 
usually narrower than the former.  
In these definitions, the range of interpretations for “same offense” focuses more on 
the legal characterisation while the interpretations of “same conduct” focus more 
broadly on the underlying factual incident.564 If one were to apply these standards of 
interpretation to the case at hand, upon closer inspection of the charges for which Mr 
Katanga was convicted and those now imposed by the DRC, it is clear that they are 
similar in timeframes and also constitute “crimes against humanity” including murder 
within the DRC. Besides the enlisting of child soldiers, all the other charges appear to 
fall within the category of ‘same conduct’. It is therefore submitted that the ICC should 
have applied this test more precisely in determining whether Mr Katanga would be 
subject to double jeopardy. It is clear from the foregoing that non bis in idem should 
be interpreted broadly and within the context of other Articles of the Rome Statute to 
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562 Para 22. 
563 L Carter “The principle of complementarity and the International Criminal Court: The Role 






ascertain whether or not double prosecution of similar offences will, in fact, occur if the 
DRC, in this instance, were to prosecute Mr Katanga. Further, upon closer inspection 
of the framing of the charges by the DRC, it lacks specificity which in turn places the 
defendant at a disadvantage in being able to adequately respond to the charges and 
therefore violates a fundamentally fair trial right. 
Finlay565 opines that the protection against double jeopardy provided for under 
Article 20 cannot be properly assessed as a stand-alone guarantee. The principle, 
therefore, needs to be situated within the broader framework of the Rome Statute and 
analysed within the context of the various interests that need to be balanced if the 
objectives of the ICC are to be fully met. In applying this interpretation, the ICC did not 
apply the principle broadly and failed to take into account all the interests in 
determining whether double jeopardy had application in the Katanga case. In 
particular, if we were to apply Finlay’s reasoning and look at the context of the Rome 
Statute broadly as well as the jurisprudence of the court, fair trial principles would be 
of paramount importance.  
 
4 6 5  Mr Katanga’s right to life 
In respect of the fair trial rights which the defence was concerned about, if the 
prosecution in the DRC was to proceed; the defence argued that the ICC had to take 
Article 21(3) into account in making its decision and should deny a request if a violation 
of internationally recognised human rights is likely to occur in the course of the 
requested prosecution and the gravity of such a violation would outweigh the legitimate 
extradition interests.566  
The defence summarised his fair trial concerns as follows: excessive delay, lack of 
legal aid, lack of adequate facilities for the preparation of the defence, inability to 
secure the attendance and examination of witnesses under the same conditions as 
the prosecution, absence of appeal from the Haute Cour Militaire on the merits of the 
case, continued availability of the death penalty, systemic failures of the DRC justice 
system and political or executive interference and lack of impartiality.567 The defence 
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relied heavily on the abuse of process doctrine and referred to an ICTR decision in 
Bell v DPP of Jamaica in which the court stated “under the abuse of process doctrine 
courts have an inherent power to decline to adjudicate a case which would be 
oppressive as a result of unreasonable delay. In making this determination, the 
following guidelines were set out:  
 
“i) the length of the trial,  
ii) the prosecution’s reasons to justify the delay;  
iii) the accused’s efforts to assert his rights; and  
iv) the prejudice caused to the accused.”568 
 
The Presidency, in addressing Mr Katanga’s fair trial concerns, stated that in 
respect of Mr Katanga’s fear of being subjected to the death penalty, the ICC had 
received assurances from the DRC that the death penalty would not be sought against 
Mr Katanga.569 It is arguable that the ICC should have taken a firmer stance in respect 
of the death penalty and should have protected Mr Katanga from being prosecuted in 
a country that has the death penalty. Further, the ICC did not analyse the extent of the 
defendant’s concerns related to his fair trial rights in the DRC. In fact, the court had a 
terse response as follows:  
 
“the presidency noted that the Appeals Chamber emphasised that the Court was not 
established to be an international court of human rights, sitting in judgment over domestic 
legal systems to ensure that they are compliant with international standards of human 
rights.”570 
 
Indeed, the court is bound to take into account international human rights standards, 
the court should have taken its guidance from Article 21(3), as referred to by Mr 
Katanga. This Article in the Statute instructs the court to ensure that its decisions 
consider international human rights. The right to life is the most important human right 
afforded to everyone and is enshrined in Article 3 of the UDHR, Article 6 of the ICCPR 
and in Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 
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Considering Article 21(3), the court had no basis for its argument that it was not 
required to take into account international human rights. However, the court sends a 
clear message to future defendants who may be prosecuted at the ICC that they too 
may be sent back to their home countries to be prosecuted again for similar offences 
for which they had either been convicted or acquitted of and that the ICC washes its 
hands of any potential human rights infringements that the accused may suffer as a 
result thereof. 
 
4 6 6  Lessons from the Tribunals and fair trial rights of the accused 
 The case law pertaining to Rule 11 bis at the ICTR in respect of the transfer of 
cases is particularly relevant to this discussion. To this end, the ICTR took a firm 
stance in Prosecutor v Yussuf Munyazi (“Munyazi”)571 not to transfer the case to 
Rwanda as the Trial and Appeals Chamber was not persuaded that the accused would 
receive a fair trial in Rwanda. Rule 11 bis572 governs the transfer, to competent national 
jurisdictions of individuals indicted but not yet tried by the ICTR.573 This rule was 
intended to create a bridge between the practice of international criminal law and 
domestic criminal justice processes by ensuring that domestic courts have an 
adequate legal framework to try international crimes and provide suitable fair trial 
guarantees. In applying Rule 11 bis, a Trial Chamber must consider whether the 
case’s intended recipient State has a legal framework that criminalises the alleged 
conduct of the accused, provides an adequate penalty structure, does not impose the 
death penalty and provides fair trial safeguards.  
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In the Munyazi case,574 the Appeals Chamber had occasion to consider the death 
penalty as well as the prison conditions and found that due to ambiguity in respect of 
“which punishment provision would apply to transfer cases, and since, therefore, the 
possibility exists that Rwandan courts might hold that a death penalty of life 
imprisonment in isolation would apply to such cases”, the court declined the transfer. 
The Appeals Chamber ruled that due to this the current structure in Rwanda is not 
adequate for the purposes of transfer under Rule 11bis of the Rules. In this case, 
Rwanda had furnished a statement giving the assurance that no person transferred 
from the Tribunal would be sentenced to solitary confinement in Rwanda.575  
This statement or assurance could be equated with the assurance given by the 
DRC to Katanga that the death penalty would not apply. However, at the tribunal, the 
defence argued that the statement is not itself law and does not change the law as 
enacted by the legislature.576 This argument is very pertinent to the ICC’s decision to 
rely on the DRC’s assurance that it would not impose the death penalty. However, 
from my viewpoint, the ICC erred in this regard and should have taken a similar stance 
to the one taken at the ICTR to not refer the case back on the basis of the concerns 
raised by Mr Katanga in respect of his fair trial rights. In fact, the ICC should have 
interrogated the issue of Mr Katanga potentially being subjected to the death penalty 
in greater detail. At the tribunal, a valid point was made, namely that an assurance is 
insufficient in light of legislation which governs either the death penalty or solitary 
confinement and yet the ICC relied on this assurance given by the DRC in its decision 
to allow the DRC to prosecute Mr Katanga. 
Although the ICC does not have an exact Article similar to Rule 11bis which 
specifies and therefore compels the tribunal to consider the death penalty and fair trial 
considerations of defendants, it may be argued that if the ICC leaned on the vast 
jurisprudence of the ICTR, it may provide guidance in its future interpretations of Article 
108. The manner in which the Tribunal considers transferring cases and its specific 
consideration of fair trial principles related to the country to which the case will be 
transferred, acts as a capacity-building mechanism for the country receiving the case, 
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as one can see due to the ICTR’s constant refusals of transfers due to fair trial 
concerns, Rwanda has changed its legislation to ensure the smooth transfer of cases. 
This same approach by the ICC could have served to ensure that the DRC makes 
similar legislative changes to protect the accused and ensure that the Mr Katanga is 
suitably protected when tried at the DRC. As it stands now, the ICC did not analyse 
case law or provide clear legal argument in respect of its agreement to allow Mr 
Katanga to be tried by the DRC. Mr Katanga therefore faces prosecution based on an 
‘assurance’ that the DRC will not subject him to the death penalty and without suitable 
recourse regarding his fair trial concerns.  
 
4 7  Reflection on the impact of the case on the rights of victims and the 
international community 
In respect of the victims of crimes particularly in respect of rape and sexual slavery 
and the recruitment of child soldiers, Mr Katanga was found not guilty which has a 
fundamental impact of the rights of victims to reparations. This is particularly so given 
the fact that neither Mr Katanga nor the prosecutor decided to proceed with an appeal 
to the conviction decision. So on the one hand, approximately 363 victims were 
allowed to participate in proceedings but sadly are unable to claim reparations due to 
the finding of Mr Katanga not being guilty of rape and sexual slavery and the 
recruitment of child soldiers in the DRC.577 This decision is not a victory for the rights 
of victims, however, it could be viewed as a significant milestone in respect of their 
increased rights of participation which were afforded to them during this trial. 
In respect of reparations to victims, on 24 March 2017, Trial Chamber II issued its 
Reparations Order awarding 297 out of 341 victims of the crimes for which Katanga 
was convicted individual and collective reparations. All 297 victims were awarded a 
symbolic amount of USD250 per person, as well as collective reparations in the form 
of support for housing, support for income-generating activities, education aid and 
psychological support. The extent of harm that was suffered by the victims was 
estimated to have a monetary value of approximately USD3 752 620, and Katanga’s 
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liability was set at USD 1,000,000. Due to Katanga’s indigence, the Board of Directors 
of the TFV were invited to consider using its resources to fund and implement the 
reparations.578 
The DRC is still impacted by severe crimes against women and children. The 
Katanga judgment should focus the DRC authorities on addressing the enormous 
“impunity gap” for crimes committed against its people. The ICC alone cannot address 
impunity comprehensively and this places a demand on the DRC to ensure that first it 
co-operates with the ICC in investigations, arrests and surrender of suspects. The 
DRC must also ensure that its legislation is in line with international law and the DRC 
authorities should establish an appropriate framework for the rule of law and ensure 
the rights of victims of past and continuing violations are being addressed. 579  
Legislative reform should be the first aspect for the DRC to tackle to ensure that its 
laws are in line with international human rights agreements, particularly in light of the 
death penalty still being implemented within the DRC. Reform is however only possible 
when the very real conflicts threatening the DRC are addressed and the political 
situation is stabilised. 
 
4 8  Conclusion 
This chapter raised critical issues and concerns related to the fairness of 
proceedings and the application of the fair trial rights as enshrined in Article 67 of the 
Rome Statute.  
In particular, the chapter demonstrated that key aspects of Article 67 of the Rome 
Statute protecting the rights of the accused had been violated by the court, particularly 
the accused’s right to remain silent. Particular fair trial issues of concern relate to the 
length of trials, inadequate and timely notice of charges and the inability of the defence 
to prepare a proper defence to the charges after the implementation of Regulation 55. 
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In particular, the case analysis demonstrated the need for the ICC to ensure that 
the accused’s right to life is protected if an accused person is transferred back to their 
country of origin. 
The next chapter will review the acquittals of three (3) accused at the ICC; including 
Bemba, Gbagbo and Blé Goude and review the fair trial rights employed in their cases, 
particularly in relation to legal certainty, the right to an expeditious trial, the right to be 
informed of the charges and no case to answer motions. The chapter will further review 






CHAPTER 5: THE ACQUITTAL OF BEMBA, GBAGBO AND BLE GOUDE 
5 1  Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on the fair trial rights of Mr Katanga, with a particular 
focus on Regulation 55, the right to silence and Mr Katanga’s right to life. It also 
reviewed the importance of the role of the confirmation of charges stage of 
proceedings, particularly in relation to the accused being informed in detail about the 
nature of the charges against him. 
The current chapter is important for the purposes of this dissertation as it relates to 
both substantive and procedural unfairness in the conduct of proceedings of Mr 
Bemba, Mr Gbagbo and Ble Goude. Mr Bemba was a militia leader in the Central 
African Republic (“CAR”) and Mr Gbagbo was a previous head of state in the Ivory 
Coast. Both countries were ravaged with conflicts in leadership which resulted in 
atrocities being committed. In both cases, the prosecutor based the accused’s liability 
on command responsibility as defined in Article 28 of the Statute.  
 The acquittals therefore critically raise the tensions which were discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation and demonstrates the extent of these tensions for the 
ICC whose main aim is, according to its Preamble at least, to end impunity.  
The cases also demonstrate the extent to which the fair trial rights of the defence 
has been treated by the ICC, particularly in light of the fact that the accused persons 
have served lengthy periods of detention and after many years, were then acquitted. 
The length of detentions and subsequent acquittals therefore infringe on Article 64(2) 
to ensure that the accused receives a fair and expeditious trial at the ICC. 
 
5 2  Background to the Bemba decision 
The CAR ratified the Rome Statute on 3 October 2001. On 21 December 2004, the 
Government of the CAR referred to the ICC crimes committed in the territory of the 
CAR after 1 July 2002. On 10 May 2007, the Prosecutor informed the Government of 





an investigation. On 3 July 2008, Mr Bemba was transferred and surrendered to the 
ICC.580 
 
5 2 1  Confirmation of charges hearing – the right to be informed promptly and in detail 
of the nature, cause and content of the charge 
 
The confirmation hearing took place from 12 to 15 January 2009. On 3 March 2009, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber decided to adjourn the confirmation hearing in the case and 
requested the Prosecutor to consider submitting to it an amended DCC, taking into 
account that the legal characterisation of the facts of the case may correspond to a 
mode of liability other than the individual responsibility relied on by the Prosecutor, 
namely criminal responsibility as a military commander or superior within the meaning 
of Article 28 of the Rome Statute.581  
Following an in-depth review of the amended DCC submitted by the Prosecutor, 
and of the observations of the Defence and the legal representatives of the victims, 
Pre-Trial Chamber II considered, on 15 June 2009, that there was sufficient evidence 
to establish substantial grounds to believe that Mr Bemba is criminally responsible for 
having effectively acted as a military commander within the meaning of Article 28(a) 
of the Statute, for war crimes (murder, rape and pillaging) and crimes against humanity 
(murder and rape). The judges confirmed that Mr Bemba would be criminally 
responsible as a commander under Article 28(a) of the Statute and not individually 
under Article 25 or as a superior under Article 28(b).582 
The Pre-Trial Chamber, in its analysis of Article 28 of the Statute, found that a 
superior may be held responsible for the prohibited conduct of his subordinates if he 
failed to repress their lawful conduct or failed to submit it to the competent 
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authorities.583 The chamber also held that under Article 28, it must be proven that a 
suspect “either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known 
that his subordinates were committing or about to commit” one or more of the crimes 
contained in Articles 6 to 8 of the Statute.584 The chamber clarified this by pointing out 
that the suspect must have knowledge or should have known that his forces were 
about to engage or were engaging or had engaged in conduct constituting the crimes 
referred to above.585  
Following the confirmation of the charges on 18 September 2009, the Presidency 
constituted Trial Chamber III and referred the case to it for the conduct of the trial.586 
The formulation and framing of the charges is critical to the accused’s fair trial rights 
in terms of Article 67(1) (a) and (b) as follows: To be informed promptly and in detail 
of the nature, cause and content of the charge, in a language which the accused fully 
understands and speaks; (b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation 
of the defence and to communicate freely with counsel of the accused's choosing in 
confidence. 
Cryer et al argue that the indictment (or DCC as it is commonly referred to at the 
ICC) is an important instrument and establishes the framework for the trial as only 
what is properly charged may lead to a conviction. To this end, the DCC must contain 
material facts containing sufficient detail to allow the defendant to prepare an adequate 
defence.587 Therefore at the ICC, an accused must be provided with a detailed 
description of the charges before the confirmation hearing. In terms of Article 61(5) the 
prosecutor must support each charge with sufficient evidence to establish “substantial 
grounds to believe” that the suspect has committed the crimes charged. The suspect 
may object to the charges, challenge the Prosecutor's evidence, and present evidence 
him or herself. Victims are usually allowed to participate in the confirmation hearing, 
generally by making submissions through their legal representatives.588 
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In terms of Article 61(7) at the confirmation hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber has to 
determine whether the Prosecutor has indeed established substantial grounds to 
believe that the suspect has committed the crimes charged. If the Pre-Trial Chamber 
is so convinced, it shall confirm the charges; if it is not so convinced, it may either 
decline to confirm the charges, or adjourn the hearing and invite the Prosecutor to 
present additional evidence or conduct further investigations; furthermore, the 
Chamber may invite the Prosecutor to amend the charges “because the evidence 
submitted appears to establish a different crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”.  
This is of particular importance in the current case as the chamber intervened and 
requested the prosecutor to amend the charges and to include the mode of liability 
under Article 28 instead of under Article 25. This is the first case at the ICC based on 
Article 28 which is a mode of liability for command responsibility. It is also the first case 
to focus on rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity and to deal substantially 
with command responsibility. This case, therefore, has important lessons in respect of 
fair trial concerns. For the purposes of this chapter, the focus will be primarily on the 
Trial Chamber conviction decision, the participation of victims and the Appeals 
chamber judgment as these are the critical decisions related to the fair trial rights of 
the defendant and the rights of victims. 
 
5 3  Commencement of trial 
On 22 November 2010, the trial commenced before Trial Chamber III with the 
parties and participants making their opening statements. The presentation of 
evidence commenced on 23 November 2010. Trial Chamber III granted 5229 persons 
the status of victims authorised to participate in the proceedings. 
On 21 March 2016,589 Trial Chamber III of the ICC issued a judgment in the case of 
The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. Mr Bemba was found guilty under 
Article 28 of the Statute of murder as a war crime and crime against humanity, rape 
as a war crime and crime against humanity, as well as pillaging as a war crime, 
committed in the CAR between 2002 and 2003. The chamber found that, In light of the 
measures available to Mr Bemba, as a superior and under the command responsibility 
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doctrine contained in Article 28 of the Statute, the Chamber concluded that the 
measures he took fell short of “all necessary and reasonable measures” within his 
power to prevent or repress the commission of crimes by his subordinates during the 
2002-2003 CAR Operation and that Mr Bemba failed to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities.590  
In respect of the fact that the crimes were committed as a result of Mr Bemba’s 
failure to exercise proper control over his subordinates, including authority over 
disciplinary matters, the Trial Chamber held that he failed to take any measures to 
remedy such deficiencies in training, either prior to deployment of the troops or in 
response to the consistent reports of crimes occurring from the earliest days of the 
2002-2003 CAR Operation. Additionally, the Chamber held that Mr Bemba’s failure to 
take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power to prevent and repress 
the commission of the crimes and submit the matter to the competent authorities 
demonstrated that Mr Bemba failed to exercise control properly over the forces 
deployed to the CAR.591  
The conviction was therefore based on Article 28 of the Statute which encompasses 
command responsibility which means that superiors could be held responsible for 
crimes of their subordinates where they knew of them but did not intervene.592 The 
decision was also the first to convict a superior commander of the crime of rape as a 
war crime and was seen as a victory for the rights of victims who were affected by the 
crimes and those who participated in the proceedings. 
 
5 3 1  Separate opinions to Trial Chamber decision 
Steiner J in her separate opinion highlighted the need for there to be a causal 
connection between the commander’s actions and the crimes committed by the 
subordinates and she stated that the language “as a result of” is meant to address this 
connection.593 The judge also equated the commander’s duties to repress the 
commission of the crime to ‘punish’  
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“and the duty to submit the matter to the competent authorities are more easily 
distinguishable from the duty to exercise control properly, since they arise after the 
commission of a crime. Accordingly, I agree with this opinion that a failure of these duties 
cannot “cause” the crimes, as a crime cannot be “caused” retroactively.”594 The judge 
agreed with the pre-trial chamber that “it is only necessary to prove that the commander's 
omission increased the risk of the commission of the crimes charged in order to hold him 
criminally responsible under article 28(a) of the Statute.”595  
 
The judge also provided insight as to the degree of risk by arguing that 
 
“the causality requirement would be satisfied where, at least, there is a high probability that, 
had the commander discharged his duties, the crime would have been prevented or it would 
have not been committed by the forces in the manner it was committed. I believe “high 
probability” is the appropriate threshold, reflecting a strict construction of the causality 
assessments relevant for both acts and omissions. In my view, the causality assessments 
should mirror each other as much as possible.”596  
 
Arguably, given the inferences in the Katanga decision to the lack of evidence, it 
seems that the ICC prosecutor is struggling to find reliable evidence to support its 
charges and therefore improbable that it would be capable of establishing causality to 
support the charges under Article 28.  
Ozaki J reflected on the following section of Article 28(a): “as a result of his or her 
failure to exercise control properly over such forces”, the judge argued that this phrase 
raises a number of interrelated interpretative questions: 
 
(i) First, competing views have been expressed as to whether this clause 
properly attaches to the criminal responsibility of the commander or to the 
commission of the crimes.  
(ii) Second, the scope of the phrase “to exercise control properly” and its 
relationship with Article 28(a)(ii) is to be considered.  
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(iii) Third, the nature of the nexus implied by the words “as a result of” must be 
considered, particularly if the failure of control is deemed to correlate to the 
commission of the crimes.”597  
 
The judge held the view that the duty to exercise proper control, including, to put 
effective systems of supervision and discipline in place, to which the nexus 
requirement attaches, is operative before the point in time when the forces are 
committing or about to commit the crimes.598  
The judge also discussed the standard to be applied and confirmed that in his view 
“as a result of” dictates that the standard adopted be more than a merely theoretical 
nexus to the crimes. He suggested that the starting point for the inquiry is the principle 
of personal culpability, which, in this context, requires that, at least, the liability of an 
accused should be confined to results that are reasonably foreseeable.599 
It is important to note that the decisions related to the correct interpretation of 
causation which was central in both of these separate opinions to the Trial Chamber 
decision as well as in the separate opinions of the judges to the Appeals Chamber 
judgment which will be discussed further in this chapter. 
 
5 3 1 1  Article 28 of the Statute – Command Responsibility 
Due to the lengthy deliberations of the judges in respect of causation in relation to 
Article 28, it is important to understand Article 28 of the Rome Statute considering Mr 
Bemba’s conviction and subsequent acquittal. The provision provides as follows: 
 
“Article 28 Responsibility of commanders and other superiors  
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court:  
 
(a)  A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by 
forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and 
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such forces, where:  
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(i)  That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii)  That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution.  
(b)  With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph 
(a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as 
a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, 
where:  
(i)  The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which 
clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit 
such crimes; 
(ii)  The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility 
and control of the superior; and  
(iii)  The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his 
or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to 
the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”  
 
Cryer et al600 opine that under the Rome Statute, command responsibility is treated 
as a form of liability for the underlying offences and the Article imputes liability to the 
superior for the actions of the subordinates.  
It is further submitted that whether or not a superior has knowledge of these crimes, 
should still not result in prosecution for those crimes, instead the superior should be 
prosecuted as a superior only and for the elements connected therewith, not for the 
actual crimes against humanity which were committed by those who fell under his 
command, unless the causal connection between the commander and the crimes 
committed by the subordinates are established beyond reasonable doubt.  
It must also be borne in mind that command responsibility is a form of liability under 
the Rome Statute and not a crime which falls within the jurisdiction of the court. The 
commander only becomes guilty of the crimes after the elements connecting him to 
those crimes are committed. If these elements are not proven beyond reasonable 
doubt, the commander cannot be held liable for the crimes of his subordinates within 
the framework of the Rome Statute. 
                                                          





As will be seen in the analysis of the appeals judgment hereunder, the biggest issue 
in respect of command responsibility for the Appeals Chamber rested on causation in 
that there must be a causal link between the fact that the crimes occurred as a result 
of the failure of Mr Bemba to supervise his subordinates.  
It must be borne in mind that at the time of the conviction decision, it was lauded as 
a great success for the ICC and for victims in particular to receive reparations but also 
in respect of the fact that it was the first case tried at the ICC that dealt with command 
responsibility and succeeded in securing a conviction against a commander. Bemba 
was one of only four people convicted by the ICC in its 16 years of operation and the 
highest-ranking among them. He had been convicted of murder, rape and pillaging for 
actions by fighters he sent to the CAR to back then-president Ange-Felix Patasse. 
 
5 4  Victim Participation in Bemba trial 
5 4 1  Background to the decisions 
Due to the large numbers of victims who were allowed to participate in this case, in 
total 5229,601 it is important to reflect on some key aspects of the modalities of 
participation which the court allowed.  
On 22 February 2010, the Chamber decided that victims authorised to participate 
at the confirmation stage of the proceedings should, in principle, continue to participate 
in the trial proceedings and to counter the volume of applications set a deadline date 
of 16 September 2011 for the submission of any new victim’s applications.602 The 
Chamber issued eleven decisions on applications by victims to participate in the 
proceedings and admitted fourteen organisations or institutions. Among the natural 
persons authorised to participate in the proceedings, eighteen individuals had dual 
status as they also appeared as witnesses before the Chamber.603  
The Chamber recognised the role played by intermediaries in the application 
process in assisting in the filling in of the forms, even writing down the answers given 
by applicants some of them being illiterate or not speaking the language in which the 
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form was filled in. However, following the notification of three reports concerning 
issues arising out of the involvement of a very limited number of intermediaries in the 
completion of victims’ applications for participation, the Chamber (i) deferred its 
decision on pending applications completed with the assistance of the intermediaries 
concerned; (ii) ordered the VPRS to re-interview the applicants concerned in order to 
verify the accuracy of the information contained in their applications; and (iii) instructed 
the VPRS to re-file the original applications together with any supplementary 
information collected, as well as a consolidated individual assessment report.604 The 
use of intermediaries has been a bone of contention for the ICC as the prosecutor had 
similar concerns related to the use of intermediaries in the Lubanga case. 
 
5 4 2 Modalities of participation  
With a view to ensuring meaningful participation by victims and in line with the 
imperative that the participation of victims not be prejudicial to the rights of the 
accused, Sixteen individuals were called by the Prosecution and two individuals were 
called by the Legal Representatives. Two legal representatives were designated to 
represent the interests of victims allowed to participate in this case. For that purpose, 
participating victims were divided into five groups depending on the location of the 
harm allegedly suffered, as well as the victims’ status. In addition, the OPCV was 
appointed to represent victims whose applications were pending a decision by the 
Chamber.605  
In accordance with the common legal representation scheme described above and 
through their Legal Representatives, victims were authorised to participate at hearings 
and status conferences, to make opening and closing statements, to file written 
submissions, to introduce evidence, to question witnesses subject to a discrete written 
application decided upon in advance by the Chamber, and to have access to 
confidential documents in the record.606  
                                                          
604 Para 22. 
605 The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Trial Chamber III Judgment pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute para 23. 





In addition, in a decision in February 2012,607 the Chamber authorised the Legal 
Representative to call two victims to give evidence as witnesses during the trial and 
invited three further victims to present their views and concerns in person. This 
decision was of importance as it evoked a partly dissenting opinion from Steiner J who 
was of the view that the chamber should have allowed the participation of more victims. 
In this decision, Steiner J partly dissented from the Majority’s decision with regard 
to the requirements for the presentation of evidence by victims and the judge indicated 
that more victims should have been allowed to give evidence and to present their views 
and concerns. In the view of the judge,  
 
“the strict limitations imposed by the Majority to the presentation of evidence by victims and 
the ‘case-by-case’ analysis of the victims’ right to present their views and concerns reflect 
a utilitarian approach towards the role of victims before the Court, which has no legal basis 
and appears to unreasonably restrict the rights recognised for victims by the drafters of the 
Statute.”608 
 
The judge took a strong stance in relation to the rights of victims to present 
evidence, particularly considering the number of victims involved in this case. 
Concerning the distinction between the presentation of evidence and of views and 
concerns in person, the Chamber found Trial Chamber I’s approach instructive: 
 
“[…] the process of victims ‘expressing their views and concerns’ is not the same as ‘giving 
evidence’. The former is, in essence, the equivalent of presenting submissions, and 
although any views and concerns of the victims may assist the Chamber in its approach to 
the evidence in the case, these statements by victims (made personally or advanced by 
their legal representatives) will not form part of the trial evidence. In order for participating 
victims to contribute to the evidence in the trial, it is necessary for them to give evidence 
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under oath from the witness box. There is, therefore, a critical distinction between these 
two possible means of placing material before the Chamber.”609 
 
In line with this approach, the Chamber found that: 
  
“the threshold to grant applications by victims to give evidence is significantly higher than 
the threshold applicable to applications by victims to express their views and concerns in 
person” and “victims who fail to reach the threshold to be authorised to give evidence may 
still be permitted to express their views and concerns in person.”610 
 
The majority was of the view that in allowing victims views and concerns to be 
presented under Article 68(3), the chamber had to do so ‘in a manner which is not 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused’, in particular, the majority was concerned 
about the accused’s rights to be tried without undue delay.611 
Steiner J disagreed with the majority finding, particularly that the participation of all 
the victims in the proceedings, would not cause undue delay.612 Further, 
 
“In light of my firm and unequivocal interpretation of the role of victims in the 
proceedings before this Court, and of their right to give evidence or to present their 
views and concerns, and having thoroughly analysed the relevant victims' written 
statements, their relevance to the case, their probative value and the potential 
prejudice to the defence, I am of the view that the Majority's decision does not provide 
any factual or legal basis that would justify why most of victims proposed by legal 
representatives were denied the possibility to give evidence or the right to present their 
views and concerns in person.”613 
 
The two victims authorised to give evidence appeared before the Chamber between 
1 and 8 May 2012 and were questioned by the Legal Representatives, the 
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Prosecution, the Defence, and the Chamber. Both witnesses testified without 
protective measures.614  
This decision reflects that a clear distinction was made between victims who give 
evidence and those who present their views and concerns. This is evidenced by the 
fact that the three victims authorised to present their views and concerns in person 
were heard by means of video-link technology and because they did not appear as 
witnesses, their submissions were not presented under oath, they were not questioned 
by the parties, and their views and concerns did not form part of the evidence of the 
case.615 
 
5 5  Acquittal decision, dissenting and separate opinions 
5 5 1  The Appeals Chamber: Majority judgement 
On 8 June 2018,616 the Appeals Chamber by a 3:2 majority acquitted Mr Bemba. As 
indicated, the Appeals Chamber was divided in terms of the judgments, therefore Van 
den Wyngaert J, Eboe-Osuji J and Morrison J were of the view that the second ground 
of appeal that the conviction exceeded the charges; and part of the third ground of 
appeal, namely Mr Bemba’s argument that the Trial Chamber erred when it found that 
he did not take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or repress the 
commission of crimes, were determinative of the outcome of the appeal.  
The Appeals Chamber limited its assessment to the Trial Chamber’s finding 
regarding Mr Bemba’s purported failure to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures, given the clear error therein.617 Separate dissenting opinions were also 
written by Monageng J and Hofmański J who disagreed with the standard of review 
for factual errors and aspects of the substantiation requirement and dissented from 
the majority’s determination on the second ground of appeal and on the third ground 
of appeal, concerning necessary and reasonable measures.618 
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5 5 1 1 Conviction exceeded the charges – The right be informed promptly and 
in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge and the right to legal certainty 
This brings us to Mr Bemba’s main argument on appeal,619 that the Conviction 
Decision exceeded the “facts and circumstances described in the charges” in violation 
of Article 74(2) of the Statute because he was convicted partly based on individual 
acts of murder, rape and pillaging committed against particular victims at specific times 
and places that had not been confirmed in the Confirmation Decision.  
In his view, the scope of the trial against him was limited to the criminal acts that 
were specifically confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Confirmation Decision, 
arguing that “[i]f [a criminal] act was not confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, […] it 
does not form part of the charges and cannot be used to found a conviction.” This 
raises the question as to whether or not the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in the charges 
which it confirmed against Mr Bemba. 
The majority of the Appeals Chamber referred to Article 74(2):  
 
“The decision of the Trial Chamber at the end of the trial shall not exceed the facts and 
circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges.”  
 
The Appeals Chamber found that the charges against Mr Bemba were ‘confirmed’ 
in relation to categories of crimes without further qualification and that this was too 
broad and provided an insufficient basis to bring Mr Bemba to trial and that it cannot 
amount to a description of facts and circumstances in terms of Article 74(2) of the 
Statute.620  
The Appeals Chamber went further and stated that the criminal acts which the 
prosecutor added after the confirmation decision was issued cannot be said to have 
been part of the ‘facts and circumstances described in the charges’ in terms of Article 
74(2). The prosecutor had not amended the charges to include murder, rape, and 
pillaging. The Appeals Chamber, therefore, held that the criminal acts that were added 
after the confirmation decision had been issued did not form part of the facts and 
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circumstances and Mr Bemba could therefore not be convicted of them.621 In essence, 
therefore, the Appeals Chamber found that Mr Bemba could only be convicted of one 
murder, the rape of 20 persons and five acts of pillaging.622  
In the dissenting opinion, the judges disagreed with the majority in respect of the 
charges and stated that it is for the Prosecutor to define the factual scope of a case 
and that the identification of the broad parameters of a case may suffice to serve Article 
74(2)’s purpose of delineating the jurisdiction of the Trial Chamber.623 The judges 
stated that: 
  
“the pre-trial chamber is tasked with determining whether there is a case to be tried; 
“whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the 
person committed each of the crimes charged.”624 
 
Indeed, this is the standard by which the Pre-Trial chamber makes its decision 
whether to confirm or decline to confirm the charges. 
The judges, however, argued that: 
 
“we consider that the pre-trial chamber may confirm the crimes charged in a broad manner 
depending on the nature of the charges brought by the Prosecutor.”625  
 
On this aspect, the majority and the minority judgments varied considerably and in 
my view the broader the scope of the charges, the more difficult it becomes for the 
defendant to prepare an adequate defence which amounts to a contravention of Mr 
Bemba’s fair trial rights. 
In respect of the prosecutorial discretion, the dissenting judges were of the view 
that “the Prosecutor has discretion to formulate the charges in a manner appropriate 
to the type of case she wishes to bring.”626  
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In reality though the broad discretion given to the prosecutor is problematic as it 
allows too much room for correcting poor investigative strategies and defining of 
charges against an accused person which further complicates the accused’s ability to 
adequately defend him/herself as the parameters are constantly changing which is 
raised in the separate concurring opinion. It is argued that this dissertation supports 
the view that the principle of legality, as contained in the Statute, specifies that the 
accused is entitled to legal certainty. Legal certainty should be viewed as a guiding 
factor in all chambers of the ICC in making its determinations. Further, the confirmation 
of charges hearing is therefore a critical component of ensuring that the correct 
charges are formulated against the accused in order for him to know and understand 
the charges against him and to prepare an adequate defence. 
Heinze627 argues that the least that can be expected in international trials is that 
there is a clear and strict formulation of the charges and he argues that the majority 
decision was therefore correct to insist on such strict formulation of the charges 
against the accused. Cryer628 argues that the importance of the indictment is for it to 
be clear and to contain the material facts which should be clear enough to inform the 
defendant clearly of the charges against him. Cryer629 argues that defects may be 
cured through amendments however the fair trial rights of the defendant must not be 
affected by such amendments.  
In the present case, it is clear that the amendment resulted in Mr Bemba being tried 
as a superior under Article 28 instead of as an individual in Article 25. Also, as a direct 
result of the manner in which the charges were framed, Mr Bemba was convicted 
under Article 28. Cryer630argues that only what is properly charged in an indictment 
may lead to a conviction which clearly indicates that if the charges were incorrectly 
formulated in the Bemba case, it could not have led to his conviction and it did, in fact, 
exceed the facts and circumstances of the case against him. 
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5 5 1 2  The Appeals Chamber – Joint Separate Opinions 
In the joint separate opinion,631 the two judges held a different view to the dissenting 
opinion and noted that a number of criminal acts were added after the Confirmation 
Decision was issued without following the procedure required in Article 61(9) of the 
Statute which would have required an amendment of the charges.632  
The judges expressed the view that while it may have been convenient for the 
prosecutor to have summarised or grouped these acts by way of geographical and 
temporal parameters, it is the criminal acts that form the basis of criminal responsibility 
and that must be established at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.633 The judges also 
argued that the challenges several Pre-Trial Chambers have experienced in the past 
were attributable more to the fact that the Prosecution was not fully prepared when it 
initiated confirmation proceedings than to the applicable deadlines.634 The judges 
reiterated that the confirmation of charges procedure has to properly identify criminal 
acts to allow a Trial Chamber to manage the trial proceedings and to allow the accused 
to prepare a meaningful defence, as well as to organise the participation and 
reparations of victims.635  
The judges raise an important point in relation to the role of the prosecutor in 
deciding when to prosecute which, according to Cassesse,636 is very broad as 
prosecutors in international criminal courts have wide discretionary powers on who to 
prosecute and charge.  
The confirmation of charges proceedings also affords the judges the opportunity to 
decide whether the charges are sound prior to commencing to trial and it is for the Pre-
Trial Chamber to ensure that suspects are not wrongfully convicted. Cassesse637 
argues however that to ensure reliability and the retroactive sanctioning of 
investigative impropriety can only be accomplished through judicial scrutiny of the 
information at the trial.  
                                                          
631 Separate opinion Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison. 
632 Para 21. 
633 Para 25. 
634 Separate opinion Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison para 28. 
635 Para 29. 
636 A Cassesse, P Gaeta, L Baig, M Fan, C Gosnell & A Whiting Cassese’s International 






On this point, one wonders then as to the role and function of the confirmation of 
charges hearing as charges are not confirmed prior to the judges ensuring that they 
are satisfied that there are “substantial grounds to believe that the person committed 
the crime charged” as articulated in Article 61(5) of the Statute.  
On this point, Nerlich opines that the most obvious function of the confirmation 
proceedings at the ICC, is the filtering out of unmeritorious cases. Nerlich argues 
further that before a suspect is put on trial (which may last several years, during which 
the suspect may have to be detained) there should be a judicial review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence. He argues that the confirmation process cannot be a mere 
rubber-stamping of the Prosecutor's charges.638 Nerlich opines further that an essential 
aspect of the confirmation process is that it defines the subject matter of the trial and 
it is submitted ensures legal certainty for the accused. Therefore, under Article 74(2) 
Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber, in its decision at the end of the trial, may 'not exceed 
the facts and circumstances described in the charges'. Thus, the DCC and the decision 
on the confirmation of charges have a crucial limiting function in that facts and 
circumstances that were not charged cannot lead to a conviction of the accused.639  
These authors raise important points in respect of the function of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and the confirmation of charges procedure which is in line with Mr Bemba’s 
argument on appeal, that the charges should have been clear at the beginning of 
proceedings, prior to the matter been sent to trial and that the conviction judgment, 
therefore, exceeded the facts and circumstances of the case. 
In the Gbagbo judgment, similar issues related to the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
and the confirmation of charges have occurred. It is concerning that the judges at the 
ICC have different views on the function and parameters of the Pre-Trial Chamber. It 
is submitted that if it is utilised less as a mini-trial and more clearly in terms of 
confirming only the charges which are supported by evidence, it may be a useful 
feature which could potentially ensure shorter, more focused trials and which would 
then also shorten the length of time spent by accused persons in detention. 
 
                                                          






5 5 1 3  Joint separate opinion – victim participation 
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is important to highlight the fact that the two 
judges in the joint separate opinion also raised their concerns as to the number of 
victims who were allowed to participate based on the broadness of the charges at an 
early stage of proceedings as more than 5000 victims were allowed to participate.640 
The judges expressed the view that allowing victims of crimes that were not explicitly 
confirmed to participate at such an early stage “can only lead to inflated expectations 
and bitter disappointment at the end of the trial.”641  
The victims were therefore allowed to participate at a stage of the trial when the 
charges had not been confirmed, the participation of victims at such an early stage not 
only raises expectations as stated by the judges, but is also capable of influencing the 
Pre-Trial Chamber in making its determination on the charges.  
In conclusion, therefore, the judgment highlights the problems in relation to the 
formulation of charges and the discretion of the prosecutor to decide whether or not to 
prosecute. Further, it highlights the role of the confirmation hearing to ensure that the 
facts are correctly defined so as to provide the defendant with the facts required for 
him to understand the charges against him.  
 
5 5 1 5  Discussion of the main elements which had a bearing on the accused’s 
right to a fair trial 
5 5 1 5 1  Causation 
In the various separate opinions of the judges, a particular issue related to causation 
was discussed at length, particularly in light of the accused’s individual liability under 
Article 28 and some interesting arguments unfold as follows: 
In the dissenting opinion view642 the judges agreed with the Pre-Trial Chamber that 
insofar as the duties to repress and to punish are concerned, causation needs to be 
demonstrated in respect of subsequent crimes that were committed because of the 
failure to punish earlier crimes.643 The judges were of the view that holding a superior 
“criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court” committed by his 
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or her subordinates pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute without causation would be 
incompatible with the culpability principle, which the ICTY Appeals Chamber has 
summarised as follows:  
 
“The basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national systems, 
the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: nobody may 
be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally 
engaged or in some other way participated (nulla poena sine culpa).”644 
 
In light of this, the dissenting judges argued that there has to be a nexus between 
the crime and the superior as it would be irreconcilable with basic tenets of criminal 
law if a superior were to be held responsible for crimes to which he or she has no 
connection.645  
This is a notable conclusion for the minority opinion as it is in keeping with upholding 
the fair trial rights of the accused in light of command responsibility. Finally, they 
decided that interpreting the “result of” element as requiring causation is in keeping 
with the principle of strict construction recognised in Article 22(1) of the Statute.646 The 
judges therefore agreed with the Trial Chamber that the superior’s failure to exercise 
control properly caused the commission of crimes by his or her subordinates.647 The 
judges argued further that the causation requirement in Article 28 of the Statute is 
satisfied where it is established that, had the commander exercised control properly, 
there is a high probability that the crimes would have been prevented and agreed with 
the Trial Chamber on this matter.648 It is substantially on this issue related to causation 
that the other judges disagreed with the minority judges as will be seen hereunder. 
Osuji J649 wrote a detailed separate opinion and discussed causation at length. In 
his discussion of causality, the judge raised an interesting point in that he argues: 
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“where more than one person may be reasonably said to have caused harm by their acts 
or omissions, the more just approach is not to absolve all from responsibility, leaving the 
victim bereft of justice.”  
 
The judge argues that the more appropriate approach is to attribute responsibility 
“at least, proportionably,” according to the part that each accomplice had played. In 
criminal law, that approach is readily accounted for as a matter of sentencing.650 This 
is an important point as the proportionality of sentencing in respect of command 
responsibility is the appropriate remedy for addressing this matter. 
The judge refers to the distinction between dereliction of duty and crimes against 
humanity. The judge argues that the Trial Chamber erred to convict him for those 
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by his subordinates (because he 
did not commit them himself) and the judge also took note of the fact that Mr Bemba 
was in fact neither charged with (nor convicted of) dereliction of duty. The judge then 
asks the relevant question, on what legal basis, then, is the Appeals Chamber to 
assess his criminal responsibility for dereliction of duty?651 The judge argues that it is 
difficult to reconcile the dereliction of duty theory with the terms of Article 28, which 
expressly require the commander to be held responsible “for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.”652 
The judge makes an important point in respect of fairness of holding an accused 
accountable for the crimes of others. He states in this regard that the text and structure 
of Article 28 and the statutory policy of the Rome Statute, together with questions of 
fairness about holding an accused responsible when other persons commit crimes 
also apply with necessary variation in the analysis of the commander’s failure. The 
judge argues that these considerations do not add up convincingly in support of the 
dereliction of duty theory, as they do for accomplice liability.653  
The judge goes further and states that: 
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“the only way in which it will be fair to convict a commander ‘for’ the crime committed by 
the subordinate is if the commander’s conduct contributed to the offence: that is to say, the 
offence was as ‘a result of’ the commander’s failure.”654 
 
5 5 1 5 2  Personal culpability 
Here it is necessary to investigate the principle of personal culpability as it was 
mentioned in the dissent as well as in Eboe-Osuji J’s arguments. According to Werle655 
“the principle of personal culpability encompasses the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility, under which responsibility can only arise from the attribution of specific 
acts or contributions, and which excludes coincidental liability.”  
Werle656 argues that the principle entails that the sentence be proportionate to the 
defendant’s individual responsibility. In regard to the ICC, the principle is not explicit 
in the Rome Statute but forms the basis of Article 25(2) and is only specifically referred 
to in relation to sentencing in Rule 145. Hence an argument can be made in this case 
that Mr Bemba had demonstrated during the course of the trial that he took all 
reasonable measures to prevent the crimes which his subordinates were committing 
and the court was unable to convict him on the basis of any omission on his part. The 
judges have agreed that the causal element, in this case, rests on the “result of” 
standard and that there has to be a causal connection between the actions of the 
commander and his subordinates in the commission of crimes.  
The majority of the Appeals Chamber, however, held that this causal connection 
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the issue of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt, Eboe-Osuji J makes the point that the theory of complicity puts two important 
and necessarily connected considerations into sharper relief: First, it makes the 
element of causality plainer to see in the interrelated criminality of the conducts of both 
the superior and the subordinate. Consequently, it puts in plainer perspective the 
fairness of holding the superior criminally responsible for the crimes committed by the 
subordinate but the judge argues that it must all be proven beyond reasonable 
doubt.657 The judge is effectively arguing that the prosecutor chose the wrong form of 
liability to ensure the successful prosecution of Mr Bemba. 
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The judges in the joint separate opinion658 argue quite strongly that: 
  
“we should not desire to hold responsible those in high leadership positions and to always 
ascribe to them the highest levels of moral and legal culpability.”659  
 
The judges argue that Article 28 of the Statute may not always be the right tool to 
link them directly to the conduct of the physical perpetrators.660 This is indeed true both 
in the Bemba and Gbagbo judgments in which both accused persons were prosecuted 
on the basis of command responsibility and both were acquitted due to insufficient 
evidence to prove that they should be held liable under Article 28. The element of 
causation being the determinative factor in the prosecutor’s burden of proof. 
The judges found errors in the Trial Chamber judgment both on issues of law and 
of fact in the following manner: The judges reasoned that the Trial Chamber erred in 
law by not making specific findings which specific crimes Mr Bemba was aware and 
at which point in time. The judges argued that it was for the Trial Chamber to 
differentiate, for each crime in relation to which Mr Bemba was said to have failed in 
his supervisory duties, between knowledge prior, during or after the troops committed 
the crimes.661 The judges also argued that the Trial Chamber erred in fact by relying 
on weak and vague evidence in relation to its findings on knowledge.662 The judges 
stated quite emphatically “In sum, we are of the view that Article 28 does not – and 
should not – require that the commander’s failure caused his or her subordinates to 
commit crimes. This view is in line with the principle of strict interpretation enshrined 
in Article 22(2) of the Statute.”663 
On the issue of whether or not they were crimes against humanity, the judges 
concurred with Osuja J and found that Mr Bemba was convicted of crimes that in their 
view were not crimes against humanity because the Prosecutor made the mistake of 
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considering that the legal elements as such are the material facts.664 The judges 
emphasised this point by stating:  
 
“This cannot be correct: the ‘multiple commission’ and ‘widespread’ requirements are legal 
elements, which must be substantiated by way of material facts, and those material facts 
must be concrete (that is, have a time and place, identified victims and perpetrators, etc.) 
Each of these material facts must be proved to the relevant standard. This means that there 
must be sufficient evidence for each individual instance of criminal conduct that is alleged 
to be part of the ‘course of conduct involving the multiple commission of [criminal] acts”665  
 
The judges took issue therefore with the manner in which the prosecutor tried to 
prove the facts based on hearsay evidence and dubious circumstantial evidence which 
in their view was not capable of a finding beyond reasonable doubt.666 Eboe-Osuji J 
raised a similar point in this regard earlier, questioning on what basis Mr Bemba was 
in fact convicted as the charges against him were not proven beyond reasonable 
doubt.  
 
5 5 1 5 3  Fair labelling 
Robinson667 argues that most writings on the topic of command responsibility 
confirm the centrality of causation. However, Robinson makes a valid point in respect 
of the protection of the accused and argues that fair labelling must take precedence. 
Fair labelling, in essence, means that an individual should not carry the burden of 
being accused of crimes he did not commit. Robinson argues strongly that this is a 
main line of defence in respect of command responsibility as it is inaccurate to label a 
failure on the part of a commander to prevent crimes as for example a crime against 
humanity. Robinson668 , therefore, argues that the distinction must be made between 
the commander’s failure to carry out his duty as a superior to exercise control over his 
subordinates from the crimes which the subordinates are guilty of committing. For 
example, Mr Bemba was accused of various crimes including murder, rape and 
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pillaging which for all intents and purposes, it became clear was not committed by him 
but by his subordinates, hence he may have been liable, if it had been proven beyond 
reasonable doubt for his failure to exercise proper control over his subordinates but 
not for the crimes which his subordinates committed. This very point was made by the 
judges in their separate opinions and particularly by Eboe-Osuji J who claimed that if 
Mr Bemba could not be convicted for dereliction of duty then what justification was 
there to convict him of the crimes of murder, rape, pillaging and that there are specific 
crimes which fall within the jurisdiction of the court, which does not include dereliction 
of duty or better said, command responsibility is not a crime as listed in the Statute 
which falls under the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
Robinson669 uses the example, of a case at the ICTY, Krnojelac670 and makes the 
point that despite the assertions in Krnojelac that the accused was charged with failure 
to exercise control and not the underlying crimes, Krnojelac was charged with and, 
through command responsibility, convicted of, numerous war crimes and crimes 
against humanity of torture, murder, and persecution, and he was sentenced for those 
crimes. Robinson671 argues strongly that the label attached to the charges, convictions, 
and sentence conveyed to the world that the accused was responsible for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. He argues that the ICTs are imposing such labels, for 
crimes bearing enormous stigma, in contravention of the principle of culpability 
recognised by the system, which requires a causal contribution to the crime for which 
one is convicted. He argues that “if the command responsibility doctrine were to 
conform to the principle of culpability, liability for international crimes based on a failure 
to punish would require that the failings of the commander ‘contributed to, or ... had 
an effect on’ crimes and that in the absence of any such contribution, to convict a 
person for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, and to impose the stigma 
that such crimes bear, contradicts the principle of culpability which ICL claims to 
respect.”672  
This argument may be subsumed into the present case of Mr Bemba and the issue 
was correctly raised in the separate opinions. Mr Bemba had been convicted by the 
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Trial Chamber for crimes which he did not commit himself but were, if it was proven 
correctly by the prosecutor, for the crimes of murder, rape and pillaging and as argued 
by Robinson this would be contrary to the principle of culpability. Despite Mr Bemba’s 
acquittal, he spent over 10 years in detention and has already been labelled for crimes 
against humanity. Despite the acquittal, he will therefore always have to carry the 
unfair label associated with the crimes committed by his subordinates. 
 
5 6  Reflection on the impact of the case on the rights of victims and the 
international community    
It is important to note that on the other charges related to bribery of witnesses, Mr 
Bemba was in fact convicted but he did not have to serve any further time in prison as 
he had already served almost ten years in detention in The Hague.  
Questions have also been raised as to the ICC’s credibility and the influence of 
politics over particularly this decision as Mr Bemba headed the Movement for the 
Liberation of Congo party and its affiliated militia. After he lost an election to Laurent 
Kabila in the DRC in 2006, he was sent to The Hague to stand trial for atrocities 
committed by his troops in the neighbouring CAR in 2002 and 2003. In this regard, Ba 
opines that although he has spent ten years in prison in The Hague, Bemba remains 
a key political figure in his country. In a political landscape already marred with 
uncertainty, Bemba's return will pose a serious challenge to President Kabila who is 
trying to cling to power despite having finished his second term in December 2016.673  
Taffo, who shares this view, avers: 
 
“Kabila is for all these reasons no longer regarded as a legitimate president of the DRC and 
the leader that can bring peace and security to the country and the Great Lakes region as 
a whole. Could the ICC have been manipulated by those who uphold prescriptive 
democratic ideals and who have the necessary power to impose “democracy” in developing 
countries? The possible manipulation of the ICC could have led to Bemba’s freedom and 
he can now challenge the presidential elections in the DRC.”674  
                                                          
673 O Ba “What Jean-Pierre Bemba's acquittal by the ICC means the ICC decision to overturn 
Bemba's conviction will have major consequences for both the DRC and the court” (13-06-
2018) Aljazeera <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/jean-pierre-bemba-acquittal-icc-
means-180612121012078.html> (accessed 10-02-2019) 
674 African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) F Taffo Analysis of 





The International Federation for Human Rights (“FIDH”) monitors the developments 
of the ICC, particularly in relation to the development of victim’s rights at the court and 
in 2018 made recommendations to “The 17th session of the Assembly of States 
Parties (“ASP” or “Assembly”) to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” 
or “Court”) held from 5 to 12 December 2018 in The Hague, the Netherlands.” 
The FIDH highlighted the following as the main challenges facing the ICC: 
 
 “a standstill in the quest for universality, an insufficient level of cooperation with the Court, 
an inconsistent implementation of victims’ rights, inadequacy of resources made available 
to the Court, a need to strengthen the Court’s investigations and prosecutions, particularly 
in relation to sexual and gender based crimes; the perception of the Court in affected 
communities, in particular after Jean-Pierre Bemba’s acquittal, a need to elect ICC Judges 
and Prosecutor on merits only, and the attacks against human rights defenders”675 
 
The FIDH made it clear in its submission that “Bemba’s acquittal was a devastating 
outcome for the 5,229 victims who participated in the trial and the reparation 
proceedings, and who had waited 15 years to see justice done and to receive some 
form of redress. FIDH fears that the decision may have a negative impact on the 
perception of the ICC in the country and in the eyes of victims and witnesses of future 
proceedings at the ICC and other courts. 
For this reason, FIDH welcomed the decision of the TFV, announced following 
Bemba’s acquittal, to accelerate the launch of a programme under its assistance 
mandate. One million euros from the voluntary contributions will be earmarked for 
medical, psychological and material assistance programmes for the victims of the 
Bemba case, as well as other victims of sexual and gender based violence in the 
2002–2003 conflict.”676  
Therefore, even though the acquittal of Mr Bemba may have been a success in 
terms of the court ensuring substantive and procedural fairness in its proceedings 
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towards the accused, it is evident that the acquittal significantly affected the multitude 
of victims who had been affected by the crimes committed in CAR. 
Mr Gbagbo’s case, to which I now turn, raises similar evidentiary and procedural 
issues as has been raised in the Bemba judgment. 
 
5 7  The Laurent Gbagbo and Blé Goude cases 
5 7 1  Background 
Laurent Gbagbo is the former president of Côte d’Ivoire. Charles Blé Goudé, a close 
ally of Gbagbo, was the youth and employment minister in Gbagbo’s government and 
the leader of the Young Patriots, a pro-Gbagbo militia group. The ICC has charged 
both men with individual criminal responsibility on four counts of crimes against 
humanity: murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, other inhumane acts, and 
persecution. 
The charges relate to the 2010–2011 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, when 
Gbagbo refused to accept the victory in the November 10 presidential election of 
Alassane Ouattara. Gbagbo’s refusal to leave office led to an armed conflict during 
which at least 3,000 civilians were killed and more than 150 women were raped, with 
serious human rights violations by both sides.677 Gbagbo is the first former head of 
state to be tried by the ICC. In December 2010, Gbagbo refused to step down when 
the Independent Electoral Commission and international observers proclaimed his 
rival, Ouattara, the winner of the 28 November 2010 presidential runoff.678 
Côte d’Ivoire, which was not party to the Rome Statute at the time, had accepted 
the jurisdiction of the ICC on 18 April 2003, by a declaration made in accordance with 
Article 12-3 of the Rome Statute; on both 14 December 2010 and 3 May 2011, the 
Presidency of Côte d'Ivoire reconfirmed the country’s acceptance of this jurisdiction. 
On 3 October 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber judges granted the Prosecutor’s request 
to open an investigation with respect to alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 28 November 2010, as well as with regard to 
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crimes that may be committed in the future in the context of the same situation in this 
country.679 On 15 February 2013, Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Rome Statute. Gbagbo was 
captured by Ouattara's troops, who were being aided by UN and French forces, and 
sent to The Hague in November 2011.680 
The cases of Gbagbo and Ble Goude were only joined in March 2015. However, for 
the purposes of this dissertation, the earlier decisions of the ICC against Mr Gbagbo 
are relevant in relation to his fair trial rights and will be discussed hereunder, 
particularly in respect of the confirmation of charges hearings, the implementation of 
Regulation 55 and then the events leading to the acquittal of Messrs Gbagbo and Blé 
Goudé. A discussion of the similarities and differences between this case and that of 
Mr Bemba will be woven into the discussion and form part of chapter 7 which deals 
with the conclusions of the dissertation. 
 
5 7 2  Confirmation of charges  
5 7 2 1  To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content 
of the charge 
On the 3 June 2013,681 the Pre-Trial Chamber had occasion to decide on adjournment 
of the confirmation hearings pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i).682 This was an interesting 
judgment as it raised issues specifically related to the role of the pre-Trial Chamber in 
confirmation of charges hearings. The chamber discussed the evidentiary threshold of 
“substantial grounds to believe” and stated that the standard required for the 
confirmation of charges is higher than the threshold required for the issuance of a 
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warrant of arrest (“reasonable grounds to believe”) but lower than the threshold 
required for the conviction of an accused (“beyond reasonable doubt”).683  
The chamber identified its role as the “gatekeeper’ and elaborated on this by 
describing its role as follows: 
 
“(i) only those cases proceed to trial for which the Prosecutor has presented sufficiently 
compelling evidence going beyond mere theory or suspicion; (ii) the suspect is protected 
against wrongful prosecution; (iii) and judicial economy is ensured by distinguishing 
between cases that should go to trial and those that should not.”684  
 
This is important in terms of the developing jurisprudence of the chambers in 
relation to the distinction of their roles. Of particular relevance here is that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in this case as opposed to Mr Bemba’s case, demonstrated concern for the 
lack of evidence in support of the charges and was also concerned about countering 
wrongful prosecutions whereas in the Bemba decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber took an 
interventionist approach and claimed that the evidence suggested a “different crime” 
and adjourned the hearing to ensure that the prosecutor amended the charges to 
include Article 28, based on the chamber’s intervention.  
The chamber held that even though Article 61(5) of the Statute only requires the 
Prosecutor to support each charge with “sufficient” evidence at the confirmation 
hearing, the chamber stated that it has to assume that the Prosecutor has presented 
her strongest possible case based on a largely completed investigation.685  
 
5 7 2 2  The right to be tried without undue delay 
The chamber relied heavily on the findings of the Appeals Chamber in 
Mbarushimana and highlighted, “the investigation should largely be completed at the 
stage of the confirmation of charges hearing. Most of the evidence should, therefore, 
be available, and it is up to the Prosecutor to submit this evidence to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.” The chamber was of the view that this approach would ensure continuity 
in the presentation of the case and that it would safeguard the rights of the Defence 
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who would then not be presented with a wholly different evidentiary case at trial and 
that it will ensure that the commencement of the trial is not unduly delayed which the 
chamber held conforms with the right of the Defence to be tried without undue delay 
pursuant to Article 67(l)(c) of the Statute.686  
The crux of the chamber’s position was that it took issue with the prosecutor’s over-
reliance on hearsay evidence and the chamber found that the prosecutor should avoid 
using hearsay evidence, particularly when it relates to anonymous statements.687 The 
chamber, therefore, adjourned the hearing and based its decision on the defence’s 
right to be informed in detail of the content of the charges and ordered the prosecutor 
to submit a new Amended DCC setting out in detail the facts of the case, including all 
incidents forming the contextual elements of crimes against humanity. The prosecutor 
was also instructed to submit a new list of evidence setting out the entirety of the 
evidence on which she intends to rely for the purposes of the confirmation of charges 
and an updated consolidated Elements-Based Chart covering the entirety of the 
charges.688 
 
5 7 2 3  Dissenting opinion Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi J 
In the dissenting opinion written by Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi J, she disagreed 
with the chamber’s interpretation of its role and also the amount of evidence which the 
prosecutor should provide at the confirmation hearing. The judge was of the view that 
it was not for the Chamber to speculate on whether it has received all the evidence or 
the “strongest possible” evidence, but solely to assess whether it has sufficient 
evidence to determine ‘substantial grounds to believe’ that the person has committed 
the crimes charged.689 In respect of the chamber’s reference to its ‘gatekeeper’ role, 
the judge’s view of the Pre-Trial Chamber was the limited purpose of the confirmation 
hearing as the judge was of the view that the chamber’s expansive interpretation of its 
purpose could potentially infringe on the procedural system of the court and may 
create duplication in proceedings.690  
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I am inclined to agree with this view. On the one hand the Pre-Trial Chamber framed 
its argument based on the insufficiency of evidence at the Pre-Trial phase but on the 
other hand, the position the chamber took by stating that “it has to assume that the 
Prosecutor has presented her strongest possible case based on a largely completed 
investigation”,691 presupposes a different standard being applied by the chamber, 
bearing in mind that the chamber is confined to the ‘substantial grounds to believe” 
standard and not the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard.  
The judge further clarified that in her opinion, a clear line, based on the individual 
charges as presented by the Prosecutor, must indeed be drawn between the facts and 
circumstances which are “described in the charges” and the facts and circumstances 
that are not “described in the charges”, as only the former must be proven to the 
requisite threshold of substantial grounds to believe.692  
The judge was very clear about the distinction between the role of the prosecutor 
and that of the Pre-Trial Chamber. She indicated that in her view under Article 
61(7)(c)(ii) of the Statute the Chamber may request the Prosecutor to consider 
amending the charges but only in relation to the legal characterisation of the facts. The 
judge made it clear that the Statute does not allow the Chamber to involve itself in the 
Prosecutor's selection of which facts to charge and it is for the Prosecutor and not for 
the Chamber to select her case and its factual parameters. The judge stated 
emphatically that: 
  
“The Pre-Trial Chamber is not an investigative chamber and does not have the mandate to 
direct the investigations of the Prosecutor.”693  
 
It is important to note at such an early stage of proceedings, the chamber was 
already questioning the prosecutor’s evidence to substantiate the charges and the 
PTC was correct in its assessment of its role to ensure that suspects are not subject 
to wrongful convictions, however, the basis of the standard “substantial grounds to 
believe” was infringed by the Pre-Trial Chambers in Bemba and in Gbagbo. In both 
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cases, the chamber intervened and requested the Prosecutor to amend the charges, 
although this duty of the Trial Chamber is covered in terms of Article 61(7)(c).  
On 3 December 2013,694 the Appeals Chamber upheld the Pre-Trial Chamber 
decision and thereafter the prosecutor amended the DCC in line with the judgments. 
The confirmation hearing took place on 12 June 2014. 
 
5 7 2 4  Final Confirmation of Charges decision 
At the confirmation hearing held on 12 June 2014, the Pre-Trial Chamber had to 
decide whether or not to confirm the charges as set out by the prosecutor in the DCC 
in which the prosecutor charged Mr Gbagbo under alternate forms of liability; 
“alternately, Article 25(3)(a) (indirect co-perpetration), 25(3)(b) (order, solicit and 
induce) and 25(3)(d), as well as Article 28(a) and 28(b) of the Statute.695 
On the matter of alternative charging, the chamber was of the view that: 
  
“when alternative legal characterisations of the same facts proposed by the Prosecutor are 
satisfactorily established by the evidence, it is appropriate that the charges be confirmed 
with the various available alternatives, in order for the Trial Chamber to determine whether 
any of those legal characterisations is established to the applicable standard of proof at 
trial.”696  
 
The chamber found that confirming all applicable alternative legal characterisations 
on the basis of the same facts is a desirable approach as it may reduce future delays 
at trial, and provides early notice to the defence of the different legal characterisations 
that may be considered by the trial judges.697 The chamber, however, refused to 
confirm Mr Gbagbo’s liability under Article 28 as it was of the view that there was 
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insufficient evidence to support his liability under Article 28.698 This is interesting as in 
Bemba, the ICC arrived at a different conclusion concerning cumulative charging. The 
Trial Chamber held that:  
 
“the Chamber intended to make it clear that the prosecutorial practice of cumulative 
charging is detrimental to the rights of the Defence since it places an undue burden on the 
Defence. The Chamber considers that, as a matter of fairness and expeditiousness of the 
proceedings, only distinct crimes may justify a cumulative charging approach and, 
ultimately, be confirmed as charges. This is only possible if each statutory provision 
allegedly breached in relation to one and the same conduct requires at least one additional 
material element not contained in the other.”699  
 
In Gbagbo the ICC allowed cumulative charging claiming that this manner of 
charging supported the fair trial rights of the defendant whereas in Bemba the court 
refused to allow cumulative charging claiming that it was in contravention of the 
accused’s fair trial rights. However, in Bemba, the court found that Regulation 55 was 
still available to charge the accused at a later stage.  
Cassesse considers this to be contrary as it is difficult to see how cumulative 
charging could be viewed as detrimental to the rights of the accused, when 
implementing Regulation 55 at any stage of the proceedings would not be detrimental 
to the fair trial rights of the accused.700 Cassesse expresses the view that often 
cumulative charging has become acceptable for international crimes due to the 
complexity and difficulty of investigations.701  
Irrespective of the difficulties involved in investigations of international crimes, the 
preferred approach to ensure the adequate protection of the rights of the accused 
would be to avoid cumulative charging, as well as the implementation of Regulation 
55.  
In Van den Wyngaert J’s dissent on this decision, she made it clear that she did not 
agree with the chamber that the charges as formulated in the DCC under Article 
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25(3)(a), (b) were sufficiently strong for the case to go to trial,702 she also found that 
there was insufficient evidence and that the hearsay evidence of anonymous 
witnesses was still being relied upon.703 The insufficiency and unreliability of evidence, 
therefore still remained after the initial adjournment and amendment of the DCC and 
yet the charges were still confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, bearing in mind that in 
terms of Article 61, the chamber could have declined to confirm the charges, which it 
chose not to do. 
The Prosecutor submitted a request to join the two cases on 22 December 2014, 
citing the similarity in facts between the two cases and claiming that joining the cases 
would minimise the impact of on witnesses, avoid duplication of evidence, promote 
judicial economy, and create consistent rulings regarding the evidence and issues. 
The cases of Gbagbo and Ble Goude were then joined on 11 March 2015.704 
 
5 8 Regulation 55  
5 8 1  The right to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content 
of the charge and the right to be tried without undue delay  
Bearing in mind that at the confirmation hearing the Pre-Trial Chamber refused to 
confirm charges against the accused under Article 28, on 24 April 2015,705 the 
Prosecutor requested that the Chamber give notice to the parties and participants that 
the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change to include liability 
under Article 28(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute. 
Of particular interest is that the prosecutor framed the request in such a way as to 
imply that the implementation of Regulation 55 underscores Mr Gbagbo’s fair trial 
rights. The prosecutor emphasised that: 
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“notice before trial ensures that Mr Gbagbo (i) is informed in detail of the charges; (ii) has 
adequate time to prepare his defence; and (iii) is tried without undue delay.”706  
 
The defence raised very pertinent arguments against the implementation of 
Regulation 55: 
  
“that the Chamber cannot reintroduce charges expressly rejected by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber: doing so would render the confirmation phase redundant and deny the accused 
notice of the charges; secondly that, in all other cases, notice under Regulation 55 of the 
Regulations was only given at trial and addressed modes of liability not considered during 
the confirmation phase and lastly that the Pre-Trial Chamber chose particular facts to 
sustain the confirmed charges and these facts only hold meaning in light of a particular 
charge.”707 
 
5 8 2  To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence 
The chamber interpreted the meaning of “trial” and found that “in this context and 
the special circumstances of this case, the term 'trial' is not limited to the hearing of 
evidence, but also extends to the phase after a trial chamber is seized of a case and 
before opening statements.”708 The Trial Chamber upheld the prosecution request for 
the implementation of Regulation 55 and the re-characterisation of the charges under 
Article 28 (command responsibility) was allowed. The chamber also denied the 
defence the opportunity to make submissions on the re-characterisation and decided 
that this could be done “after the hearing of evidence and at an appropriate stage of 
the proceedings.”709 
This decision is troubling considering the specific function of the confirmation of 
charges hearing and the different and varied interpretations of the use of Regulation 
55 at the ICC. This decision, like the decisions in Bemba, reflects serious problems of 
interpretation of the Statute in respect of the functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber, the 
purpose of the confirmation of charges hearing and the implementation of Regulation 
55 which is contrary to the fair trial rights of the accused.  
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On appeal, the decision of the Trial Chamber to re-characterise the facts and 
circumstances under Article 28 was upheld. The Appeals Chamber710 made the 
following key findings:  
 
I. While the Appeals Chamber is not called upon to consider whether the term “trial” 
has the same interpretation when used in other contexts throughout the legal 
framework of the Court, the ordinary meaning of the phrase “at any time during 
the trial” in the context of Regulation 55, does not exclude the stage after a Trial 
Chamber is seized of a case and before opening statements.  
II. There is no legal impediment to a Trial Chamber re-characterising facts and 
circumstances to include a mode of liability that was considered, but not 
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, so long as the facts and circumstances that 
could potentially be re-characterised were confirmed by that Pre-Trial Chamber. 
 
Even though the Appeals Chamber upheld the finding of the Trial Chamber to 
implement Regulation 55 and to change the mode of liability to Article 28, it must be 
borne in mind that in Van den Wyngaert J’s dissent (previously discussed under 
confirmation of charges), she raised the limited amount of evidence to support this 
mode of liability and the fact that most of the evidence which the prosecutor relied on 
was hearsay evidence. Despite the clear lack of evidence and the fact that the Pre-
Trial Chamber declined to confirm the charges based on Article 28, the Chamber 
decided to re-characterise the mode of liability.  
In addition, the argument raised above remains, that despite the prosecutor and 
Appeals Chamber arguing that giving the notice as early as possible in fact addressed 
the accused’s fair trial right to be informed timeously of the charges, Mr Gbagbo was 
placed at a disadvantage in that his defence strategy would have to be amended to 
accommodate a different mode of liability. Even more interesting is how this judgment 
nullifies the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s confirmation decision, in which the 
Pre-Trial Chamber specifically declined to confirm the charges based on Article 28 
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liability largely due to insufficient evidence to support this form of liability. This decision 
seriously puts into question the role of the confirmation hearing and in particular, the 
accused’s right to legal certainty.  
 
5 9  Victim participation Ghabgo and Ble Goude 
On 17 January 2012, Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi J acting as the Single Judge 
convened a meeting to assess with the VPRS and other representatives of the 
Registry the victims' application process and to explore different options, including, in 
particular, the possibility of applying a collective approach to victims' applications for 
participation in the Case.711 In light of the above, the Registry proposed a particular 
approach to victims' participation to be implemented in three main phases: 
 
(i) the production of an initial mapping report identifying the main communities of 
victims affected by the alleged crimes, their representatives and civil society 
organisations, as well as security considerations;  
(ii) the subsequent collection and processing of victims’ applications for 
participation, for which the Registry requests that a “reasonable final deadline” 
is set; and 
(iii)  the organisation of the common legal representation of the victims, suggesting 
that the Chamber "initiates this process at the earliest opportunity.712 
 
The Single Judge agreed with the mapping approach but stated that the approach 
should be used for the following: 
  
(i) identify main communities or groups of victims;  
(ii) identify potential persons that could act on behalf of multiple individual victims, 
with their consent, in accordance with Rule 89(3) of the Rules; 
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(iii)  encourage potential individual applicants to join with others and to that effect 
consent to a single application to be made on their behalf in accordance with 
Rule 89(3) of the Rules.713 
  
Furthermore, the Single Judge considered the mapping process should also 
provide an opportunity to initiate the organisation of legal representation. The judge 
indicated that it should be used to assess whether the applicants could be further 
grouped for the purposes of common legal representation in accordance with Rule 90 
of the Rules and to start identifying potential common legal representation.714 
On 11 June 2014, the Single Judge, issued the “Decision on victims’ participation 
in the pre-trial proceedings and related issues” in the Blé Goudé case, wherein she 
admitted 199 victims to participate in the proceedings, appointed counsel from the 
OPCV as common legal representative and ruled on the set of procedural rights 
accorded to the participating victims in the present case.715  
On 1 August 2014, the Single Judge admitted a further 272 victims to participate in 
the proceedings, represented by the same common legal representative and 
terminated the status as victim participating in the case of one applicant.716 
In March 2015, the chamber reflected on the fact that the Registry had estimated 
the total number of victims would not exceed 700.717 The chamber in this matter 
decided to adopt option 1 advanced by the Registry, which followed the system 
implemented in the case of Bosco Ntaganda (the case discussed in chapter 6 
hereof).718 
This system requires the Registry to: 
 
(i)  receive applications for participation; 
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(ii)  prepare redacted versions of the Simplified Form; and  
(iii) transmit them, in their redacted or unredacted version, to the Chamber and the 
parties, together with a Report under Regulation 86(6) of the Regulations.  
 
Thereafter, the parties may submit their views in accordance with Rule 89(1) of the 
Rules. Finally, the Chamber will consider the applications individually and grant victim 
status to qualifying applicants.719 
These decisions represent an initiative of the court to effectively address the volume 
of victim applications in a systematic way and to ensure that they have adequate 
representation during the course of the trial. Essentially, this case implemented a 
collective approach to victim participation which has been criticised, in this regard 
Moffett is of the view that this approach could dilute the role of victims in proceedings 
and transform their participation into a ‘purely symbolic’ form of participation thereby 
negating their real experiences.720 
 
5 10  Orders for the continuance of proceedings 
It should be noted that the continual lack of evidence and the weak prosecutorial 
case eventually resulted in Mr Gbagbo’s acquittal in January 2019. The events leading 
up to the acquittal are discussed below.  
The trial commenced on 28 January 2016, bearing in mind that Mr Gbagbo was in 
custody since 2011. In February 2018,721 however, the Trial Chamber issued an order 
on the continuance of the trial. This order came as a result of a request from the 
defence that the prosecutor provide an amended pre-trial brief because a number of 
witnesses had withdrawn since the commencement of the trial.722 The Trial Chamber 
therefore ordered the prosecutor to submit an amended pre-trial brief containing all 
the evidentiary items submitted and the testimonies linked to each of the charges as 
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well as how she thinks the evidence supports each of the elements of the different 
crime and forms of liability charged.723  
On 19 March 2018, the prosecutor submitted the amended mid-trial brief stating 
that she only included relevant evidence, only addressed matters of importance and 
reserved her right to make further submissions in the event of the defence raising 
challenges to the sufficiency of evidence provided.724 On 23 April 2018, the defence 
filed their observations claiming that the prosecutor had not provided sufficient 
evidence and requested an acquittal of all charges.725 
On 4 June 2018, the Trial Chamber rendered a second order on the continuance of 
proceedings and was of the view that the chamber had a duty to ensure the fairness 
and expeditiousness of proceedings and that the chamber was therefore required to 
“devise procedural steps to contribute to a shorter and more focused trial, thereby 
providing a means to achieve greater judicial economy and efficiency in a manner 
which promotes the proper administration of justice and the rights of an accused.”726  
The chamber stated as follows: 
 
“Accordingly, the Chamber believes that, at this stage, the most appropriate and efficient 
way to proceed in light of its statutory duties is to authorise the defence to make concise 
and focused submissions on the specific factual issues for which, in their view, the evidence 
presented is insufficient to sustain a conviction and in respect of which, accordingly, a full 
or partial judgment of acquittal would be warranted. More specifically, the defence are 
invited to explain why there is insufficient evidence which could reasonably support a 
conviction. In order not to defeat their purpose, and in light of the stage reached by these 
proceedings, such submissions must be filed and resolved expeditiously.”727  
 
The Trial Chamber also held that after receiving the written submissions, it would 
hold public hearings to allow parties to respond to specific questions.728 
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5 10 1  No Case to Answer – Presumption of innocence and proof beyond 
reasonable doubt 
On 28 September 2018, the defence filed a no case to answer motion which means 
that the prosecutor has not proven its case beyond reasonable doubt and the defence 
seeks an acquittal from the Trial Chamber. One may well ask what the ‘no case to 
answer’ motion entails as it is not specified in the Rome Statute. In the Ruto case at 
the ICC, Trial Chamber V(A) set out quite clearly what this motion is about as well as 
the standard which the Trial Chamber should apply in determining whether there is ‘no 
case to answer’. For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to understand the 
court’s jurisprudence on this issue. In Ruto,729 therefore, the court found that the 
primary rationale underpinning a no case to answer motion is the principle that an 
accused should not be called to answer a charge when the evidence presented by the 
prosecution is insufficient for the defence to present a case.730 The ICC emphasised 
that their reasoning is in line with the accused’s right to be presumed innocent and to 
a fair and speedy trial in terms of Article 66(1) and 67(1) of the Statute.731 The Trial 
Chamber clarified this motion further by noting: 
 
“the Statute places the onus on the Prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused. This is 
consistent with the underlying premise of a 'no case to answer' motion, which is 
appropriately brought in cases where the Prosecution has failed to fulfil that burden by not 
having presented evidence for the elements that would be required to be proven in order 
to support a conviction.”732 
 
The Trial Chamber also clarified the different evidentiary standards applicable to 
the confirmation of charges hearing and the trial by stating:  
 
“The lower evidentiary standard, limited evidentiary scope and distinct evidentiary rules 
applicable at the confirmation of charges stage do not preclude a subsequent consideration 
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of the evidence actually presented at trial by the Prosecution in light of the requirements 
for conviction of an accused. Furthermore, the nature and content of the evidence may 
change between the confirmation hearing and completion of the Prosecution's presentation 
of evidence at trial. In addition, the Prosecution need not introduce the same evidence at 
trial as it did for confirmation.”733 
 
In respect of the fact that this motion is not included in the Statute the chamber held 
that Article 64(3)(a) of the Statute sets out that the Chamber shall: 
  
“[c]onfer with the parties and adopt such procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair 
and expeditious conduct of the proceedings.”  
 
The Chamber was also of the view that it could entertain “no case to answer” 
motions pursuant to its power to “rule on any other relevant matter”, as contained in 
Article 64(6)(f) of the Statute.734 The Trial Chamber also referred to Rule 134 which it 
claimed conferred broad powers on the Chamber to rule on “any issue concerning the 
conduct of the proceedings” and on “issues that arise during the course of the trial”. 
The chamber further emphasised that by considering a “no case to answer motion” 
the chamber would be complying with its general obligation under Article 64(2) to 
ensure that the trial is fair and expeditious.735  
In respect of the elements required to be proven in order to sustain a conviction 
before the Court (i) both the legal and factual components of the alleged crime and (ii) 
the individual criminal responsibility of the accused must be established. The court 
found, therefore, that evidence which could support both of those aspects must be 
present.736 The chamber concluded that the appropriate test to be applied is whether 
there is evidence on which a reasonable chamber could convict. To this end, the 
chamber stated that this would be done considering each count in the DCC separately 
but “for each count, it is only necessary to satisfy the test in respect of one mode of 
liability, as pleaded or for which a Regulation 55 of the Regulations notice has been 
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issued by the Chamber. The Chamber will not consider questions of reliability or 
credibility relating to the evidence, save where the evidence in question is incapable 
of belief by any reasonable Trial Chamber.”737 
This decision set the standard for no case to answer motions at the ICC, the Trial 
Chamber also referred to the fact that no case to answer motions have been dealt with 
at the tribunals even though it is not specifically contained in the Rome Statute. Even 
though this standard for “no case to answer” motions was set out and followed in 
Gbagbo’s trial, the same standard was not followed in Ntaganda which will be 
evidenced in Chapter 6 hereof. 
 
5 11  Mr Gbagbo and Blé Goudé’s acquittal 
On 23 July 2018, Mr Gbagbo filed a motion for acquittal claiming that the evidence 
presented by the prosecutor failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. On 
3 August 2018, the defence for Mr Blé Goudé filed a similar motion, both motions 
effectively amounted to a no case to answer motion which the court had to deliberate 
and decide upon. After the court conducted hearings on these motions, the court 
issued an oral decision on 15 January 2019 stating that it would issue a full reasoned 
judgment in due course. The oral judgment acquitted both the accused persons and 
Carbuccia J issued a dissenting opinion.  
The majority found that the Prosecutor had failed to submit sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the responsibility of Mr Gbagbo and Mr Blé Goudé for the incidents under 
the Chamber's scrutiny. In particular, having thoroughly analysed the evidence, the 
Chamber concluded by majority that the Prosecutor had failed to demonstrate several 
core constitutive elements of the crimes as charged, including the existence of a 
“common plan” to keep Mr Gbagbo in power, which included the commission of crimes 
against civilians “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy”; and 
the existence of patterns of violence from which it could be inferred that there was a 
“policy to attack a civilian population.” Furthermore, the Chamber concluded, by 
majority, that the Prosecutor failed to demonstrate that public speeches by Mr Gbagbo 
or Mr Blé Goudé constituted ordering, soliciting or inducing the alleged crimes. The 
                                                          





Chamber decided that, accordingly, there is no need for the defence to submit further 
evidence.738 
 
5 11 1 Dissenting opinion of Carbuccia J to the Oral Decision of 15 January 2019 
Carbuccia J issued a dissenting opinion to the oral decision of the majority of the 
court and disagreed with the majority on two points: first, delivering a decision without 
any reasoning, and secondly, on the majority’s conclusion to grant the Defence 
motions for judgment of acquittal on the basis that there is no evidence capable to 
sustain a conviction for either one of the two accused in this case.739 
The judge argued that a reasoned judgment was essential to the accused’s right to 
a fair trial and allows parties to understand the basis of any subsequent right to appeal 
and that any undue delay in reaching such a decision impairs the accused’s fair trial 
rights.740  
The judge also raised the issue of the length of time for delivering judgment and 
she cited Rule 142(1) of the Rules which provides that the Chamber's “pronouncement 
shall be made within a reasonable period of time after the Trial Chamber has retired 
to deliberate.” 741 The judge argued that the timing of the judgment is important for the 
parties to file their appeals742 and also that it safeguards judicial impartiality which 
prevents judges from taking hasty decisions before fully analysing the facts and 
assessing the evidence.743 In her argument regarding the expeditiousness of 
proceedings, the judge was of the view that the right to a fair trial applied to both the 
defence and the prosecutor.744  
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Respectfully, this is not a view supported in this dissertation as expressed in the 
introductory chapters. The view supported and argued in this dissertation is that the 
accused and victims have a right to a fair trial; the same rights are not afforded to the 
prosecutor under the Rome Statute. 
The judge also held the view that there was evidence upon which a reasonable Trial 
Chamber could convict the accused.745 The judge argued that the Chamber must 
analyse the evidence bearing in mind the nature and purpose of this “halfway stage”, 
which will not conclude with a determination of the truth or a decision based on a 
“beyond reasonable doubt” finding746 standard. She also criticised the chamber for 
taking long to arrive at its decision having taken over six months to arrive at its decision 
which once again she argued impaired the expeditiousness of proceedings.747  
In respect of the standard to be applied in determining no case to answer motions, 
the judge referred to the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the case of The Prosecutor v 
Goran Jelisic:748 
 
“The capacity of the prosecution evidence (if accepted) to sustain a conviction beyond 
reasonable doubt by a reasonable trier of fact is the key concept; thus the test is not whether 
the trier would in fact arrive at a conviction beyond reasonable doubt on the prosecution 
evidence (if accepted) but whether it could. At the close of the case for the prosecution, the 
Chamber may find that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond 
reasonable doubt and yet, even if no defence evidence is subsequently adduced, proceed 
to acquit at the end of the trial, if in its own view of the evidence, the prosecution has not in 
fact proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.” 
 
The judge concluded that she was not convinced that the Trial Chamber complied 
with their duty to consider the relevance, probative value and potential prejudice to the 
accused of each item of evidence. She argued that this was required to reach a 
conclusion of beyond reasonable doubt.749 
The judge’s standard for a no case to answer motion is therefore different to the 
standard adopted by Ruto. The judge relies on the Jelic standard which is: 
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“the test is not whether the trier would in fact arrive at a conviction beyond reasonable 
doubt on the prosecution evidence (if accepted) but whether it could”  
 
as opposed to the Ruto standard: 
 
“The lower evidentiary standard, limited evidentiary scope and distinct evidentiary rules 
applicable at the confirmation of charges stage do not preclude a subsequent consideration 
of the evidence actually presented at trial by the Prosecution in light of the requirements 
for conviction of an accused. Furthermore, the nature and content of the evidence may 
change between the confirmation hearing and completion of the Prosecution's presentation 
of evidence at trial. In addition, the Prosecution need not introduce the same evidence at 
trial as it did for confirmation.”750 
 
The Ruto standard specifically refers to ‘the evidence actually presented at trial’ 
which is the beyond reasonable doubt standard, whereas the judge argues that it is 
not based on the standard beyond reasonable doubt and that the Trial Chamber erred 
in its application of the relevant standard. What is more concerning about the 
dissenting opinion is the judge’s constant reference to the fair trial rights of the 
accused, although she clearly refers to the fair trial rights as applying to both the 
accused and the prosecutor which is difficult to understand given that an acquittal 
based on insufficient evidence which became apparent at the confirmation of charges 
phase of proceedings is in favour of the accused’s rights.  
The more worrying aspect of this judgment is the fact that on the one hand the judge 
argues that the chamber erred specifically in relation to the length of time it took 
between the no case to answer motions and its final judgment, when the prosecutor’s 
case was flawed in 2014 already at the pre-trial stage of proceedings. At the time of 
completion of this dissertation, the ICC had not issued its final written decision. 
 
5 12  Reflection on the impact of the case on the rights of victims and the 
international community 
Similarly, to the Bemba acquittal, the acquittal and subsequent release of Mr 
Gbagbo has attracted much media attention, particularly in respect of the 
                                                          





disappointment of victims who had been promised justice and received none due to 
the acquittals of the leaders who had been accused of gross human rights violations. 
In November 2010, following a contentious presidential election, Alassane 
Ouattara, a former senior International Monetary Fund official, became the president 
of Côte d I’Voire. A few weeks later, the Ivoirian Constitutional Council overturned the 
Commission’s verdict and named Ouattara’s opponent, former President Laurent 
Gbagbo, the victor. Soon thereafter, violence erupted between Ouattara’s and 
Gbagbo’s supporters, leaving more than three thousand people dead and a million 
displaced. In Abidjan, Gbagbo’s forces abducted political opponents from their homes, 
torturing and killing them. Others were burned alive, beaten to death with bricks, or 
simply executed.751  
By late December 2010, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
had found “growing evidence of massive violations of human rights” in Côte d’Ivoire.752  
It is important to note, that in 2020 the Ivory Coast is once again facing elections 
and the acquittal makes one contemplate whether or not the same levels of violence 
will not be reignited.  
In respect of the failings of the case at the ICC, the prosecutor has also received 
much criticism for the paucity of evidence in relation to prosecuting high-profile 
accused persons. In this regard, Batros argues, in each of the high-profile cases that 
have been dismissed, the prosecution had started at the top with a case that targeted 
the highest political or military leader. Such cases are challenging, both in terms of the 
“linkage” to establish the individual criminal responsibility of senior leaders for specific 
crimes, and the political opposition that the cases generate. Focusing all of the 
investigative and prosecutorial resources on a single high-profile case is a high-risk 
strategy, as the fallout from the recent cases illustrates. Trying to distil the complexity 
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of mass atrocity situations into a single case can also give the impression, likely 
unwarranted, of a superficial investigation or understanding.753 
The argument is that the prosecutor should develop an effective prosecutorial 
strategy aimed at securing convictions, taking into account the needs and interests of 
victims, this may not entail necessarily prosecuting those high in power but it may be 
more satisfactory for victims to see at least mid-level leaders being prosecuted for 
victims to receive some form of justice. 
Clearly, the impact of this acquittal would have left victims feeling particular 
disappointment, especially in light of a study conducted in 2015 of victim’s experiences 
and expectations of the ICC. 
The FIDH made the following statement following the acquittal announcement:  
 
“In October and November 2018, hearings were held by the Chamber for the parties to 
present their arguments. Victims, through their legal representatives, expressed concern 
over the conduct of proceedings, and regretted their inability to put forward their views in 
relation to the assessment of evidence and any eventual withdrawal of any charge given 
its impact on their personal interests. Without convictions, victims participating in the case 
will no longer expect reparations, and the assistance programme announced by the Trust 
Fund for Victims (TFV) for Côte d’Ivoire is not yet in place.”754  
 
As seen above, the victims have a deep desire for justice to be done and also to 
ensure that the accused pays the price for the crimes committed against them. 
 
5 13  Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that in both the Bemba as well as in Gbagbo and Ble 
Goude decisions, that the Pre-Trial Chamber must play a more effective and efficient 
role in ensuring that only the cases for which the prosecutor has reliable evidence 
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proceeds to trial, if it fails to do so the confirmation of charges phase in the ICC 
proceedings becomes null and void and should then be removed.  
The chapter demonstrated that the fair trial rights of specificity of charges at the pre-
trial stage as well as through the implementation of Regulation 55 has been infringed. 
In addition, the principle of legal certainty and the detrimental impact of the length of 
proceedings on the accused had been violated. The accused’s right to be presumed 
innocent and for the prosecutor to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, was also 
found to be wanting.  
The next chapter focuses on the fair trial rights of Mr Ntaganda which was the first 
trial at the ICC to secure a conviction on the basis of war crimes of rape and sexual 
slavery. The chapter discusses the relationship between international humanitarian 
law and international criminal law, the principle of legal certainty and the manner in 
which the court applied these principles to Mr Ntaganda’s case. The chapter further 
demonstrates the lack of consistency in the court’s interpretation and reasoning in 







CHAPTER 6: THE TERMINATOR (BOSCO NTAGANDA) 
6 1  Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the fair trial rights and the acquittals of Mr Bemba, 
Ghabgo and Blé Goudé and the impact that their acquittals had on the rights of victims. 
In particular, the chapter raised some important aspects in relation to the fair trial rights 
of the accused in terms of their right to know the charges against them, the importance 
of the confirmation of charges hearing and the paucity of evidence which the 
prosecutor had to ensure a conviction. The chapter also reviewed command 
responsibility, personal culpability and fair labelling of the accused persons. 
This chapter will focus on the Appeal Judgement of 15 June 2017 regarding Counts 
6 and 9: Rape and Sexual Slavery of Child Soldiers as War Crimes (Article 8(2)(e)(vi) 
of the Statute). The chapter will explore the relevant court decisions pertaining to these 
charges in relation to the interplay between international criminal law and international 
humanitarian law (“IHL”) and the fair trial concerns. Of importance in this chapter is 
the court’s decision on the participation of victims and their legal representatives, the 
principle of legal certainty and the court’s different view in Mr Ntaganda’s case as 
opposed to Mr Bemba and Gbagbo on “no case to answer” motions as well as the 
impact of the Article 70 proceedings on Mr Ntaganda’s fair trial rights. At the time of 
writing this chapter, the closing arguments in the trial had been concluded but the court 
had not issued its final decision. 
 
6 2  Introduction and background to the Ntaganda case 
Mr Ntaganda is alleged to be the former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the 
Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (“FPLC”), the armed wing of the UPC. 
Known as “the Terminator” or “Warrior” among his troops for his tendency to lead from 
the front and directly participate in military operations. Mr Ntaganda faces charges of 
multiple war crimes and crimes against humanity, including sexual violence against 
civilians, acts of rape, and sexual slavery against child soldiers. 
The DRC ratified the Rome Statute, the founding instrument of the ICC, on 11 April 
2002.755 On 3 March 2004, the Government of the DRC referred to the Court the 
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situation (the events falling under the Court's jurisdiction) in its territory since the entry 
into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002. After a preliminary analysis, the 
Prosecutor initiated an investigation on 21 June 2004. On 22 March 2013, Bosco 
Ntaganda surrendered himself voluntarily and is now in the ICC’s custody. His initial 
appearance hearing took place before Pre-Trial Chamber II on 26 March 2013.756 The 
crimes were allegedly committed during 2002 and 2003 while Ntaganda was the 
deputy chief of staff of the FPLC. At the time, the FPLC, which was the armed wing of 
the UPC headed by Thomas Lubanga, was among various militia involved in an ethnic 
conflict in Ituri district of the DRC. 2123 victims have been granted the right to 
participate in the Ntaganda trial.757 
 
6 3  Rape and sexual slavery as war crimes 
The discussion hereunder reviews the decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Trial 
Chamber and finally the Appeals Chamber decision on the matter of whether Mr 
Ntaganda could be charged for Rape and Sexual Slavery as a war crime. These 
decisions are important particularly in respect to Mr Ntaganda’s right to the principle 
of legality. 
 
6 3 1  Pre-Trial Chamber decision 
In the Pre-Trial Chamber, the cause of disagreement centred around counts 6 and 
9: Rape and Sexual Slavery of Child Soldiers as War Crimes (Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the 
Statute). The Prosecutor charged Mr Ntaganda with the rape and sexual slavery of 
“UPC/FPLC child soldiers under the age of 15.758 Mr Ntaganda argued that the crimes 
of rape and sexual slavery against these persons are not foreseen by the Statute, as 
IHL does not protect persons taking part in hostilities from crimes committed by other 
persons taking part in hostilities on the same side of the armed conflict.759  
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In making its decision as to whether the Chamber may exercise jurisdiction over 
alleged acts of rape and/or sexual slavery committed by members of the UPC/FPLC 
against UPC/FPLC child soldiers under the age of 15 years, the Chamber noted the 
following: 
 
“The Chamber takes note of common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
relevant part of which sets forth that “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities […] 
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely”. “The Chamber also noted the relevant 
parts of article 4(1) and (2) of APII, which stipulate that “[a]ll persons who do not take a 
direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities […] shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely” and that the following acts against these persons “are and shall remain 
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever: […] (e) outrages upon personal dignity, 
in particular […] rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”. In 
determining whether UPC/FPLC child soldiers under the age of 15 years are entitled to 
protection against acts of rape and sexual slavery by other members of the UPC/FPLC, the 
Chamber must assess whether these persons were taking direct/active part in hostilities at 
the time they were victims of acts of rape and/or sexual slavery.”760 
 
The Chamber was of the view that the direct/active participation in hostilities of 
children under the age of 15 years must be assessed in the light of the prohibition.761 
The chamber stated that the mere membership of children under the age of 15 years 
in an armed group cannot be considered as determinative proof of direct/active 
participation in hostilities, considering that their presence in the armed group is 
specifically proscribed under international law in the first place.762 The Chamber said 
that “to hold that children under the age of 15 years lose the protection afforded to 
them by IHL merely by joining an armed group, whether as a result of coercion or other 
circumstances, would contradict the very rationale underlying the protection afforded 
to such children against recruitment and use in hostilities.”763 This is an important point 
because the crimes against Mr Ntaganda were of such a serious nature and 
concerned the use of children as child soldiers, bearing in mind that many international 
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agreements (as discussed in chapter 1 and 2) also afford protection to children as 
victims of crime. 
The chamber concluded that,  
 
“children under the age of 15 years lose the protection afforded by IHL only during their 
direct/active participation in hostilities.764 That said, the Chamber clarified that those subject 
to rape and/or sexual enslavement cannot be considered to have taken active part in 
hostilities during the specific time when they were subject to acts of a sexual nature, 
including rape, as defined in the relevant Elements of Crimes. The sexual character of these 
crimes, which involve elements of force/coercion or the exercise of rights of ownership, 
logically preclude active participation in hostilities at the same time.”765  
 
On this basis, the Chamber found that child soldiers under the age of 15 years 
continue to enjoy the protection of IHL and that the Chamber has jurisdiction over 
these counts.766 The Chamber based its findings on the following evidence:  
 
“Witness P-0758, aged 13 at the time, was abducted by UPC/FPLC soldiers in or around 
July-August 2002 and raped in several UPC/FPLC camps, including Lingo camp, where 
she underwent training. The rapes continued throughout her training which lasted around 
3 months. Two other girls, one aged 9 and another under 13 were raped in Lingo camp 
during the training period of witness P-0758. They were unable to escape from the camp 
as there were soldiers around and “they shot at people who tried to flee”. Also, women in 
the UPC/FPLC camps, and this included children under the age of 15 years, were likened 
to a “guduria”, a large cooking pot, to express the fact that any soldiers could sleep with 
them at any time.”767 
  
The chamber relied on the above evidence to support its finding that child soldiers 
under the age of 15 remain protected by IHL. 
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6 3 2  Trial Chamber decision 
6 3 2 1 The principle of legality 
Mr Ntaganda challenged this decision until it reached the Trial Chamber on 4 
January 2017.768 The Defence argued “that Counts 6 and 9 do not fall within the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the Court because: 
 
i) Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute is subject to the established requirements of 
international law; 
ii) according to Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949769 
(‘Common Article 3’) war crimes may not be committed by members of an 
armed force against fellow members of the same armed force; 
iii) the Prosecution has defined the victims of Counts 6 and 9 as being ‘members’ 
of the same armed force as the perpetrators  
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time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:  
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture; b) taking of hostages; 
c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; 
d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
 2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, 
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties 
to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 






iv) the notion of ‘membership’ of an armed force is not compatible with ‘taking no 
active part in hostilities’; and  
v) international humanitarian law does not recognise any exception for child 
soldiers.”770 
 
Notably, the tension here specifically relates to the nature of the crimes for which 
he had been charged which concerned crimes of a sexual nature against children. The 
protection of children is important in all instances and the rights of children are widely 
protected by many international human rights instruments but at the same time, the 
Rome Statute also prescribes protection for the rights of the accused, particularly in 
respect of the principle of legal certainty. 
The Chamber decided to conduct its analysis on the basis of both international and 
non- international conflicts.771 In this instance, the distinction between the two types of 
conflicts becomes relevant. An international armed conflict is a conflict waged between 
two or more states and IHL and the law of war is applicable to this type of conflict.772 
Non-international armed conflict involves conflicts between government forces and 
other armed groups or between armed groups that take place within the territory of 
one single state.773 IHL has been extended to non-international armed conflicts by 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and by APII.774 The Rome Statute 
prescribes certain conditions for a conflict to be of a non-international nature in Article 
8(2)(f): 
 
“(f) Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus 
does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated 
and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts 
that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.” 
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Hence the requirements for a non-international armed conflict are that the armed 
conflict has to be “protracted” and there has to be a form of organisation.775 It is only 
when these two elements have been fulfilled, that a non-armed conflict affects the 
international community. Werle explains the application of IHL on non-international 
armed conflict only comes into play if an intrastate conflict is comparable to an inter-
state conflict due to the organisation of the parties and the increased power to control 
the belligerents connected with it. He argues that intrastate conflicts do not endanger 
world peace.776 The Chamber in its decision making failed to make this important 
distinction and instead treated the conflict as encompassing both international and 
non-international and this distinction would have significantly impacted its decision in 
terms of the applicability of IHL on the conflict and crimes. 
The Chamber noted that the defence argued that the criminalisation of acts 
committed against members of one’s own forces does not form part of customary law 
and that Counts 6 and 9 violate the principle of legality.777  
The Chamber responded as follows:  
 
“The Chamber observes that the Statute is first and foremost a multilateral treaty which 
acts as an international criminal code for the parties to it. The crimes included in Articles 6 
to 8 of the Statute are an expression of the States Parties’ desire to criminalise the 
behaviour concerned. As such, the conduct criminalised as a war crime generally will, but 
need not necessarily, have been subject to prior criminalisation pursuant to a treaty or 
customary rule of international law.”778 
 
In its analysis of IHL, the Chamber referred to the fact that: 
 
“Rape and other forms of sexual violence have long been prohibited by international 
humanitarian law, namely; the 1863 Lieber Code which states that ‘all rape’ against persons 
in the invaded country is prohibited, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional 
Protocols expressly prohibit rape in certain provisions, as well as behaviour that would 
include sexual violence. The fundamental guarantees contained in Article 75 of Additional 
Protocol I (“API”), for any person in the power of a Party to the conflict, include the 
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prohibition of ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault’. In addition, various 
chambers of the ICTY have held that rape or other forms of sexual assault are prohibited 
under customary international law at all times, and in times of armed conflict constitute 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, thus qualifying as war crimes.”779  
 
The Chamber went further in respect of slavery, stating 
 
“that it is prohibited in all forms under APII, which therefore includes sexual slavery. Sexual 
slavery can also be considered to fall within the general prohibitions on indecent assault 
and attacks against honour as applicable to rape, as well as enforced prostitution. The 
prohibitions on rape and (sexual) slavery also form part of customary international 
humanitarian law, applicable both in times of international and non-international armed 
conflicts.”780  
 
The Chamber referred to the ICRC, in its updated Commentary to the First Geneva 
Convention of 1949 which addresses the question of ‘whether armed forces of a Party 
to the conflict benefit from the application of common Article 3 by their own Party’. 
“When considering the ‘example’ of ‘members of armed forces who are sexually or 
otherwise abused by their own Party’”, the ICRC explains that:  
 
“[t]he fact that […] the abuse [is] committed by their own Party should not be a ground to 
deny such persons the protection of common Article 3. This is supported by the 
fundamental character of common Article 3 which has been recognized as a ‘minimum 
yardstick’ in all armed conflicts and as a reflection of ‘elementary considerations of 
humanity’.”781 
 
In summary, the Trial Chamber based its analysis on the prohibitions against rape 
and sexual violence in IHL and referred to Article 75 of Additional Protocol I. The 
Chamber also referred to an ICTY decision, the Martens Clause782 and the ICRC 
updated Commentary to the First Geneva Convention of 1949 to substantiate that 
counts 6 and 9 constitute war crimes and does fall within the jurisdiction of the court.783  
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6 3 3  Appeals Chamber judgment on the charges – the principle of legality 
Mr Ntaganda submitted that any argument by the Prosecutor that the factual 
allegations under Counts 6 and 9 do not preclude a finding that the victims at the 
relevant time were not actively participating in hostilities should be rejected. He argued 
that, under Counts 6 and 9 it is alleged that the victims were members of the 
UPC/FPLC, and that membership in an armed group is incompatible with the notion 
of not taking active part in the hostilities. In his submission he stated that a member of 
an armed force or group attains that status only when ceasing to be a member of that 
force or group, laying down arms, or being placed hors de combat.784  
In its analysis, the Appeals Chamber found “when the provisions on war crimes 
were negotiated, there was a desire to “define the specific content or constituent 
elements of the violations in question.”785 The court found that at the time, States were 
concerned with providing certainty as to the specific conduct that would give rise to 
criminal liability and in upholding the principle of legality.786  
The Appeals Chamber stated that:  
 
“even if no Status Requirements were to apply to the crimes pursuant to Article 8(2)(b) (xxii) 
and (e) (vi) of the Statute, there would in all probability be much overlap with the war crimes 
listed under article 8(2)(a) or (c). This is because in practice it is likely that in many cases 
the victims of rape or sexual slavery would actually be “protected persons” or “persons not 
actively participating in hostilities”, thereby potentially fulfilling the elements of article 8 (2) 
(a) or (c) of the Statute, in addition to those of article 8 (2) (b) (xxii) and (e) (vi).”787  
 
The important portion of the decision is as follows:  
 
“If customary or conventional international law stipulates in respect of a given war crime set 
out in Article 8 (2) (b) or (e) of the Statute an additional element of that crime: “the Court 
cannot be precluded from applying it to ensure consistency of the provision with 
international humanitarian law, irrespective of whether this requires ascribing to a term in 
the provision a particular interpretation or reading an additional element into it. In the view 
of the Appeals Chamber, this does not violate the principle of legality recognised in article 
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22 of the Statute, which protects accused persons against a broad interpretation of the 
elements of the crimes or their extension by analogy; therefore, it does not impede the 
identification of additional elements that need to be established before an accused person 
can be convicted.”788  
  
This aspect of the judgment is crucial in determining whether or not the appeals 
chamber complied with the principle of legality. The Appeals Chamber summarised its 
reasoning as follows:  
 
“Notwithstanding the fact that the provisions of Geneva Conventions I and II extend 
protection irrespective of affiliation, the Appeals Chamber is not aware of any case in which 
the grave breaches regime has been applied to situations in which victims belonged to the 
same armed force as the perpetrators. However, the Appeals Chamber is unconvinced that 
this, in and of itself, reflects the fact that Status Requirements exist as a general rule of 
international humanitarian law. In this regard, and as noted by the Prosecutor, Common 
Article 3 provides for unqualified protection against inhumane treatment irrespective of a 
person’s affiliation, requiring only that the persons were taking no active part in hostilities 
at the material time.”789 
 
 In this decision, the Appeals Chamber found that it will ascribe additional elements 
into crimes if it must and that the decision of the court to do so, does not violate the 
principle of legality. The Appeals Chamber comes to this conclusion without analysing 
such interpretation against the principle of legality. The Appeals Chamber places 
emphasis on the nexus between the conduct and the context as a defining 
characteristic of what serves to define a war crime but concludes that the provisions 
of the Statute do not include the status requirements and whether the children were 
active participants at the time. The nexus requirement which the court refers to is the 
fact that the perpetrator must be aware of the actual circumstances from which the 
existence of an armed conflict arises.  
Werle opines that the existence of an armed conflict is not only an objective 
condition for criminality and a requirement for jurisdiction of the ICC but it must also 
be reflected in the perpetrator’s mind.790 He explains further that in the event that the 
conduct only amounts to a war crime when committed in the context of an international 
                                                          
788 Para 54 [own emphasis]. 
789 Para 60. 





armed conflict, the principle of individual guilt requires that the perpetrator be aware 
of the circumstances establishing the international character of the conflict.791 
Therefore, the nexus requirements or mental elements of the crime must be 
established to provide for the jurisdiction of the court over the crimes of rape and 
sexual slavery as set out in Article 30792 of the Statute. 
 
6 4  International law 
6 4 1  The distinction between human rights law, international human rights law and 
international criminal law 
In respect to these decisions, it is important to discuss the distinction between 
human rights law, international human rights law and international criminal law and its 
application in the present case.  
Sivakumaran asserts that just as there are significant differences between 
international and internal armed conflicts, so are there important differences between 
IHL and international criminal law, and between IHL and international human rights 
law. He cites the differences as follows: 
  
“International Humanitarian Law works on the premise of equality of belligerents; 
international human rights law traditionally has been constructed around the relationship 
between the state and the individual. International criminal law is based on individual 
criminal responsibility; international humanitarian law seeks to strike a balance between 
military necessity and humanity. The bodies are closely related, suggesting that each can 
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usefully draw upon the other; however, the differences suggest that ideas from one body 
cannot be imported into another ipso facto without more.”793  
 
This distinction illustrates how the Chambers arrived at their decisions, how they 
analysed the law and what weight was attached to IHL in respect of determining that 
rape and sexual slavery were in fact war crimes. Most importantly, he avers that the 
ideas from one body of law cannot be imported into another body of law. Sivakumaran 
goes further to state that:  
 
“given that international criminal law relates to ‘the most serious crimes of international 
concern and that war crimes give rise to individual criminal responsibility, the war crime is 
sometimes drawn up or interpreted in a narrower fashion than its international humanitarian 
law equivalent.”794 
 
Illustrating how the international criminal law standard is not always coterminous 
with the IHL standard by considering the issue of child soldiers,795 he argues that 
Article 4(3)(c) of APII provides that “children who have not attained the age of fifteen 
years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part 
in hostilities”.796  This, the author argues, stands in contrast to the equivalent war crime 
as well as the equivalent provisions in the law of international armed conflict and 
international human rights law, all of which are narrower.797 
Sivakumaran goes further to explain that Article 8(2)(vii) of the Rome Statute refers 
to ‘[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces 
or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.” On the other hand, Article 
77(2) of APII prohibits children from taking any part in hostilities, which means that 
only an aspect of that prohibition has been criminalised, namely the active participation 
of children in hostilities.798 
He, however, cautions that:  
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“future case law of the International Criminal Court should not be taken as a reflection of 
the IHL standard. Indeed, it may be that the provision is not even reflective of customary 
international criminal law on point; rather it goes to the delimitation of the crime for the 
purposes of the International Criminal Court alone”.799  
 
It is evident from this analysis, that a distinction must be drawn between ICL, IHL 
and HRL and that the Chambers cannot merely apply the principles interchangeably, 
instead, the judges should exercise caution in their interpretation of what constitutes 
a war crime. 
In analysing this important paragraph of the Appeals Chamber, it is important to 
investigate the Geneva Conventions’ application in the Ntaganda case, the protection 
afforded to civilians who are hors de combat, other case law pertaining to how courts 
interpret crimes as well as the principle of legality which serves to protect the fair trial 
rights of the accused. 
 
6 4 2  The Geneva Convention and hors de combat 
The Geneva Conventions (but not the Additional Protocols to them) have been 
universally ratified and are binding on all states and is generally regarded as rules of 
customary international law. These treaties deal mainly with the humanitarian 
treatment of the victims of warfare, in particular, those persons who do not, or who no 
longer, take part in armed conflict.800  
For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to distinguish between the two 
types of armed conflict as the rules applicable to non-international armed conflicts are 
more limited than those applicable to international armed conflicts. The rules 
applicable to non-international conflicts were first contained in Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions; the only provision in these treaties dealing with non-
international conflict. APII deals exclusively with non-international armed conflicts.801 
While human rights law protects all people within the jurisdiction of a state, IHL 
categorises persons and affords different protections to different groups of protected 
persons. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 only apply to protected persons within the 
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meaning of each of those conventions. Therefore, it must be established that a 
particular individual is under the protection of the particular Convention.802 
Under Article 5 of the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. War crimes are violations 
of the laws and customs of war. They can be committed in both international and non-
international armed conflicts, though there are differences regarding the war crimes 
that may be committed in the two types of conflicts. Accordingly, Article 8(2) which 
sets out the list of war crimes is divided into:  
 
a. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions [Arts 50, 51, 130, 147, GCs I, II, III 
and IV]. Since the Geneva Conventions apply only to international armed 
conflicts, liability for these crimes ensues only when the armed conflict is 
international.  
b. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international 
armed conflicts. These crimes are provided for in customary international law, 
but many are also grave breaches of Additional Protocol I [Art. 85(3) and (4)].  
c. Serious violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which deals 
with non-international armed conflicts.  
d. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in non-international 
armed conflicts. 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber investigated the aspect of direct/active participation in 
hostilities at length as can be seen from the quoted sections above whereas the Trial 
Chamber and Appeals Chamber did not place much emphasis on that aspect. 
Common Article 3 states that in non-international armed conflicts, fighters who have 
laid down their arms and those placed “hors de combat” are to be treated humanely in 
all circumstances without distinction. Amongst other acts, violence to life and person, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, and murder are specifically prohibited.  
While Common Article 3 offers no definition of the term hors de combat, its definition 
is provided for in Article 41 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 
(Additional Protocol 1) which lays out that a person is hors de combat if:  
 






a.  They are in the power of an adverse Party;  
b.  They clearly express an intention to surrender; or  
c.  They have been rendered unconscious or are otherwise incapacitated by wounds or 
sickness, and therefore are incapable of defending themselves; provided in any of 
these cases they abstain from any hostile act and do not attempt to escape.803 
 
In Ntaganda, the Chambers did not consider whether the children were hors de 
combat and yet applied the relevant Geneva Convention.  
Kevin Heller804 opines that “one of the most basic assumptions of ICL is that an act 
cannot be a war crime unless it violates a rule of international humanitarian law (IHL).” 
He argues that if the Appeals Chamber had limited the scope of its judgment to rape 
and sexual slavery committed against child soldiers who were hors de combat as 
defined by the ICRC, as “anyone who is defenceless because of unconsciousness, 
shipwreck, wounds or sickness”, the Appeals Chamber would have been on firm 
ground. 
Heller argues that instead, the Appeals Chamber made it clear that member-
against-member rape and sexual slavery are war crimes even if the victim is an active 
combatant – that is, one who is not hors de combat. 
In respect of paragraph 65805 of the Appeals Chamber judgment, Heller asserts that 
this is incorrect as there is a specific rule excluding active combatants from the war 
crimes of rape and sexual slavery in member-against-member situations: namely, the 
rule that says violence in member-against-member situations violates IHL only when 
                                                          
803 KJ Heller “Persons Hors de combat in Non-International Armed Conflicts” (2017) 
Humanitarian Response  
<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/docume
nts/files/ohchr_syria_-_hors_de_combat_-_legal_note_en.pdf P2> (accessed 18-01-2019). 
804 KJ Heller “ICC Appeals Chamber holds a war crime does not have to violate IHL” (15-06-
2017) Opinio Juris <http://opiniojuris.org/2017/06/15/icc-appeals-chamber-holds-a-war-crime-
does-not-have-to-violate-ihl/> (accessed 01-11-2018). 
805 “If customary or conventional international law stipulates, in respect of a given war crime, 
an additional element of that crime, the Court cannot be precluded from applying it to ensure 
consistency of the provision with international humanitarian law, irrespective of whether this 
requires ascribing to a term in the provision a particular interpretation or reading an additional 
element into it. This does not violate the principle of legality recognised in article 22 of the 
Statute, which protects accused persons against a broad interpretation of the elements of the 
crimes or their extension by analogy; therefore, it does not impede the identification of 





the victim is hors de combat. He argues that not all violations of IHL are war crimes, 
but all war crimes are violations of IHL. In this regard, therefore, he argues that the 
burden of proof was not on Ntaganda to show that rape and sexual slavery cannot be 
war crimes in member-against-member situations if the victim is an active combatant. 
The burden was on the prosecution to prove that such acts actually violate IHL.”806 
The author makes the following statement regarding the Appeals Chamber’s 
judgment: 
 
“In the end, the AC’s decision in Ntaganda is little more than the latest iteration of the 
Court’s willingness to rely on teleological reasoning when the Rome Statute does not 
protect victims as much as the judges think it should. No one is in favour of raping and 
sexually enslaving child soldiers. But the solution isn’t to detach the law of war crimes from 
its moorings in IHL by holding — if only implicitly — that an act can be a war crime even if 
it does not violate IHL. To do so is not only legally indefensible, it risks delegitimising both 
the Court and the law of war crimes itself.” 
 
Rodenhauser, writing on the Appeals Chamber’s findings, has a different view 
which is more in line with the Chamber’s reasoning. He offers a more supportive 
commentary on the Appeals Chamber judgment and opines that in respect of the 
concept of protection for persons that are hors de combat, that this was not developed 
with intra-party violence in mind and that members of the same party to the conflict 
are normally not considered a threat to each other, and intra-party violence does not 
provide a military advantage.807 The author explains further that the notion of hors de 
combat is also understood as including persons who are in the power of a party to the 
conflict, normally through detention by the adversary. He clarifies this by stating that: 
 
“at least during acts of rape or sexual slavery, which by definition include an element of 
coercion or deprivation of liberty, a child is in the power of the perpetrator and confined 
against his or her will. These considerations show that victims of intra-party rape or sexual 
slavery, in particular children under the age of 15, can be considered hors de combat for 
the purposes of common Article 3 as well as Article 8(2)(e)(vi) ICC Statute. As a result, 
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even in cases where children may no longer be considered civilians under IHL, intra-party 
sexual violence can still amount to war crimes under the ICC Statute.”808 
 
 Rodenhauser concludes by stating:  
 
“losing civilian status vis-a'-vis the adversary in the context of the conduct of hostilities 
should not mean that children also lose fundamental protections vis-a'-vis those who 
unlawfully use them. In addition, even if children are no longer considered civilians, they 
continue to benefit from IHL protection if they are rendered hors de combat.”809  
 
Upon closer examination, the Appeals Chamber confirmed that it was persuaded 
that IHL does not contain a general rule that categorically excludes members of an 
armed group from protection against crimes committed by members of the same 
armed group.810 
 
6 5  Case law: ICC and the Tribunals 
6 5 1  ICC case law 
In Lubanga, the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of what constitutes ‘using [children] 
to participate actively in hostilities’ in Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute centred 
around “those who participate actively in hostilities include a wide range of individuals, 
from those on the front line (who participate directly) through to the boys or girls who 
are involved in a myriad of roles that support the combatants. All these activities, which 
cover either direct or indirect participation, have an underlying common feature: the 
child concerned is, at the very least, a potential target.811 
The decisive factor, therefore, in deciding if an ‘‘indirect’’ role is to be treated as 
active participation in hostilities is whether the support provided by the child to the 
combatants exposed him or her to real danger as a potential target. Given the different 
types of roles that may be performed by children used by armed groups, the 
Chamber’s determination of whether a particular activity constitutes ‘‘active 
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participation’’ can only be made on a case-by-case basis.812 In Lubanga it is clear that 
the court considered the notion of active participation as a determinant in establishing 
whether children were protected or not. It remains unclear why the judges in Ntaganda 
did not look at the direction given in this case or others already tried at the ICC. 
In the Katanga Trial decision, the Trial Chamber embraced the same position as in 
Lubanga and confirmed that children are considered to be a “potential target” and 
should be protected and held that IHL does not recognise any exception for child 
soldiers.813 
The court could not be clearer in its analysis of the crimes and what constitutes a 
war crime and it is submitted that the judges in Ntaganda, should have drawn from the 
jurisprudence in these judgments in arriving at its decision in Ntaganda. 
In the Vasiljevic judgment at the ICTY, the Trial Chamber held that the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege: 
 
“does not prevent a court from interpreting and clarifying the elements of a particular crime. 
Nor does it preclude the progressive development of the law by the court. But under no 
circumstances may the court create new criminal offences after the act charged against an 
accused either by giving a definition to a crime which had none so far, thereby rendering it 
prosecutable and punishable, or by criminalising an act which had not until the present time 
been regarded as criminal.”814  
 
Considering this, it is arguable that if this principle had been applied strictly in the 
Ntaganda judgment, the court would have arrived at a different conclusion. Hence, the 
ICC did not effectively apply the principle of legality in the Ntaganda judgment. In fact, 
in arriving at its conclusion, the Appeals Chamber should have placed more emphasis 
on previous judgments of the tribunals as well as the ICC, which it failed to do.  
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6 6  Principle of legality 
In assessing the Ntaganda judgments related to whether rape and sexual slavery 
amounts to a war crime, it is evident that the principle of legality has largely been 
neglected and in this regard, Mcgonigle raises an important point:  
 
“where human rights norms and standards may be interpreted expansively in order to 
achieve their stated goals of broad protection, the principle of legality and the rights of an 
accused in a criminal process largely dictate that criminal law be strictly interpreted and in 
cases of ambiguity resolved in favour of an accused.”815  
 
This is consistent with the wording of Article 22(2) as stated above. Mcgonigle goes 
further and states that the ICC was never designed to operate as a human rights 
institution but rather as a criminal court.816 This is a crucial point, particularly in light of 
the tensions which exists within the court and as espoused in this dissertation. 
This distinction is important and begs the questions: to what extent has the ICC 
adopted an overtly human rights approach to the interpretation of its substantive and 
procedural provisions and does it do so in a clear and principled manner?817 She 
asserts that: 
  
“there has been a real fear by those working within international criminal law that 
international criminal institutions have been adopting “contradictory assumptions and 
methods of reasoning” from criminal law and international human rights law. This 
amalgamation has manifested in internal contradictions and potentially unfair practices.”818  
 
 Mcgonigle cites and supports liberal criminal justice systems which rely on and 
employ restraining principles in order to achieve accuracy and fairness in the 
process.819 In turn, she quotes Robinson who emphasises three important liberal 
criminal justice restraining principles: the principle of personal culpability, the principle 
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of legality and the principle of fair labelling820 (which has been discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5).  
The principle of legality, or nullum crimen sine lege, holds that definitions of crimes 
should not be applied retroactively and be strictly applied, to provide fair notice to 
individuals and restrain any arbitrary abuse of power.821 Here, the importance of legal 
certainty should be emphasised and Mcgonigle states that it is closely related to the 
notion of predictability, the principle of legitimate expectation and the rule of law. The 
principle of legal certainty refers to the requirement that legal rules be sufficiently clear 
and precise, and that situations and legal relationships remain foreseeable.822  
This argument conforms to fair trial principles of the accused in which there should 
not be an element of surprise in regard to the crimes an accused may be prosecuted 
and convicted for. It also points to the role of judges in ensuring that their methods of 
interpretation relate to the key principles in international criminal law.  
Mcgonigle asserts that the ICC deals with the prosecution of individuals accused of 
serious violations of human rights (and IHL). Further, international human rights 
standards are listed as a secondary source of applicable law under the Statute and 
that due to the fact that the ICC was never designed to operate as a human rights 
institution but rather as a criminal court, obvious tensions ensue. She argues that to 
resolve these tensions, a more comprehensive and transparent approach by the 
judges is required.823  
The point is important as the present case displays the tensions between the rights 
of the accused to legal certainty but also the rights of victims who have been subjected 
to sexual violence and who are entitled to all the protections afforded to them in respect 
of international law. 
Davidson, opines that Article 22 contains three overlapping guarantees in an 
attempt to translate strict construction into a variety of legal languages; First, crime 
definitions shall be strictly construed; Secondly, crime definitions shall not be extended 









by analogy and thirdly, ambiguities shall be interpreted in favour of defendants or 
would-be defendants.824  
Davidson articulates a way forward for judges at the ICC as follows:  
 
“Thus, if judges are inquiring into the possibility of unfair surprise due to a new application 
or interpretation of an ambiguous or vague provision of the Rome Statute, and are looking 
to customary international law for guidance, judges should look for strong evidence of both 
state practice and opinio juris in support of a crime under customary international law or, at 
a minimum, of a clear international norm supporting a particular reading of a Rome Statute 
crime. This traditional approach to identifying customary international law may not be 
optimal from a “utopian,” ending-impunity vantage point, but it is more defensible from the 
vantage point of legality and strict construction.”825  
 
She concludes her argument by advancing the proposition that the ICC is likely to 
be in a better position, from a resource, knowledge, and, political perspective, to 
identify the emergence of new customary international law norms than most. To 
achieve this aim, the author argues that what is required is transparent reasoning and 
explicit customary international law and comparative criminal law analysis in 
judgments.826  
It is for this reason that in interpreting the crimes and applying Article 21, the ICC 
Appeals Chamber should have consistently worked through the entire Article 21 in its 
interpretation of the law together with Article 22, which it failed to do. In its failure to do 
so it did not take the fair trial rights of the accused into account. It is of significance 
that no dissenting or separate opinions were written by the judges which demonstrate 
that a unanimous decision was taken on an important legal principle. 
 
6 7  Victim participation 
In May 2013, the single judge adopted the following decisions regarding victim 
participation, with the particular aim of ensuring the simplification of the application 
procedures for victims as well as ensuring that victims understand the processes 
followed at the ICC: 
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The Single Judge was of the view that outreach action, in accordance with rule 
92(3) and (8) of the Rules, is the first step in the victims' application process to ensure 
that the application process runs smoothly. In this regard, the Registry and PIDS were 
tasked with performing this function.827 The judge elaborated on the outreach activities 
and said that it should  
 
“be aimed at providing potential victims, in a timely manner, with accurate, concise, 
accessible and complete information both on the Court's overall mandate and, more 
specifically, on the various roles which the victims are statutorily called to play in the 
proceedings.”828 
 
The judge emphasised the need for the education and outreach to include an 
explanation of the reparations proceedings and to ensure that victims are made aware 
that they are only entitled to claim reparations if the accused is found guilty.829  
In light of the need to improve the victims’ participation system, the Single Judge 
was of the view that the availability of a concise and simplified individual form might 
significantly assist victims willing to participate in the current case, as well as the VPRS 
in processing their applications and the Chamber in its assessment of the 
requirements set forth in rule 85 of the Rules. The judge emphasised that this form 
would enhance the overall efficiency and expeditiousness of the proceedings leading 
to the confirmation of charges hearing.830 
The Single Judge endorsed the approach of grouping victims' applications but 
decided that the VPRS will itself perform the grouping of victims who have filled in the 
Simplified Form.831 In respect of the model of common legal representation which was 
inaugurated in the case of the Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo, whereby the OPCV's 
lead counsel was appointed as common legal representative of all admitted victims 
and was assisted by a team member based in the field, “with wide knowledge of the 
context” and “to be paid by the Court's legal aid budget”. The judge took note of this 
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but was of the view that in the event that the involvement of the OPCV as common 
legal representative becomes an option, such a person in the field could have the role 
of an “assistant to counsel” as provided for in regulation 81(3) of the Regulations.832  
In Ntaganda, the issue of victim participation was clarified by a ruling of Trial 
Chamber VI in February 2015.833  
At the confirmation stage, the Pre-Trial Chamber II granted victim status to 1120 
applicants, permitting them to participate at the confirmation of charges hearing and 
in related proceedings.834 On 21 July 2014, the Chamber scheduled a status 
conference on this matter and invited the parties to make relevant submissions on the 
procedure to allow victims to participate in trial proceedings.835 The Trial Chamber set 
out a detailed admission system for victims to participate in trial proceedings. This 
admission system would be managed by the registry who would be responsible for 
assessing the applications of victims.836 This process set out by the chamber was 
meant to simplify the victim application process but it is submitted would require a lot 
of work on the part of the registry. 
The chamber recognised the rights of victims to participate as well as the fair trial 
rights of the accused in the following manner:  
 
“The Chamber recognises the importance of effective and meaningful victim participation 
in the proceedings. Achieving an efficient application process which provides applicants 
with a fair and timely determination of their status based on straightforward criteria is an 
important element in giving effect to such participation. However, such a process must not 
negatively impact the fairness or expeditiousness of the proceedings or the rights of the 
accused.”837  
 
The chamber provided clarity on what “direct participation” means as well as the 
differentiation between victims and witnesses as follows: 
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“As for what participating 'directly' means, this term covers any victims who may be 
subsequently allowed to appear solely to present their views and concerns to the Chamber. 
'Direct participation' is not referring to participating victims who testify before the court as 
witnesses called by the Prosecution ('dual status witnesses'). Witnesses do not ordinarily 
act as 'participants' in ICC proceedings - they are persons called upon by the participants 
(or the chamber) to give evidence. Because they do not become 'direct participants' simply 
by testifying, dual status witnesses will have had their applications assessed through the 
procedure applicable to all other victims.”838  
 
The chamber indicated that only persons who were victims of the crimes charged 
would be allowed to participate.839 The chamber also decided that LRVs have a right 
to access the case record including filings, transcripts and material, both public and 
confidential.840 
In the second decision on victim participation,841 in June 2015, a discussion ensued 
as to the matter of legal representation, with a dissenting opinion on this issue. The 
majority of the chamber was of the view that it had considered whether any reasons 
exist to modify the current legal representation system. The Majority considered 
whether counsel from the DRC should replace the current counsel in order to achieve 
closer proximity of the counsel to the victims.842 The Majority, with Ozaki J dissenting, 
considered that there are no compelling reasons to modify the current system of legal 
representation for the purpose of trial proceedings. In reaching the decision the 
Majority took into account that the current LRVs have been working on the case since 
December 2013 and are thus familiar with the voluminous record of the case, as well 
as the procedural history. In the Majority's view, besides the importance of continuity 
and the general requirement of possessing the necessary legal skills, proximity to the 
victims is a relevant consideration to be taken into account when deciding who should 
represent these victims. In this regard, it considers that proximity to the victims does 
not necessarily require physical proximity. Any counsel representing victims should 
have knowledge of the victims' culture, the context in which the alleged crimes took 
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place (that is, the armed conflict) and, in order to assess the impact of the alleged 
crimes on the individual victims, also the circumstances in which the victims live.843 
In the partly dissenting opinion of Ozaki J, he presented his argument in relation to 
proximity and independence as follows: 
The judge was of the view that many of the participating victims live in villages that 
are not easily accessible and do not have means of following the proceedings 
independently, thereby being reliant on regular, personal contact with the LRVs in 
order to be properly informed, give instructions to their counsel and participate in a 
meaningful way is important.844 The judge argued further that the requirement for 
proximity and confidence is additionally heightened in cases such as the present 
where the participating victims include former child soldiers and those reporting crimes 
of sexual violence.845 
The judge was of the view that, local counsel, counsel living and working in the 
affected region, whether nationals of the situation country or not, should, where 
appropriate, be afforded the opportunity to lead the representation of the victims. He 
argued that the perspective of these lawyers, including arising from their proximity to 
and understanding of the victim communities, as well as their diversity of experience, 
and knowledge of domestic laws and cultural context, has the potential to greatly 
enhance the proceedings.846 
The minority view is of particular importance in ensuring that domestic regions play 
an active role in ensuring the effective participation of victims and also protecting the 
fair trial rights of victims. It is important to note that a total of 2129 victims, represented 
by their legal representatives participated in the trial.  
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6 8  Other fair trial concerns of importance in the Ntaganda trial 
6 8 1  No case to answer 
In the Ntaganda case, the court came to very different conclusions compared to the 
decisions taken in Bemba and Gbagbo and Ble Goude regarding ‘no case to answer’ 
motions.  
The Trial Chamber found that the circumstances of Mr Ntaganda’s case in respect 
of the evidence led at the close of the prosecution’s case was very different to the Ruto 
case in which it was clearer to the court that there may indeed be no case to answer.847 
In this regard the court found the following:  
 
“The Chamber does not consider that the situation in the present case meets the conditions 
which would warrant the Chamber, at this stage of proceedings, granting leave to file a ‘no 
case to answer’ motion and assess whether the evidence presented, when taken at its 
highest, would require any partial acquittal.”848 
 
On appeal, the chamber found that the court has a discretion to consider ‘no case 
to answer’ motions.849  
The Appeals chamber set out the relevant provisions of the Statute which it 
considered relevant in reviewing ‘no case to answer’ motions as follows: 
 
“Nevertheless, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, a ‘no case to answer’ procedure is not 
inherently incompatible with the legal framework of the Court. A Trial Chamber may decide 
to conduct such a procedure based on its power to rule on relevant matters pursuant to 
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article 64 (6) (f)850 of the Statute and rule 134 (3)851 of the Rules. A decision on whether or 
not to conduct a ‘no case to answer’ procedure is thus discretionary in nature and must be 
exercised on a case-by-case basis in a manner that ensures that the trial proceedings are 
fair and expeditious pursuant to article 64 (2) and 64 (3) (a) of the Statute.”852 
 
The Appeals Chamber found that even though the Trial Chamber relied on the 
reasoning as set out in the Ruto case, due to the differences between the Ntaganda 
and Ruto cases, the court is not bound to entertain the same request by Mr Ntaganda 
and subsequently his no case to answer motion was turned down by the Appeals 
Chamber confirming the decision of the Trial Chamber.853  
The article and rule relied on by the court in respect of the applicable legislation in 
the Rome Statute appear to be very vague, however the court relied on the fair trial 
rights of the accused too. This situation still seems largely open to the discretion of the 
judges as there is no specific Article or Rule dealing specifically with “no case to 
answer” motions.  
The vagueness of this procedure in addressing ‘no case to answer’ motions in the 
absence of a specific legislative framework seems to the rights of the accused to legal 
certainty and the Statute, therefore, provides very little guidance to an accused in 
motions of this nature. 
 
6 8 2  The impact of Article 70 proceedings on the accused’s rights 
Problems arose in the Ntaganda case in relation to the acquisition of information by 
the prosecutor of privileged information due to the same prosecutor working on the 
Ntaganda main case as well as the Article 70854 case. 
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In this matter, the second stay of proceedings decision is important. In this 
decision,855the Defence requested that the Chamber ‘[order] the stay of the 
proceedings against Mr Ntaganda with prejudice to the Prosecutor’ since the 
prosecutor had obtained 4,684 conversations of Mr Ntaganda’s. The defence claimed 
that: 
  
“given the high relevance of those conversations to Defence strategy as well as to Mr 
Ntaganda’s personal knowledge of the case amounts to an abuse of the Court’s process, 
as a result of which Mr Ntaganda cannot receive a fair trial.”856 
 
The Trial Chamber set out the following procedure to be followed in these cases 
stating that “it is not necessary to find that the Prosecution acted in bad faith. It is 
sufficient to show that:  
 
“(i) the rights of the accused have been violated to such an extent that the essential pre-
conditions of a fair trial are missing; and  
(ii) there is no sufficient indication that this will be resolved during the trial process.”857  
 
The Trial Chamber referred to the Bemba decision as a precedent on this issue and 
found that it had a duty to ensure that the proceedings were fair and that the rights of 
the accused were respected.858 However the court observed that the ICC was different 
to the tribunals on this matter and that Article 70 does not prohibit proceedings from 
being initiated and conducted by the same Prosecution team as in the main 
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proceedings and that this view was confirmed in the Bemba decision and that it does 
not result.859 
In respect of the decision to stay proceedings, the court held: 
  
“The Chamber recalls that a permanent stay of proceedings is an exceptional remedy only 
to be granted as a last resort, when the essential pre-conditions of a fair trial are missing, 
and when there is no sufficient indication that the relevant issues will be resolved during 
the trial process, rendering it impossible to ‘piece together the constituent elements of a fair 
trial.”860 
 
The chamber found in the circumstances of the Ntaganda trial that it was still 
possible to conduct a fair trial. The court did, however, impose measures to protect 
the accused’s fair trial rights by prohibiting the prosecutor from using the material 
obtained in the Article 70 proceedings in the main trial of Mr Ntaganda.861 The chamber 
also found that it may consider taking additional measures upon receipt of a 
substantiated application setting out concrete instances of prejudice as a result of the 
Prosecution having unduly benefitted from its access to the Conversations and these 
measures may include allowing the defence to recall prosecution witnesses, and/or 
disregard certain evidence.862 
The relevance of this decision to the fair trial rights of the accused is crucial as the 
court should have a mechanism in place which either prevents the same prosecution 
team from prosecutions on Article 70 and the main case against an accused to ensure 
the integrity of the proceedings are not tainted or a “Chinese wall” should be 
established between the main case and the Article 70 proceedings as each case is 
independent of each other and not interrelated. In this regard, to prevent future 
problems arising in similar situations, it is recommended that the Court appoint 
separate prosecutors to try the Article 70 proceedings against an accused as the 
current situation does not support the protection of the fair trial rights of the accused 
in the main case. It must be borne in mind that the Article 70 proceedings are still 
under investigation, the charges have not yet been proven against the accused and 
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should therefore not be used against him in his main case. This situation is 
fundamentally unfair towards the accused and should not be allowed to continue.  
 
6 9  Reflection on the impact of the case on the rights of victims and the 
international community 
Subsequent to the conclusion of this dissertation, Mr Ntaganda was found guilty of 
all thirteen counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity, including 
enlisting and conscripting child soldiers, rape and sexual slavery. He was also 
sentenced to 30 year’s imprisonment. 
This represented the first case at the ICC to ensure the conviction of a leader for 
rape and sexual slavery. It, therefore, served as a great victory for the many victims 
who had been involved in the trial and who had suffered the trauma of rape and sexual 
slavery. 
To this end, Amnesty International responded as follows: 
 
“We can only hope that today’s verdict provides some consolation to those affected by the 
grotesque crimes perpetrated by Ntaganda and paves the way for his victims and their 
families to finally obtain a measure of justice and reparations.” 
“Every day of the seven years that Ntaganda freely roamed the streets of Goma after the 
International Criminal Court issued his arrest warrant increased the torment that the victims 
and their families had to endure – to the shame of DRC authorities and the international 
community.”863 
 
A statement from the United Nations office on Mr Ntaganda’s sentence reflected the 
following: 
 
“The sentence of 30 years of imprisonment is the longest ruled by the ICC since its 
establishment in 2002. Ntaganda’s crimes include, among others, murder and attempted 
murder, rape, sexual slavery, persecution, intentionally directing attacks against civilians, 
and the conscription and use of children under the age of 15 into an armed group and using 
them to participate actively in hostilities. 
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The sentence handed down today by the ICC sends a strong message to both perpetrators 
and victims that no one is above the law and that accountability for atrocity crimes must be 
pursue at all times,” the three UN Officials stated. They commended the survivors for their 
courage and expressed their deep support and solidarity with the victims and their families. 
“No sentence can compensate the suffering of the victims; yet, this verdict has the power 
to bring some peace and a sense of justice to victims and survivors of grave violations and 
human rights abuses in the DRC and around the world,” said the three UN Officials. They 
also stressed that there are other alleged perpetrators in ICC custody facing similar 
charges.”864 
 
The DRC has now seen three accused convicted and sentenced at the ICC, 
including Lubanga, Katanga and now Ntaganda. These judgments highlight the need 
for further action against impunity, especially in the context of ongoing violence in Ituri 
and elsewhere in the country. Justice efforts for victims should be focused not only on 
the ICC but also on ensuring that justice occurs at national and local levels.  
 
6 10  Conclusion  
It is clear from this chapter and from the manner of analysis in the judgments 
pertaining to the jurisdiction of the court over rape and sexual slavery that the court 
relied heavily on international law interpretation in determining the crime and did not 
adhere to the principle of legality in coming to its conclusion because if it had 
interpreted the law in the strictest sense according to customary international criminal 
law and had also relied on previous case law of the tribunals as well as the ICC itself, 
it may not have arrived at the same conclusion. 
The chapter, therefore, reviewed the application of IHL to war crimes and in relation 
to the principle of legality. The chapter further reviewed the court’s reasoning in 
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respect of ‘no case to answer’ motions and Article 70 proceedings. The chapter further 
explored the important decisions related to victim participation. 
The next chapter will comprehensively explain the importance of this dissertation 






CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7 1  Introduction 
This chapter constitutes the conclusion of the entire dissertation; the summary of 
lessons which may be derived from the chapters including recommendations on how 
to address these in the future. 
The research and analysis contained in this dissertation represent an important 
contribution to the advancement of fair trial rights of the accused. In addition, the 
research critically assessed the rights of the accused in relation to the dialectical 
tensions between the rights of the accused, the participation of victims and the 
demands of the international community within the context of selected cases at the 
ICC.  
The importance of this research is that it contributes to the discourse in the field of 
international criminal law as the ICC is a relatively new court, with developing 
jurisprudence. The research provides documented insight into key decisions 
undertaken by the court thus far, reflecting on both the rights of the accused as well 
as the participation of victims. The research further analyses the complexities inherent 
in the nature and function of the ICC, particularly in light of the diverging interests the 
court seeks to accommodate. 
Further, the dissertation reviewed these complex issues in light of the roles of the 
prosecutor and judges at the ICC. The lessons and recommendations will, therefore, 
serve to contribute to the discourse and literature on these important developments at 
the ICC, which is still in its fledgling stages of developing jurisprudence on international 
crimes, ending impunity and ensuring the participation of victims. In sum, this research 
is important because it openly confronts the underlying challenges confronting the ICC 
and it ventilates the tensions inherent in the functioning of the court, based on the case 
law. 
In developing the lessons and recommendations contained in this chapter, the 
dissertation covered the following:  
 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 reviewed the content of the relevant articles of the Rome 
Statute in relation to fairness and to set out a comprehensive theoretical framework in 
terms of which “fairness” (as identified in the Rome Statute and other relevant 





framework for the rights of victims and initiated a conversation on the international 
community, with a focus on African States, largely due to the fact that all of the cases 
which had been analysed arose from African States; including the DRC and the Ivory 
Coast. 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 sought to assess the extent to which fairness in trials has 
been applied by the ICC with particular reference to the Lubanga and Katanga, 
Bemba, Gbagbo and Ble Goude and Ntaganda cases.  
Finally, the concluding chapter seeks to suggest a balanced approach in answer to 
the dialectics presented by the competing demands in the theoretical and practical 
senses and as identified in the dissertation. 
Through the analysis of the case law, I have concluded that the ICC does not 
adequately protect the fair trial rights of the accused. During the course of the 
dissertation I have identified key themes to support this finding which will be discussed 
hereunder. This chapter also identifies the limitations encountered in the course of the 
research undertaken and makes suggestions for future research. 
 
7 2 Lessons on re-characterisation and its impact on the Accused’s right to 
know and understand the charges and the accused’s right to legal certainty 
In all the cases investigated in this dissertation, a critical issue arose in respect of the 
application of Regulation 55 which had a detrimental impact on the rights of the 
accused. In particular, the activation of this regulation resulted in the lengthy trials of 
the accused persons at the ICC. Regulation 55 grants the authority of the Chamber to 
modify the legal characterisation of facts. It is important to bear in mind that the 
regulations of the ICC are judge-made rules. Therefore, Regulation 1 which 
encompasses the “Adoption of these Regulations” states: 
 
“These Regulations have been adopted pursuant to article 52 and shall be read subject to 
the Statute and the Rules.”  
 
As a result of the framing of the Regulation, it gives us permission to read the 
Articles in the Statute together with the Regulations to ensure that fair trial processes 
have been followed. In Lubanga (Chapter 3), we found that Fulford J and the Appeals 





55. The Appeals Chamber also distinguished Regulation 55 from Article 61(9) which 
deals with the amendment of charges.  
 The invocation of Regulation 55 allows the legal characterisation to be changed at 
various stages of proceedings which consistently allows for a level of uncertainty on 
the part of the accused in respect of his Article 67 rights and also in respect of legal 
certainty which is a fundamental common law right. 
If we look at this in more detail, it is apparent that Regulation 55 refers to the 
“Chamber” which may invoke Regulation 55. Regulation 2 defines “chamber” as “a 
chamber of the court”. The Chambers consist of eighteen judges organised into the 
Pre-Trial Division, the Trial Division, and the Appeals Division. The judges of each 
Division are then divided into chambers which are responsible for conducting the 
proceedings of the Court on specific cases and situations at different stages of the 
judicial procedure. Therefore, if we were to apply the Regulation literally, the chamber 
does not include the prosecutor or victims who may invoke the regulation and yet to 
date this has been the case.  
It is, therefore, my conclusion that Regulation 55 both in the way that it is written 
and the way it has been applied, despite its reference to the fair trial rights of the 
accused does not provide any form of legal certainty to the accused. 
The issue of legal certainty remains a critical concern in terms of the rights of the 
accused. The right to legal certainty is the cornerstone to the rights of the accused to 
know the case against him or her.865 The principle of legal certainty is contained in 
Article 22866 of the Rome Statute. Legal certainty prevents the unintended charges 
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and convictions against an accused that was not foreseeable. It goes further to restrict 
any cases of ambiguity and states that crimes should be interpreted in favour of the 
accused. However, the very nature of Regulation 55 creates legal uncertainty for the 
accused throughout the trial.  
In my view, Regulation 55 is too broad. It allows for too many errors in the 
prosecution’s case to be amended; it allows victims to attempt to amend or re-
characterise charges and, given that it is a judge-made rule, it ultimately protects the 
decisions of the court and allows for the judges to decide to recharacterise or not. 
In my view, the Regulation gives too much room for judges to decide what outcome 
they wish for in a particular case. If they feel the accused should be treated harshly, 
invoke Regulation 55, if they feel the accused should be protected acquit the accused 
based on the irregular Regulation 55. This in and of itself is problematic and 
demonstrates the inconsistent application of the Regulation in the different cases 
reviewed within this dissertation. 
Further hereto, the investigation and formulation of charges by prosecutors should 
be clear and defined at the pre-trial stage already and the case should proceed on this 
basis. The use of Regulation 55 seems to be a fall-back mechanism by the ICC in 
case it gets it wrong. This is simply not good enough when its objective to end impunity 
needs to be balanced against ensuring that trials are conducted in a fair manner.    
Throughout the dissertation, I have leaned on the judgments and manner of 
decision making of the tribunals. In this instance, Rule 50867 of the ICTY Rules bears 
relevance for the discussion of Regulation 55. In the Katanga (Chapter 4) chapter of 
this dissertation, I referred specifically to this rule and to case law at the ICTY.  
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international law independently of this Statute. 
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charges and, where necessary, the date for trial may be postponed to ensure adequate 





In the Katanga chapter, I referred to a case at the ICTR, Karemera et al,868 in which 
the Appeals Chamber stated that “a postponement of the trial date and a prolongation 
of the pre-trial detention of the accused” are some but not all of the considerations 
relevant to determining whether a proposed amendment would violate the right of the 
accused to a trial “without undue delay”.  
In my opinion, the ICC can learn critical lessons from the tribunals in utilising 
Regulation 55. 
 
7 2 1  Recommendations 
In the first instance, it is my view that Regulation 55 should be removed from the 
regulations. There should never be a regulation that allows for continuous re-
characterisation of charges against any accused person because it infringes on the 
accused’s Article 64, 67 and Article 22 rights. If the regulations are to be read together 
with the Statute as per Regulation 1 then the regulation does not correspond with the 
many rights which the statute seeks to protect in terms of the fair trial rights of the 
accused. 
In the second instance, if Regulation 55 was not to be removed, the ICC should 
take key lessons from the tribunals and review Rule 50. In this instance, Regulation 
55 has to contain provisions which more specifically guarantees the fair trial rights of 
the accused by making provision for the following: 
 
 The re-characterisation timeframe is too broad, and it has to be framed in a more 
finite manner in order to ensure that the accused has legal certainty at the pre-
trial stage of proceedings. 
 Upon re-characterisation, a specific time period should be set out for the accused 
to be given sufficient time to prepare his defence. In the case of the tribunals it 
was 30 days, however this would largely be dependent on the extent of the re-
characterisation and the impact it may have on the defendant’s case. The time 
period should therefore be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
                                                          
868 Prosecutor v Karemera et al, No ICTR-98-44-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor’s interlocutory 
appeal against Trial Chamber II Decision of 8 October 2003 Denying leave to File an amended 





account the rights of the accused to have the time and facilities to prepare an 
adequate defence. 
 
To conclude on this matter, Regulation 55 has been applied inconsistently in most 
cases to seriously prejudice the accused’s rights to a fair trial, not only has it served 
to provide legal uncertainty, but it has also unnecessarily delayed proceedings.  
 
7 3 Lessons on disclosure of evidence and confidentiality 
This issue of disclosure of evidence, confidentiality and exculpatory evidence came 
out quite profoundly in the Lubanga case (Chapter 3). Disclosure of evidence is of 
paramount importance in ensuring the fair trial rights of the defence are upheld. The 
disclosure of evidence ensures that a defendant is in a good position to adequately 
prepare his or her defence which is a key aspect of a fair trial. Further, when the 
disclosure of evidence is delayed, the trial is also delayed which further infringes upon 
the defence’s right to be tried without undue delay. In the Lubanga case this was 
particularly concerning as is evidenced by the many stays in proceedings before the 
chamber in an attempt to address the failure of the prosecutor to disclose evidence 
which proved to be exculpatory and would have a direct bearing on the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant.  
There are various Articles and Rules in the Rome Statute that govern disclosure of 
evidence. The most concerning Article 54(3)(e) which was problematic in the Lubanga 
trial related to confidentiality agreements entered into by the Prosecutor: 
 
Article 54(3)(e) “Agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or 
information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the 
purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information consents”  
 
This Article is in direct conflict with Article 67(2) which states:  
 
“In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as 
soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or 
control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or 
to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution 






In the Lubanga judgment, the court ultimately made the correct decision by insisting 
that the prosecutor disclose the relevant evidence, however, in my opinion, Article 
54(3)(e) needs to be tightened. In addition, to avoid undue delays in trials, the 
prosecutor should receive punishment or sanctions for acting contrary to the fair trial 
rights of the defendant.  
My argument is as follows: I concur with the recommendation made by Ambos who 
recommended, in line with the interpretation of Article 54(3)(e), the Prosecutor should 
conclude confidentiality agreements only under three conditions: first, there is no other 
“normal” way to obtain the respective information; second, the information is absolutely 
necessary to continue the investigation; and third, the information is only requested to 
generate new evidence.869 
This suggestion and perhaps an insertion into the rules which requires the 
prosecutor to argue before the chamber why confidentiality agreements are required 
in a particular case may circumvent the difficulties which were experienced in Lubanga 
and also avoid undue delays for the defendant. 
 
7 3 1  Recommendations 
In this regard I concur with Ahronwitz and a few other authors870 who have 
advocated that there should be consequences for the misconduct of prosecutors. 
However, as can be seen from my argument regarding the judicial approaches in the 
Lubanga chapter, the tribunals, as well as the ICC in Lubanga, have been hesitant to 
impose penalties for prosecutors.  
In order to achieve the balance between impunity and respect for the fair trial rights 
of the defence it is necessary and indeed prudent for the judges to demonstrate 
through its jurisprudence, that the Prosecutor, who has been given wide discretion, 
can and will be punished for transgressions that result in the infringement of the fair 
trial rights of the accused and particularly in relation to undue delays in the cases 
before the ICC. 
                                                          
869 Ambos (2009) New Criminal Law Review 556. 
870 Turner (2012) International Law and Politics 175-257; Pitcher Judicial Responses to Pre-
Trial Procedural Violations in International Criminal Proceedings 413-435. Both authors argue 





In terms of the rules at the tribunals and the ICC which provides for sanctioning of 
the prosecutor, the Tribunal has Rule 68 bis.871 A similar rule which provides for 
misconduct at the ICC is contained in Article 71:872 Pitcher argues that the approach 
of the tribunals and the ICC to rely on whether the late or non-disclosure prejudiced 
the accused has been problematic.873   
In my view, the approach undertaken by the tribunals and the ICC judges in regard 
to violations of the disclosure of evidence infringes on equality of arms and certainly 
infringes upon the fair trial rights of the accused. We can learn from the approaches 
taken by the tribunals, however, a more stringent approach should be undertaken by 
the ICC judges. It is arguable, therefore, that the judges at the ICC should implement 
sanctions against prosecutors to ensure equity and fairness in proceedings for the 
accused to receive a fair trial at the ICC. 
In conclusion, Article 54(3)(e) should be tightened in terms of its application to only 
include instances where confidentiality agreements are necessary. This should further 
be confirmed by the chamber, through the judges, who should have the final say in 
respect of whether such confidentiality agreements are necessary or not. Sanctions 
should be imposed as opposed to stays of proceedings against prosecutors who fail 
to adhere to the rules of the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. In this way the fair 
trial rights of the accused and equality of arms would be protected. 
 
                                                          
871 Rule 68 bis Failure to Comply with Disclosure Obligations (adopted 13 Dec 2001) 
 The pre-trial Judge or the Trial Chamber may decide proprio motu, or at the request of either 
party, on sanctions to be imposed on a party which fails to perform its disclosure obligations 
pursuant to the Rules. 
872 ICC Article 71 - Sanctions for misconduct before the Court 
1. The Court may sanction persons present before it who commit misconduct, including 
disruption of its proceedings or deliberate refusal to comply with its directions, by 
administrative measures other than imprisonment, such as temporary or permanent 
removal from the courtroom, a fine or other similar measures provided for in the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. 
2. The procedures governing the imposition of the measures set forth in paragraph 1 shall 
be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 






7 4 Lessons on Katanga’s right to life 
Katanga represented a critical area of non-adherence to fair trial principles of the 
defendant, particularly considering the Court’s interpretation of Article 108874 of the 
Rome Statute. The prosecution of Mr Katanga in his home country would and does 
undermine his fair trial rights. Not only has he already been tried by the ICC (even 
though it was argued that it is not for the same offences, that still remains open to 
interpretation in my view) but he had also already served a lengthy sentence and more 
than that his life is at stake in a country that still has the death penalty. I find it 
remarkable and non-sensical, to say the least, that the ICC made this grave decision 
so lightly. At the very least, the ICC should have developed criteria to be used in future 
cases in deciding a matter of this magnitude. The criteria which I allude to should 
include whether the accused would be given a fair trial in his home country. This is not 
evident from the decision of the court at all.  
Chapter 1 set out the fair trial principles applicable to accused persons and 
specifically referred to the ICCPR and the ECHR, in both the general comments and 
guidelines, it was clear that international human rights law does not condone the 
current situation faced by Mr Katanga, as is evident from the Human Rights 
Committee: 
 
“Returning an individual to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
the individual faces a real risk of a severe violation of liberty or security of person such as 
prolonged arbitrary detention may amount to inhuman treatment prohibited by article 7 of 
the Covenant.875 
                                                          
874 Article 108 Limitation on the prosecution or punishment of other offences  
1. A sentenced person in the custody of the State of enforcement shall not be subject to 
prosecution or punishment or to extradition to a third State for any conduct engaged in prior 
to that person's delivery to the State of enforcement, unless such prosecution, punishment 
or extradition has been approved by the Court at the request of the State of enforcement.  
2. The Court shall decide the matter after having heard the views of the sentenced person. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 67  
3. Paragraph 1 shall cease to apply if the sentenced person remains voluntarily for more 
than 30 days in the territory of the State of enforcement after having served the full sentence 
imposed by the Court, or returns to the territory of that State after having left it. 
875 General Comment 35 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Distr.: General 
16 December 2014 Original: English Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 35 






7 4 1  Recommendations 
In the Katanga chapter of this dissertation, I referred to the Munyakazi case at the 
ICTR and the fact that the ICTR declined to refer the defendant back to Rwanda due 
to the potential of life imprisonment in isolation. In this case, the tribunal was not 
assured by Rwanda that the defendant would receive fair treatment and it was a big 
consideration by the judges. The applicable Rule which found application at the ICTR 
was Rule 11bis.876 
The Rome Statute contains no similar rule. However, it can be argued that in the 
Court’s interpretation and application of Article 108, particularly in light of the 
importance of such a decision for the accused, the Court was also bound by Article 
21(3) which clearly points to the fact that the court should have considered 
international law. If the court had done so and particularly looked at human rights and 
the fundamental right to life as well as the fair trial rights of the accused contained in 
Article 67 of the Rome Statute, the court may have arrived at a different conclusion.  
Secondly, the Rome Statute falls short in terms of not clearly articulating the criteria 
by which the court should be guided in making its decision.  
In sum, therefore, my argument has a few components:  
 
(i) First, the court should have considered international law in making its 
decision as this is clearly enunciated and offers the court direction in Article 
21(3).  
(ii) Secondly the court should have reviewed the work of the tribunals and the 
manner in which they made their decisions, particularly taking into account 
the fair trial rights of the defendant and refusing to allow the transfer of a 
case in instances where the accused would also not receive fair treatment. 
                                                          
876 Rule 11 bis (B) The Referral Bench may order such referral proprio motu or at the request 
of the Prosecutor, after having given to the Prosecutor and, where applicable, the accused, 
the opportunity to be heard and after being satisfied that the accused will receive a fair trial 
and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out. (Revised 30 Sept 2002, amended 







(iii) Thirdly, similar situations such as the one in Katanga should be prevented in 
the future as it is utterly and completely unfair for the accused to effectively 
be prosecuted twice.  
 
This situation could be averted by a revision of Article 108 of the Rome Statute to 
include criteria which would be used to guide the decision making of the judges in 
respect of the accused. Such criteria would include whether the accused would have 
his or her fair trial rights protected and whether the death penalty is imposed in the 
country to which he will be transferred. It is common cause that most international or 
bilateral agreements between countries in respect of extradition contain such 
guarantees.877 
Such criteria are simply not optional but should rather be mandatory in ensuring 
that the ICC is given the respect as an international criminal court as its duty is not 
only to end impunity but also to protect the rights of the accused.  In interpreting law 
and deciding on the fate of an accused, it is argued that the judges at the ICC need to 
inculcate a more consistent approach throughout all their cases and that they should 
lean more effectively on the work of the tribunals in determining difficult matters 
pertaining to the fair trial rights of the accused.  
In conclusion, therefore, Article 108 should be amended to include criteria as 
discussed above and the judges should be more consistent in their interpretation of 
the Articles of the Statute and also take account of the circumstances surrounding 
each case respectively but ultimately ensure that there is fairness in all proceedings 
and decisions of the court. 
 
7 5  Lessons from the acquittals of Bemba and Gbagbo and Ble Goude 
The key lessons from these acquittals were in respect of the confirmation of charges 
hearings and the accused’s right to be informed about the charges and to have legal 
certainty. Other rights of the accused that were of critical importance pertained to the 
accused’s rights to an expeditious trial, the inconsistent approaches of the court to ‘no 
case to answer’ motions as well as prosecutorial discretion. 
                                                          






7 5 1  Recommendations: Pre-Trial Chamber and Confirmation of Charges Hearings 
The confirmation hearings have a specific function at the ICC and is a new and 
innovative concept, which if utilised correctly can ensure the effective, smooth and 
expeditious trial process. However, to achieve this, it is recommended that: 
 
 Clear guidelines be developed in respect of the formulation of charges which 
should only focus on charges supported by reliable evidence; 
 Cumulative charges should be avoided, and Regulation 55 should be used only 
in exceptional cases; 
 The distinction between the role of the prosecutor and the judges should be 
clarified and a clear distinction should be drawn between the two to ensure that 
the prosecutor investigates cases which are only capable of successful 
convictions; 
 The judges should only confirm charges which will not result in the wrongful 
prosecution of suspects; 
 In instances where there is insufficient or unreliable evidence, the judges should 
decline to confirm charges instead of adjourning proceedings which result in 
undue delays for the defendant. 
 
7 5 2  Recommendations: Fair trial rights of the defendant 
The fair trial rights of the defendant should be of paramount importance in all 
proceedings before the court. This is particularly so in the following instances: 
 
 The principle of fair labelling should be adhered to by all chambers of the court, 
particularly in relation to the exact charges for which accused persons are 
convicted; 
 Command responsibility as a mode of liability should only be used when the 
prosecutor has sufficient evidence to support the elements necessary to prove 
this form of liability; and the principle of personal culpability should take 
precedence in determining whether or not to charge a defendant under Article 
28; 
 Regulation 55 (if it is to be retained) should be implemented with caution by the 





this fundamentally impacts on the accused’s fair trial rights to prepare an 
adequate defence; 
 Written and reasoned judgments should be delivered by the court to ensure that 
the accused understands the basis upon which his acquittal or conviction was 
determined but also to ensure that there are no untoward inferences drawn on 
the basis of an oral judgment, particularly in light of the divergent interests and 
expectations from different role-players who have an interest in the court. 
 
7 5 3  Recommendations: Defendant’s right to an expeditious trial  
 Mr Bemba was arrested in 2008 and released in 2018, which means he spent 
over 10 years in detention at the ICC for crimes that were never proven beyond 
reasonable doubt against him. The time between his arrest and the 
commencement of the trial amounted to two years which means that the Pre-
Trial Chamber took two years to confirm the charges against him.  
Mr Gbagbo was arrested in 2011 and released in 2019, which means he spent 
8 years in detention also for crimes that were never proven beyond reasonable 
doubt. There were five years between his arrest and the commencement of his 
trial at the ICC and the Pre-Trial Chamber took approximately five years to 
confirm the charges against him, based on insufficient evidence, to begin with. 
The length of Pre-Trial proceedings and trial proceedings needs to be reduced 
significantly, as the ICC procedures are negating the accused’s rights to an 
expeditious trial at the ICC. 
 The length of trial proceedings may be unnecessarily prolonged due to the 
extensive participation of victims. In Mr Bemba’s trial, over 5000 victims were 
allowed to participate and in Mr Gbagbo’s trial over 700 victims participated in 
the Pre-Trial Chamber. The participation of victims requires that extensive and 
time-consuming applications are being attended to by the court and victims are 
being allowed to participate at almost every stage of proceedings. The court 
has however tried to reduce the time taken by implementing the collective 
approach to victim participation. This approach may reduce the length of trials 
in the future. 
  A further argument is that victims should not be allowed to participate at a stage 





influence the manner in which the charges are formulated and confirmed in a 
Pre-Trial Chamber which is already struggling to comply with its mandate in 
terms of the Statute.  
 
7 5 4  Recommendations: No case to answer 
It is recommended that due to the fact that this motion is not contained in the 
Statute, that the Statute be amended to include such a motion which clearly sets out 
the manner and standard upon which the judges are to decide to either acquit the 
accused or continue with the trial. The inconsistent approaches currently being 
employed by the court concerning. The ICC needs to ensure that it develops clear 
jurisprudence to guide the work of the chambers on this matter. The inclusion of this 
motion in the Statute and through clear guidelines of the court will further serve to 
protect the fair trial rights of defendants who will clearly know how and at what stage 
to invoke such a motion, on what basis they are able to do so, the format for such a 
motion along with a clear standard of review which the judges will follow in making 
their decisions on such motions. This will ensure consistency and adherence to the 
principle of legality. 
 
7 5 5  Recommendations: Prosecutorial Discretion 
It is evident from the case law discussed in this dissertation that the discretion of 
the prosecutor in selecting cases, the potential outside influences on the selection of 
cases and the pressure to ensure a conviction all play a role in the manifestation of 
fair trial rights of the defendant.  
Mechanisms need to be put in place by the ICC to curb the discretionary powers of 
the various functionaries, especially the Prosecutor, as many of the subsequent 
problems encountered by the ICC, begins with the prosecutor’s selection, investigation 
of cases and formulation of charges.  
In the cases discussed the prosecutor relied on weak evidence, and the accused 
persons spent years in detention away from their families. Article 85 of the Rome 
Statute provides for compensation to accused persons for wrongful convictions and 
detentions and it is recommended that this be implemented by those acquitted of 
crimes against them, particularly in instances where they have been in detention for 





due to heinous crimes being committed during times of armed conflict, however, we 
fail to recognise that they are human, they have families and lives and if they have 
been wrongfully prosecuted surely, just as victims, they should receive reparations for 
their suffering. 
It is strongly recommended that the prosecutorial strategy for the selection and 
investigation of cases should be revisited but more than that, prosecutor’s should 
receive sanctions in these instances for their poor performance and the Pre-Trial 
Chamber needs to take a firmer stance in terms of only confirming charges, based on 
reliable evidence and according to the ‘substantial grounds to believe’ standard, not 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard which is reserved for the Trial Chamber. 
 
7 6  Lessons from Ntaganda and the principle of legal certainty 
The Ntaganda chapter significantly reviewed the principle of legality and the court’s 
interpretation of international human rights law in relation to legality. Particularly the 
ICTY had the following guidance in respect of the principle of legality: 
 
“But under no circumstances may the court create new criminal offences after the act 
charged against an accused either by giving a definition to a crime which had none so far, 
thereby rendering it prosecutable and punishable, or by criminalising an act which had not 
until the present time been regarded as criminal.”878 
 
7 6 1  Recommendations 
In the Ntaganda case, it is my view that the judges erred in terms of the 
interpretation of the crime. The importance of this case is the manner in which the 
judges disregarded the fundamental principle of legality. The principle of legality 
provides certainty for an accused person and this certainty provides a firm basis upon 
which an accused may prepare his or her defence. Nevertheless, the fundamental 
concept of equality of arms was infringed in the Ntaganda judgment as the judge’s 
interpretation placed the defence at an unfair disadvantage. In Ntaganda, the ICC 
interpreted IHL too broadly without taking the facts and circumstances of Mr 
Ntaganda’s specific case into account.  
                                                          





Therefore, in sum I am of the view that the critical and fundamental principles of 
criminal law were infringed by the chambers in the Ntaganda decisions in respect of 
jurisdiction. That the court’s reliance on IHL infringed on Mr Ntaganda’s right to know 
the case against him and the principle of legality. 
It was clear that the court relied heavily on teleological international law 
interpretation in determining the crime and did not strictly adhere to the principle of 
legality in coming to its conclusion because if it had interpreted the law in the strictest 
sense according to customary international criminal law and had also relied on 
previous case law of the tribunals as well as the ICC, it may have arrived at a different 
conclusion. 
Lastly, it is recommended that Article 70 prosecutions should be conducted by 
independent and separate prosecutors from the main case. Judicial economy is simply 
not a reason to continuously allow the same prosecutors to prosecute the main case 
as well as Article 70 proceedings. If this were to continue, a similar situation regarding 
the prosecutor’s access to confidential information may occur in future cases before 
the court and accused persons should be protected from this eventuality. A system of 
a clear delineation between cases should be adhered to by prosecutors working 
independently on the two distinct and separate cases against the same accused. 
Judges should conduct oversight over this process to ensure that the fair trial rights of 
the accused are protected. 
 
7 7 The dialectical tensions demystified 
Is the ICC a confused and conflicted Court in need of guidance? Is it a court to end 
impunity, one defending the fair trial rights of the accused or a court whose sole aim 
is to ensure that victims receive reparations? 
In Katanga we saw that the court did not utilise the opportunity to pronounce on the 
fair trial rights of the accused when it allowed Mr Katanga to be prosecuted after its 
Article 108 decision. In Bemba we saw an entirely different scenario, where the court 
found numerous errors and acquitted the accused. The most telling portion of the 







“What we do suggest is that we stop viewing the International Criminal Court’s reparation 
procedures as (part of) a mechanism to restore social justice and to heal the wounds of 
societies that have been torn apart by aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity or 
war crimes. Only if we do that will it be possible to manage victims’ expectations and can 
we relieve International Criminal Court prosecutors and judges from potential pressure that 
is currently imposed upon them to secure convictions at all cost.”879 
 
This paragraph illustrates the crux of the tension which the ICC experiences in 
respect of its role and competing interests within the international community. The 
different cases reviewed the various decisions taken by the court in relation to the 
participation of victims. The cases have demonstrated the extent to which the ICC has 
grappled with the role of victims and their participation in criminal proceedings.  
Chapter 1 and 2 expressly set out all the fair trial rights to which victims are entitled. 
The views of various authors have also been included to ensure that the tensions 
between the rights of the accused and the participation of victims are ventilated. The 
dissertation revealed that victims have equal rights to justice in the same way as the 
accused.  
However, the case law research further revealed that the ICC is grappling with 
ensuring the appropriate balance between the rights of the accused and the 
participation of victims in proceedings. It is for this reason, that the argument is made 
that the ICC should ensure a more effective method of the participation of victims in 
proceedings to ensure that the rights of the accused are upheld in all proceedings 
before the court but also to ensure that victims receive their rights to truth, justice and 
reparations. 
The ICC, in the first instance, is an international criminal court and it is grappling 
with the very noble aspirations that it seeks to achieve; those being ensuring that the 
fair trial rights of the accused are upheld, that victim participation is meaningful and 
that ending impunity is a reality for international communities. It is for this reason that 
the following recommendations are made: 
 
(i) The court moves towards a point of becoming clearer about its role in relation 
to the competing interests of all parties; 
                                                          





(ii) That the ICC and the Assembly of States Parties reach consensus on the 
impact it wishes to make within the context of balancing the political arena 
and ending impunity for crimes against humanity; 
(iii) That the ICC, and particularly the prosecutor, reviews the manner in which it 
conducts investigations and relates to victims in the context of African 
countries, taking into account the particular context of the countries in which 
investigations are initiated and the needs and interests of the victims in those 
countries. In particular, reviewing the best possible way to obtain evidence 
and to represent victims in African countries with a view to also engaging in 
outreach activities in a more substantive and nuanced manner; and 
(iv) That the ICC institutionalises a practice of reform within African countries, by 
advocating for those countries who are not parties to international human 
rights agreements to become parties thereto and to implement legislative 
reform to address potential gaps to ensure fair trial practices are upheld and 
fair treatment is adhered to. 
 
In conclusion, the dissertation revealed the very real conflicting interests confronting 
the ICC, however, the main function and purpose of the court are primarily to ensure 
the convictions of those accused of crimes against humanity. By focusing on this 
objective primarily, the court will as a consequence ensure that the needs of victims 
and the international community are met. 
 
7 8 Limitations of study and recommendations for future research 
The focus of this study was on the fair trial rights of the accused as viewed through 
the legal and factual matrixes of six cases; Lubanga, Katanga, Bemba, Gbagbo and 
Ble Goude and Ntaganda. Since its inception in 2002 however, the ICC has only dealt 
with 26 cases of which six have been closed.  
A key limitation of this dissertation is therefore that only six cases were analysed 
and this was done primarily with a view to investigating whether or not the ICC had 
conducted fair trials towards defendants, also taking into account the participation of 
victims and the international community. Even so, principles are not about raw 





The numerical limitation, however, presents an opportunity for further research in 
the future particularly in respect of the following key areas identified by this 
dissertation: 
 
(i) The amendment of Regulation 55; 
(ii) Further research into complementarity and Article 108, particularly in light of 
the right to life of defendants; 
(iii) The role and function of the prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
confirmation of charges against defendants; 
(iv) Insertion of an Article in the Statute on ‘no case to answer’ motions; 
(v) The appointment of an independent prosecutorial team in Article 70 
investigations and 
(vi) A revision of certain Articles and Rules of the Rome Statute, particularly in 
relation to the wide discretion given to the prosecutor and sanctions which 
should be imposed against the prosecutor in actions which serve to subvert 
the proper functioning of the court.  
(vii) Furthermore, in-depth research on the actual experiences of victim’s who have 
participated in the ICC trials, focusing on whether their experiences within the 
ICC trials has contributed to their rights to truth, justice and reparations; and 
(viii) Further detailed research into the political influences which potentially impact 
the ICC. 
 
7 9 Concluding remarks 
The ICC has been given a huge challenge to try those accused of the most heinous 
crimes, to end impunity and also to ensure the participation of victims. It comes as no 
surprise that the ICC has received much criticism, particularly from African countries. 
As to date, the ICC has tried and convicted accused persons from African countries 
only. South Africa for one has stated that it wishes to withdraw from the ICC.880  
                                                          
880 As of date the latest South African withdrawal bill, in the form of the International Crimes 
Bill, is still in bill form and in the various legislative and committee phases. It is not clear when, 





The ICC case law reflects the many challenges still encountered by this court 
struggling with defining its role and finding credibility within the international 
community. 
However, there are judges at the court who have come out quite clearly in favour of 
protecting the rights of the accused. This, however, is insufficient as the Rome Statute 
and its Rules need to be applied consistently in all cases. In the future, the court has 
an important decision to make in terms of its identity and its consistent application of 
the law.  
The Rome Statute as the founding instrument of the ICC projects the ICC (wrongly) 
as primarily a human rights court with a broad mandate to end impunity and enhance 
world peace. In reality, the ICC is, of course, a criminal court with one paramount task: 
to determine, via fair criminal trials, whether accused persons are guilty of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC. More emphasis or at least a balanced approach 
should be applied between the interests of victims and those of the accused. In many 
instances (as illustrated in this dissertation) the court has unfortunately not succeeded 
in protecting the fair trial rights of the accused nor ensured that there is equality of 
arms within trial proceedings.   
Contradictions and tensions, in the dialectical sense, can be healthy. Law is not an 
exact science and competing interests, interpretation, consideration, reflection and 
reform are all tools and dispositions that can help to achieve justice for both the 
perpetrator and the victim of crime. The criticisms and proposals for reform put forward 
in this dissertation should, therefore, be seen as an attempt to make the ICC a better 
institution; a legal and institutional role-player in the international criminal justice 
project that will not collapse under its own contradictions, but that will find synthesis in 
a narrow, precise and fair construction of its role as the eminent tribunal where those 
accused of the most serious crimes under international law can face justice in which 
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